Learning from medication errors through a nationwide reporting programme by Cheung, K.C.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/139519
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Learning from medication 
errors through a nationwide 
reporting programme
Ka-Chun Cheung
 
 
 
 
 
Learning from medication errors through 
a nationwide reporting programme  
 
 
 
 
 
 
For reasons of consistency within this thesis, some terms have been standardized throughout the text. As 
a consequence the text may differ in this respect from the articles that have been published. 
 
The studies presented in this thesis have been performed at the Scientific Institute for Quality in 
Healthcare and Department of Clinical Pharmacy, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen. The 
Scientific Institute for Quality in Healthcare is part of the Radboud Institute Health Science (RIHS), one of 
the approved research institutes of the Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen. 
 
The research presented in this thesis was financially supported by the Royal Dutch Pharmacists 
Association (KNMP). 
 
Financial support for publication of this thesis was provided by Stichting KNMP-fondsen, Dutch Kidney 
Foundation (Nierstichting), Stichting Portaal voor Patiëntveiligheid - Centrale Medicatie incidenten 
Registratie (CMR) and Nederlands Bijwerkingen Fonds, and is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
ISBN: 978-94-6279-888-5 
 
Nijmegen, 2015 
 
Copyrights: 
Chapter 2:  The British Pharmacological Society 
Chapter 3:  Elsevier Ltd. 
Chapter 4:  Springer International Publishing Switzerland 
Chapters 5, 6 and 9: BMJ Publishing Group Limited 
Chapter 8:  Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 
 
Cover:   1) Following the track of a medication error is like finding your way 
through a labyrinth. The CMR can provide us insight into the nature, 
causes, consequences, outcomes and risk factors. 
   2) A patient can experience the treatment of an illness as a labyrinth 
and the pharmacist has a role as healthcare provider to guide the 
patient in getting well again.   
Cover design: Jaap Snijder 
Lay-out: Jolanda van Haren 
Translation abstract in Chinese:  Joanne Ho, Hong Kong 
Print:  GVO drukkers en vormgevers B.V. | Ponsen & Looijen, Ede 
 
© 2015 Ka-Chun Cheung 
For articles published, the copyright has been transferred to the respective publisher. No part of this 
thesis may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form of by any means 
without the permission of the author or, when appropriate, the publisher of the manuscript. 
 
 
 
 
Learning from medication errors through 
a nationwide reporting programme  
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. Th.L.M. Engelen, 
volgens besluit van het college van decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 17 april 2015  
om 12.30 uur precies 
 
 
 
 
door Ka Chun Cheung 
 
 
 
 
 
geboren op 18 februari 1978 
te Roosendaal en Nispen 
  
Promotoren:  Prof. dr. P.A.G.M. de Smet 
 Prof. dr. M.J.P. Wensing 
Prof. dr. M.L. Bouvy (Universiteit Utrecht) 
 
Copromotor:  Dr. P.M.L.A. van den Bemt (Erasmus MC) 
 
 
Manuscriptcommissie: Prof. dr. W.J.J. Assendelft 
 Prof. dr. C. Wagner (VUmc) 
Prof. dr. H.G.M. Leufkens (Universiteit Utrecht) 
 
Contents 
 
Chapter Title Page
Chapter 1 Introduction 7
Section I The input for the CMR 21
Chapter 2 Medication errors: the importance of safe dispensing
Br J Clin Pharmacol 2009;67(6):676-80 
23
Chapter 3 Improving European cooperation on medication errors
Lancet 2014;383(9924):1209-10 
35
Chapter 4 Relevance of foreign alerts and newsletters for the medication errors 
reporting programme in The Netherlands: an explorative retrospective 
study 
Drug Safety 2014;37(11):981-87 
41
Section II The basic functioning of the CMR as a reporting system including 
analysis of reports 
59
Chapter 5 A nationwide medication errors reporting system in The Netherlands 
J Am Med Inform Assoc 2011;18(6):799-804 
61
Chapter 6 Classification of medication errors associated with information technology 
J Am Med Inform Assoc 2014;21(e1):e63-e70 
83
Chapter 7 Medication errors related to automated dose dispensing in community 
pharmacies and hospitals: a reporting system study 
PLoS One 2014;9(7):e101686 
111
Section III The output of the CMR 129
Chapter 8 Erroneous exchange of asparaginase forms in the treatment of acute 
lymphoblastic leukemia 
J Pediatr Hermatol Oncol 2011;33(3):e109-13 
131
Chapter 9 Self-reported uptake of recommendations after dissemination of 
medication error alerts 
BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21(12:1009-1018 
141
Chapter 10 General discussion 159
 Summary 175
 Samenvatting 185
 總結 195
 Nawoord 205
 About the author 213
  
 
 Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
Learning from medication errors through a nationwide reporting programme 
8 
PATIENT SAFETY 
Patient safety became an important issue in healthcare, particularly after the publication of the 
report ‘To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System’ by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in the 
United States in 1999.1 This report made the general public, healthcare policy makers and 
healthcare providers aware that targeted actions are needed to increase patient safety. The 
report placed patient safety high on the healthcare agenda. In October 2004, the WHO (World 
Health Organisation) launched the World Alliance for Patient Safety.2 Several interventions were 
started to improve the safety of patients.3,4 For instance, the WHO Collaboration Centre for 
Patient Safety invested with several countries in projects about managing concentrated 
injectable medicines, assuring medication accuracy at transitions in care and performance of the 
correct procedure at the correct body site.5,6 A range of other strategies and policies has been 
developed with the intention to enhance patient safety.7,8 
In 2005, the European Union adopted a declaration on patient safety stating: “The health sector 
should be designed in a way that errors and adverse events are prevented, detected or contained 
so that serious errors are avoided. Risk management must be introduced as a routine instrument 
within the running of the entire health sector. A precondition for risk management is an open 
and trusting working environment, combined with a culture that focuses on learning from near 
misses and adverse events as opposed to concentrating on ‘blame and shame’ and subsequent 
punishment”.9,10 
Patient safety has also gained increased attention in Dutch healthcare. For instance, a 
retrospective study of Dutch inpatient records from 2004 showed that adverse events (AEs) 
occurred in 5.7% of hospitalized patients and preventable AEs in 2.3%. Medication errors were 
the third leading cause of AEs (15.3%).11 The Dutch Hospital Admissions Related to Medication 
(HARM) study found that 5.6% of unplanned hospitalisations were medication-related and that 
almost half of these (46.5%) were potentially preventable.12 
 
MEDICATION ERRORS 
Within the patient safety theme medication-related errors play a key role. The relationships 
between adverse events (AEs), adverse drug events (ADEs), adverse drug reactions (ADRs), and 
medication errors (MEs) have been discussed by various authors and several definitions exist, 
which entail a risk of confusion every time these terms are used without defining them 
explicitly.13,14 For this thesis we follow the definitions by Aronson and Ferner.15 They describe an 
adverse event as any abnormal sign, symptom, laboratory test, syndromic combination of such 
abnormalities, untoward or unplanned occurrence (e.g. an accident or unplanned pregnancy), or 
any unexpected deterioration in a concurrent illness.15 They define an adverse drug event as an 
adverse event that occurs while a patient is taking a drug or at some time afterwards, but that 
may or may not be attributable to it.15 Both adverse drug reactions and medication errors belong 
to the domain of ADEs. Aronson and Ferner consider them as different in more than one respect 
and present a Venn diagram to show their view on the relationship between adverse events, 
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adverse drug events, adverse drug reactions, and medication errors (see figure 1). A medication 
error can occur at any stage of the treatment process: from prescribing to dispensing and 
compounding and eventually to the administration of a medicine and monitoring of its effect.16 
Another term for medication error is medication incident and both terms are used 
interchangeably. In this thesis we use the term medication error. Examples are given below to 
illustrate possible medication errors in the different stages of the medication process: 
• In the prescribing phase the physician unintentionally selects a wrong medicine in the 
computerized prescriber order entry system because the items are next to each other on the 
screen. 
• In the phase of entering of prescriptions into the pharmacy information system the pharmacist 
enters ‘CHLO25’ into the pharmacy computer system and accidentally selects chlortalidone 
25 mg instead of chlordiazepoxide 25 mg on the screen.  
• In the dispensing phase the pharmacy assistant takes the wrong medicine package from the 
cabinet due to look alike packages and dispenses the wrong medicine to the patient.  
• In the administration phase a nurse administers undiluted potassium sodium-phosphate 
concentrate intravenously to the patient, which rapidly leads to a fatal cardiac arrest. 
• In the monitoring phase blood is withdrawn from a patient who was administered gentamicin. 
Results of the laboratory research are entered into the hospital system but the physician is 
distracted and does not review these results. The patient receives a next dose of gentamicin 
which is too high.  
• A near miss medication error: In the operating room the nurse hands over a different 
medicine and the anaesthesiologist discovers this mistake by checking the name label. The 
nurse corrects this mistake and the patient receives the correct medicine.  
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Figure 1. A Venn diagram showing the relation between adverse events, adverse drug events, adverse drug 
reactions, and medication errors as defined by Aronson and Ferner.15  
 
 
 
 
Examples of the categories in the Venn diagram: 
1: A patient is using naproxen and suddenly fractures his arm during a soccer game. 
2:  A patient is using naproxen and omeprazole with the correct dosing, despite the use of a gastro-protective 
medicine the patient gets gastric haemorrhage. 
3:  A patient is using naproxen and both physician and pharmacist forget to add a gastro-protective medicine. After a 
few weeks the patient is admitted in the hospital with a gastric haemorrhage. 
4:  A patient does not finish the treatment of flucloxacillin due to poor counselling. The patient relapses in the 
infection.  
5:  A patient is using naproxen and both physician and pharmacist forget to add a gastro-protective medicine, but 
the patient does not get a gastric haemorrhage. 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
11 
DETECTION OF MEDICATION ERRORS  
The challenge of detecting medication errors is in many ways comparable to the detection of 
adverse drug reactions by pharmacovigilance centres. Several decades of experience with the 
detection of adverse drug reactions may thus be considered when setting up detection methods 
for medication errors. Detection of adverse drug reactions can be done in several ways. 
Healthcare providers can spontaneously report observations of suspected adverse drug 
reactions. In other industries, such as civil aviation and the petroleum industry, spontaneous 
error reporting is also an important strategy to enhance safety.17 Beside spontaneous reporting 
systems, other detection methods are available such as chart review, computerized screening, 
reviewing administrative databases and claims data, and interviewing patients and healthcare 
providers.18-21  
 
PHARMACOVIGILANCE SYSTEMS 
Spontaneous reporting systems for adverse drug reactions (ADRs) were first established in the 
1960s in response to the thalidomide tragedy.22,23 The first systems collected many cases of 
suspected adverse drug reactions. In the 1980s several methods were created to assess the 
causality between drug exposure and adverse events. In the 1990s a main focus was 
underreporting and, when higher numbers of reports became available, data mining tools were 
developed to identify alerts or to verify potential alerts.22 
Nowadays all countries have national pharmacovigilance systems which rely heavily on voluntary 
reporting of suspected adverse drug reactions are by healthcare providers.24 National 
pharmacovigilance centres send their adverse drug reaction reports to the WHO Uppsala 
Monitoring Centre, where they are processed, evaluated and entered into a global database 
called VigibaseTM.25,26 
An important advantage of spontaneous reporting to pharmacovigilance centres is the relatively 
low costs for maintaining the reporting system. Another advantage is that a reporting 
programme can involve large numbers of healthcare providers. Furthermore it is an efficient way 
to collect large numbers of potential cases.  
Nevertheless, current pharmacovigilance reporting programmes have a number of limitations. 
Despite the large numbers of reports underreporting is a common issue and it can be hard to 
motivate healthcare providers to report adverse drug reactions. In The Netherlands healthcare 
providers and patients can use the pharmacovigilance database to consult summarized reports 
about adverse drug reactions, but many adverse drug reactions reporting programmes elsewhere 
do not yet offer this possibility. Last but not least there may be too little time for analysing 
incoming reports of adverse drug reactions.27 According to Stricker et al most pharmacovigilance 
monitoring centres work in isolated non-academic environments, are often understaffed and 
have all kinds of responsibilities for regulations related to the registration of medicines.27 
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REPORTING: MEDICATION ERRORS VERSUS ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS 
Although pharmacovigilance centres have many years of experience in maintaining reporting 
programmes for adverse drug reactions, this does not automatically mean that they also 
systematically collect and analyse medication errors. Despite the overlap between adverse drug 
reactions and medication errors (see figure 1), there are also differences. An adverse drug 
reaction is always directly related to the pharmacological characteristics of the medicine. In a 
medication error a medicine is always involved, but the medicine is not always causing the error 
or the causes cannot always be traced back to the characteristics of the medicine. A medication 
error is mostly related to underlying system problems rather than related only to individual 
mistakes.28 The root cause of a medication error is often more complex due to the relations with 
the work process and/or handling of healthcare providers. These work processes and handling 
can also lead to or contribute to the occurrence of medication errors. The root cause analysis of a 
medication error is often different from the causality assessment of an adverse drug reaction, 
because the former focuses on underlying human and organisational causes, while the latter 
focuses on the pharmacology of the drug. Another characteristic of medication errors is that 
some medication errors imply risk, but occur without any actual harm to the patient. In a 
reporting programme for adverse drug reactions healthcare providers will only report when they 
have noticed harm to patients. Furthermore, the recommendations related to adverse drug 
reactions and medication errors are different. For adverse drug reactions the most common 
recommendations are to withdraw the medicine or to adapt the Summary of Product 
Characteristics (SPC). In contrast, recommendations concerning medication errors are more 
extensive and related to the medication process, work process and/or handling by healthcare 
providers. In other words, these differences can complicate efforts to broaden the focus of 
existing pharmacovigilance reporting programmes to include the whole spectre of medication 
errors.  
 
Table 1. Comparison of medication errors and adverse drug reactions as defined by Aronson and Ferner.15 
 
Characteristic Medication error Adverse drug reaction 
Product involved Medicine and/or device necessary to 
administer a medicine 
Medicine 
Harm Actual or potential harm to the patient Actual harm to the patient 
Causality Related to human and/or organisational 
causes 
Always related to pharmacological 
characteristics of the medicine 
Recommendations Recommendations relate to the medication 
process, work process and/or handling of 
healthcare providers 
Withdrawing the medicine or adapting 
(e.g. reducing the dosage, adding a 
protective medicine) the Summary of 
Product Characteristics (SPC) 
 
Reporting medication errors  
Reporting medication errors helps healthcare providers to become more aware of risk taking 
behaviour and actual errors in their own daily practice and to learn from their own errors. 
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Individual healthcare providers need to recognise and analyse medication errors to retrieve 
causes, to obtain insight into the risk of the medication process, and to share their experiences 
with other healthcare providers in their own organisation (e.g. hospital) and in their own country. 
Local and national reporting programmes can facilitate learning from medication errors by 
providing information on types of errors, causes and risks, and preventive actions in healthcare 
organisations and systems.29-34 Such information about the risks and underlying causes helps 
healthcare providers and regulators to prioritize which safety issues most urgently require 
preventive measures to prevent repetition or new errors. 
Several national reporting programmes for medication errors have been established which 
comprise both obligatory and voluntary systems.35-37 In the obligatory programmes healthcare 
providers are required to report errors, which are mostly restricted to errors with serious harm 
or death to the patient. Near misses and errors with less serious or no harm to the patient can 
also be reported to voluntary reporting programmes.32 A further distinction is that between local 
and national programmes. A local reporting programme can be available in one healthcare 
organisation such as a hospital or it can be established regionally by several collaborating 
healthcare organisations. Different local reporting programmes can be connected to a national 
reporting programme, but individual healthcare providers can also report directly to the national 
reporting programme. 
 
NATIONAL REPORTING PROGRAMMES FOR MEDICATION ERRORS 
Currently a few national reporting programmes exist, which collect all kinds of adverse events. In 
these programmes, medication errors comprise one of the largest categories of adverse events. 
For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK) this is the second largest category in the National 
Reporting Learning System (NRLS), the largest category being patient accidents.38 In the Danish 
Patient Safety Database medication errors are by far the most commonly reported category.9 
In the United States (US) the Institute for Safe Medication Practice (ISMP) was in 1975 the first 
safety agency to set up a specific national reporting programme for medication errors.39,40 Many 
other countries have followed since then.41-43 In 2006 some of these countries established an 
international network for medication safety called International Medication Safety Network 
(IMSN). Currently IMSN has 26 country members.44 One of the countries is The Netherlands with 
a nationwide Central Medication incidents Registration (CMR) for hospitals, community 
pharmacies and mental healthcare organisations. 
 
CENTRAL MEDICATION INCIDENTS REGISTRATION 
In The Netherlands hospitals were the first healthcare organisations to start local reporting 
programmes in hospitals for all kinds of adverse events. Hospitals also set up special committees 
to analyse the reported errors and to disseminate recommendations to the healthcare 
professionals and wards within the hospital. In 2006, the Dutch Association of Hospital 
Pharmacists established a national reporting programme, called Central Medication incidents 
1
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Registration (CMR). From that year on, hospital pharmacists could send medication errors to the 
CMR, which were derived from the local reporting programmes. In this system, the participating 
hospitals shared their medication errors with other hospitals in The Netherlands. In 2010, the 
CMR was technically adapted and community pharmacies and mental healthcare organisations 
started to participate in the CMR as well. Today, the CMR screens, analyses and evaluates the 
reported medication errors and if necessary (because there is a high risk of recurrence, high 
educational potential for other healthcare providers, and/or a high risk of serious harm to the 
patient) an alert is disseminated. The support staff at the CMR organisation currently consists of 
a clinical pharmacologist, a former community pharmacist, a former hospital pharmacist, two 
other pharmacists, a physician, a pharmacy technician, and a nurse. Alerts consist of a description 
of the reported medication error together with concrete recommendations to prevent 
recurrence. Less urgent but relevant matters are communicated through a periodical electronic 
newsletter. 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Overall the attention to patient safety, risk management, and reporting errors started to rise in 
1999 with the Institute of Medicine’s report ‘To Err is Human: Building a safer Health System’. 
Only a few research papers about reporting adverse events had been published earlier than 
1999. One of the first publications about error reporting by nurses was in 1960 by Safren and 
Chapanis.45,46 Different medical specialists such as psychiatric and radiology developed reporting 
programmes in the seventies and eighties.47-49 Way et al published a pilot study about an error 
reporting system in 1985 to reduce paperwork and staff time for healthcare providers in three 
psychiatric centres.48 Instead of a paper reporting system a computer was used and more errors 
were being reported, a record was available on wards for review, and staff was enthusiastic 
about the new reporting system via computers.48 
So far, most studies have investigated batches of reports that concerned one ward, one hospital 
or were related to one medical specialty.48-54 Some of these studies focused on medication 
errors, but again from one ward or hospital or only a few hospitals.54,55 Reported errors mainly 
remained within the walls of the healthcare organisation (e.g. hospital) itself. Research focusing 
on the role of a nationwide reporting programme for medication errors in clinical practice is 
mostly lacking.  
 
AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis aims to explore the usefulness of national medication error reporting systems in the 
context of clinical practice, using the Dutch CMR as an example. The CMR is a tool for practising 
healthcare providers to prevent errors and to ensure a safer practice for patients. Figure 2 shows 
the CMR in the perspective of healthcare practice including an overview of studies. The CMR as a 
tool is dependent on input from clinical practice, especially in the form of medication errors 
reports by healthcare professionals. 
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In the second step the CMR analyses the reports to draw lessons for other healthcare providers 
to prevent recurrence. Thereafter the CMR disseminates output like newsletters and alerts with 
recommendations to warn healthcare providers on specific risks. This thesis consists of three 
related sections: the first focuses on the input for the CMR, the second on the basic functioning 
of the CMR as a reporting system including analysis of reports, and the third consists of studies 
about the output of the CMR. 
 
The specific objectives of the research in this thesis are: 
1. To explore the potential role of scientific literature as input for the CMR. A narrative review 
provides insight into the subject of dispensing errors, in order to support clarify and extend 
the CMR reports about dispensing errors. 
2. To explore to which extent alerts and newsletters about medication errors issued in one 
country could be relevant as input for other countries. More specifically, we compare the 
output (disseminated information items: alerts and newsletters) from three major national 
programmes in Canada, USA, and UK with the input (reported medication errors) and output 
(disseminated information items: alerts and newsletters) of the Dutch national reporting 
programme Central Medication incidents Registration. 
3. To describe the nationwide Central Medication incidents Registration’s structure and 
performance and to compare these with other nationwide incident reporting programmes. 
4. To identify the nature and consequences of a large sample of IT-related medication errors, as 
reported by Dutch healthcare professionals in community pharmacies and hospitals, using a 
structured framework. 
5. To identify the nature and consequences of medication errors related to automated dose 
dispensing, as reported by healthcare professionals in community pharmacies and hospitals. 
6. To assess the degree of uptake within the Netherlands of the recommendations that were 
issued in three medication safety alerts and to identify potential determinants associated with 
successful uptake. 
 
In the first section two types of input are discussed. Chapter 2 reviews the scientific literature 
about dispensing errors, which is one of the six main categories of errors in the medication 
process starting from prescribing to administration. Chapter 3 arguments the need for exchange 
of alerts between national centres for medication errors. With a striking medication error with 
Jevtana® we provide a compelling argument for making better mutual use of warnings issued by 
national centres for medication errors. In chapter 4 we explore to which extent the output of 
sister organisations in other countries could be relevant as input for the Dutch CMR. More 
specifically, we compare a certain number of output items (alerts and newsletters) from three 
major foreign programmes (ISMP-Canada, ISMP-USA, NRLS-UK) with the input (reported 
medication errors) and output (disseminated alerts and newsletters) of the Dutch national 
reporting programme (CMR-NL).  
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Section II consists of three studies about the basic functioning of the CMR as a reporting system 
and analysis of reports. In chapter 5 the characteristics and basic functioning of the CMR 
reporting programme are described and briefly compared with other nationwide reporting 
programmes. In chapter 6 we analyse the nature and consequences of a large sample of IT-
related medication errors, as reported by Dutch healthcare professionals in community 
pharmacies and hospitals, using the most recently adapted version of the classification of 
Magrabi et al.43,56 Chapter 7 provides insight into the nature and consequences of medication 
errors related to automated dose dispensing, as reported by healthcare professionals in 
community pharmacies and hospitals. 
Section III consists of two studies about the output from the CMR. Chapter 8 explores how a 
single medication error can be transformed into a scientific case report. In chapter 9 we look at 
how healthcare professionals handles the recommendations which were are disseminated by the 
CMR. This study explores the degree of self-reported uptake of the recommendations and 
identifies potential determinants associated with successful uptake. 
1 
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ABSTRACT 
Although rates of dispensing errors are generally low, further improvements in pharmacy 
distribution systems are still important because pharmacies dispense such high volumes of 
medications that even a low error rate can translate into a large number of errors. 
From the perspective of pharmacy organisation and quality assurance, pharmacists should 
intensify their checking of prescriptions, in order to reduce prescription errors, and should 
implement strategies to communicate adequately with patients, in order to prevent 
administration errors. More and better studies are still needed in these areas. 
More research is also required into: dispensing errors in out-patient health-care settings, such as 
community pharmacies in the USA and Europe; dispensing errors in hospitals and out-patient 
healthcare settings in middle- and low-income countries; and the underlying causes of dispensing 
errors. 
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Six main types of medication error can occur in the chain of pharmacological and pharmaceutical 
patient care: prescribing errors, prescription errors, transcription errors, dispensing errors, 
administration errors, and ‘across settings’ errors.1 In this article we focus on dispensing errors. 
 
DEFINITION OF A DISPENSING ERROR 
A dispensing error is a discrepancy between a prescription and the medicine that the pharmacy 
delivers to the patient or distributes to the ward on the basis of this prescription, including the 
dispensing of a medicine with inferior pharmaceutical or informational quality.1-6 
 
CATEGORIES OF DISPENSING ERROR 
Table 1 shows the categories of dispensing errors.1-3,6,7 If dispensing errors are considered from 
the perspective that the quality of all pharmacy care activities should be assured by the 
pharmacist, this list can be extended by the addition of three other categories: failure to detect 
and correct a prescribing error before dispensing; failure to detect a manufacturing error before 
dispensing; and failure to provide adequate patient counselling in order to prevent 
administration errors. These categories arise in other segments of the pharmaceutical patient 
care chain, but they are nevertheless important when one strives for a full assessment of the 
pharmacy’s performance.8,9 
 
Table 1.  Categories of dispensing errors. 
 
Dispensing medicine for the wrong patient (or to the wrong ward)
Dispensing the wrong medicine 
Dispensing the wrong drug strength 
Dispensing at the wrong time 
Dispensing the wrong quantity 
Dispensing the wrong dosage form 
Dispensing an expired or almost expired medicine 
Omission (e.g. failure to dispense)  
Dispensing a medicine of inferior quality (pharmaceutical companies) 
Dispensing an incorrect compounded medicine (compounding in pharmacy) 
Dispensing with the wrong information on the label  
Incorrect patient name 
Incorrect drug name 
Incorrect drug strength 
Incorrect instruction (including incorrect dosage) 
Incorrect drug quantity 
Incorrect dosage form 
Incorrect expiry date 
Omission of additional warning(s) 
Incorrect pharmacy address 
Other labelling errors  
Dispensing with the wrong verbal information to the patient or representative 
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RECENT STUDIES OF DISPENSING ERRORS 
We searched Pubmed on-line using the keywords ‘dispensing errors’ and related search terms. 
We also searched manually for related articles in the reference lists of the studies we retrieved 
and selected. We used only studies that were published in English after 2003. 
 
Nature and frequency of dispensing errors 
Table 2 shows the rates of dispensing errors and different subtypes of dispensing errors.2-4,6,7,10–16 
The rates of dispensing errors were 0–45%. The highest rates of dispensing errors were in studies 
in which a researcher observed the dispensing process or checked and compared the dispensed 
medicines against the relevant prescriptions. 
Some studies used a self-reporting system to count the number of dispensing errors. These 
studies did not produce any error rates, because the total number of dispensed medicines was 
unknown, owing to the use of a reporting system that only counted the number of dispensing 
errors without measuring a denominator.12,13 
 
Underlying causes of dispensing errors 
Causes of dispensing errors can be traced by root-cause analysis or by eliciting explanations by 
practising pharmacists by means of a survey. Root-cause analysis comes closer to reality, because 
a survey measures only the perceptions and opinions of pharmacists. An example of the former 
type was a study in a UK hospital in which the researchers used semistructured interviews of 
pharmacy staff about self-reported dispensing errors.2 In all, 106 error-producing conditions 
were mentioned in the interviews. The most common causes mentioned were: being busy (21%), 
being short-staffed (12%), being subject to time constraints (11%), fatigue of healthcare providers 
(11%), interruptions during dispensing (9.4%), and look-alike/sound-alike medicines (8.5%). 
In a Danish study a research team analysed self-reports of community pharmacies to identify the 
causes of dispensing errors.17 The research team identified four causes: poor, often unreadable, 
handwriting; ‘traps’ (look-alike and sound-alike medications); lack of effective controls; and lack 
of concentration caused by interruptions.  
In a Finnish study a survey questionnaire was used to elicit pharmacists’ perceptions and 
opinions.18 There were five main categories of potential causes. The first was related to 
organisation (37% of all potential causes given). The other categories were: individual 
professionals (30%), prescriptions (17%), drugs (10%), and problems with customers (4%). 
Examples of the last were talkative customers, conversations with customers, customers with 
many prescriptions, and customers in a hurry. 
Two studies have investigated the potential causes of failure to detect and prevent drug-drug 
interaction problems during dispensing. In the first study the researchers calculated the 
dispensing ratios for 11 undesirable drug-drug interactions in 256 Dutch community pharmacies; 
only one of these was significantly related to determinants – the type of medication surveillance 
system and whether the pharmacy was part of a healthcare centre.19 The second study was 
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performed in the USA and evaluated the relations between handling 25 potential drug-drug 
interactions and the operational characteristics of community pharmacies; the risk of dispensing 
drugs with potential drug-drug interactions was significantly related to pharmacist workload, 
overall pharmacy workload, and automated telephone systems for prescription orders.20 
 
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Over the years, pharmacies have introduced several methods and strategies to reduce dispensing 
errors, depending on the different working phases of the pharmacies in the medication process 
and the development of information technologies.21-25 
We have found only four studies of the effects of these strategies. In the first, the rate of 
dispensing errors in a US hospital fell from 0.19 to 0.07% by the use of a bar-code system; in a 
cost-benefit analysis the break-even point for return on investment was during the first quarter 
of the fourth year.5 In another hospital study the use of two different dispensing processes using 
a bar-code system was examined: a carousel fill process, which dispensed compact and non 
refrigeration-requiring forms of commonly used medications into semi automated medication 
cabinets; and a 2-day fill process, in which less commonly used medications were stocked 
manually on shelves and retrieved by hand during the filling step.23 The carousel fill process 
reduced the rate of dispensing errors from 0.25 to 0.018% and the second process reduced it 
from 0.71 to 0.026%. 
In a third study a hospital implemented an automated pharmacy carousel system, consisting of 
bar-coded medication bins, a bar-code scanner, a label printer, and software that allowed the 
carousel system to interface with the hospital’s pharmacy information system.24 The researchers 
investigated the rates of dispensing errors and incorrectly filled orders of three dispensing 
processes, but did not perform statistical analyses. The first process dispensed the first doses for 
new patient-specific medication orders, which were not readily available from automated 
dispensing cabinets on patient care units. The missing prescription requests were faxed to the 
pharmacy and the orders were in a similar manner. Once filled, medication orders were verified 
by pharmacists before transport. In this process the rate of incorrectly filled orders increased 
from 2.1 to 2.3%. The rate of dispensing errors increased from 0.5 to 1.2%. The second 
dispensing process was an automated dispensing cabinet fill. The rate of incorrectly filled orders 
fell from 1.6 to 0.6%. In a repeat measurement the rate fell further to 0.4%. The rate of 
dispensing errors fell from 0.4 to 0.2% and in the last measurement to 0.3%. The third process 
was an interdepartmental request fill. In this process the medication orders came from clinics 
affiliated to the hospital, such as ophthalmology, pain, neurology, and pathology and the cancer 
centre. No dispensing errors were found in 123 clinic orders (6,006 doses) before implementation 
of the automated pharmacy carousel system. One dispensing error involving a quantity 
discrepancy was identified out of 85 clinic orders (3,505 doses) after installation of the 
automated pharmacy carousel system. For this process, only dispensing errors were recorded, 
because interdepartmental requests were filled sporadically throughout the day.  
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Table 2. Results of studies of dispensing errors. 
 
Ref Settinga Perspectiveb Data 
collectionc 
Categories of dispensing errors
2 H CP HP Wrong medication; wrong drug strength; wrong dosage form; wrong 
quantity; omission; wrong expiration date of medication with quality 
deviation; wrong information on label; other errors 
3 MP CP R Wrong medication; wrong drug strength; wrong dosage form; wrong 
quantity; wrong information on label; wrong instruction; wrong expiration 
date; omission 
4 H QP R Wrong quantity; wrong drug strength; wrong medication; wrong dosage 
form; wrong information on label; order entry;  
wrong expiration date; omission; reconstitution; other errors 
6 CP CP HP No detail information; all incidents that were detected during the 
dispensing process 
 
7 CP CP HP No detail information
 
 
10 H CP HP Wrong medication; wrong dose; wrong patient; other errors 
 
 
11 CP QP HP Medication selection; dose; communication; prescription; frequency; 
documentation; patient information; drug monitoring; quantity; device; 
insufficient information 
12 H QP R Omission; wrong dose; wrong quantity; wrong medication; wrong dosage 
form; wrong information on label; medication with quality deviation; 
medication; prescribed without concentration, quantity, etc. 
 
13 H CP R Wrong medication; wrong dose; wrong dosage form; wrong quantity; 
omission; wrong expiration date of medication with quality deviation; other 
errors; wrong information on label 
14 H CP HP Unauthorized medication error; wrong dosage form; wrong dose; omission; 
wrong time; wrong expiration date of medication with quality deviation 
 
15 H CP R An indicated medication was not given (omission); a non-indicated 
chemotherapeutic drug was administrated (wrong medication); the 
duration of treatment was different (wrong quantity); a >10% difference 
between indicated and administrated dose of any medication 
(administration error) 
16 CP CP HP No detail information
17 H CP HP Medication prescribed without concentration, quantity, etc.; prescription 
errors; administration errors; transcription errors; omission; wrong patient; 
wrong medication; wrong dosage form; wrong dose; wrong time; 
compounding errors; across settings errors 
 
a CO = community pharmacy, H = hospital, MP = mail pharmacy 
b CP = chain of pharmaceutical patient care, QP = quality of all pharmacy care activities 
c HP = healthcare provider, R = researcher 
d CO = clinical outcome, IO = improvements organisation 
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Outcomed 
 
Dispensing  
error rate (%): 
Near-miss dispensing 
error rate (%): 
Top 3 dispensing errors (%): 
IQ 30/194,584 (0.02) 104/4,849 (2.1) Wrong information on label (46) 
Omission (19) 
Wrong drug strength (12) 
Not studied 16/21,252 (0.08) Not studied Wrong information on label (88) 
Entry wrong quantity in system (6.3) 
Omission (6.3) 
CO 1,059/140,755 (0.8) 4,016/140,755 (2.9) Wrong quantity (59) 
Wrong drug strength (11) 
Wrong medication (11) 
Not studied 50/125,395 (0.04) 280/125,395 (0.22) Wrong medication (34) 
Wrong information on label (33) 
Wrong quantity (17) 
Not studied 39/51,357 (0.08) 247/51,357 (0.48) Wrong drug strength (23) 
Wrong medication (19) 
Wrong quantity (18) 
CO 82/n.s. Not studied Wrong medication (38) 
Wrong patient (29) 
Wrong dose (26) 
CO 13/n.s. Not studied No detail information 
 
 
Not studied 719/2,143 (34) Not studied Omission (57)
Medication prescribed without 
concentration, quantity, etc. (13) 
Wrong dose (13) 
Not studied 295/655 (45) Not studied Wrong quantity (70) 
Omission (14)  
Wrong information on label (11) 
CO 24/7,249 (0.3) 155/7,249 (2.1) Wrong dose (32)
Omission (30) 
Wrong time (21) 
Not studied 0/172 (0) Not studied No dispensing errors detected 
 
 
 
 
CO 203/1,466,043 (0.01) 234/958,313 (0.02) No detail information 
CO 915/n.s. Not studied Wrong medication (32) 
Wrong dose (27) 
Omission (22) 
 
 
The last study involved the implementation of a computerized drug–drug interaction alerting 
system in community pharmacies and physicians’ offices.22 The rates of prescriptions with 
potential interactions were measured in three periods. In the first period about 40% of 
pharmacies but no physicians’ practices implemented the system; in the second period the 
system was online in 90% of pharmacies and in about 40% of physicians’ practices; and in the 
2
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third period 95% of pharmacies and approximately 90% of physicians’ practices used the system. 
The dispensing of prescriptions with serious interactions by pharmacists was reduced in the 
second and third periods compared with the first period (21% and 68%, respectively). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Most studies have investigated dispensing errors in hospitals in the USA or Europe, from the 
perspective of the chain of pharmaceutical patient care (e.g. excluding prescribing errors and 
administration errors). Less research has been performed on community pharmacies or mail-
order pharmacies. The rates of dispensing errors were low to very low. Nevertheless, it is still 
necessary to pay close attention to dispensing errors, because nowadays pharmacies dispense 
such high volumes of medications that even a low error rate can translate into a large number of 
errors.4 
Two independent Brazilian studies have shown much higher rates of dispensing errors. Both 
research groups correctly concluded that the rates of dispensing errors were high compared with 
other studies, and they suggested that a possible cause was the absence of verification by the 
pharmacist.12,13 Ten years ago studies in the USA and Europe reported similar high rates of 
dispensing errors. In one study the rate of dispensing error was 24%; no reasons were given for 
this.26 
It was difficult to compare reported rates of dispensing errors directly across studies, owing to 
differences in study design. Researchers have used different operational definitions of dispensing 
errors and also different denominators (such as total numbers of prescriptions, numbers of 
dispensed doses, or numbers of prescribed medications). In order to make more direct 
comparisons between the studies, we recalculated some of the rates of dispensing errors. 
Nevertheless, the studies are heterogeneous. 
Most studies have investigated dispensing errors from the perspective of the integral chain of 
pharmaceutical patient care, but not all categories of dispensing errors have been investigated. 
Our Pubmed search may not have been sufficiently specific to retrieve all such studies and was 
also limited in time and to English-language papers. We found two studies that classified 
dispensing certain undesirable drug-drug interactions as dispensing errors, but no studies of the 
detection of manufacturing errors or the absence of counselling or incorrect counselling as 
dispensing errors. From a quality assurance point of view, it is important to redress this paucity of 
data. A US study showed that an intensive counselling intervention significantly improved care-
giver accuracy and adherence in administrating liquid medications to children.27  
Little information is available about the underlying causes of dispensing errors, because most 
studies have not addressed this. In the few root-cause analyses that have been performed, the 
most important causes of dispensing errors were related to organisational problems, such as 
shortages of staff and high workloads, which are clearly related. The same causes of dispensing 
errors were mentioned in a survey of pharmacists.18 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the years pharmacists have implemented various methods to reduce the rates of dispensing 
errors. We found only a few studies that measured the impact of such methods. Understandably, 
the interventions were mostly specific to the local settings. There are several pharmacy 
distribution systems, and different pharmacies have different processes for distributing 
medications; it is not clear to what extent the results of these studies were location specific. 
Consequently, further research in other settings is necessary. 
Although the rates of dispensing errors are low, further improvements in pharmacy distribution 
systems are still important. From the perspective of pharmacy organisation and quality 
assurance, pharmacists should also intensify checking of prescriptions in order to reduce 
prescription errors, and should implement strategies to communicate adequately with patients in 
order to prevent administration errors. More and better studies are still needed in these areas. 
More research is also required on: dispensing errors in outpatient healthcare, such as community 
pharmacies in the USA and Europe; dispensing errors in hospitals and outpatient healthcare in 
middle- and low-income countries; and the underlying causes of dispensing errors. 
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In September, 2013, the Portal for Patient Safety/Central Medication incidents Registration 
(CMR) in the Netherlands issued an alert concerning eight reconstitution errors with cabazitaxel 
(licensed as Jevtana, Sanofi-Aventis, Paris) that had resulted in doses that were more than 15% 
higher than intended.1 The underlying problem was insufficient clarity in the summary of product 
characteristics about the appropriate reconstitution of a solution for infusion from two different 
vials. When the CMR approached the Dutch Medicines Evaluation Board and the national 
representative of the manufacturer, it turned out that the same problem had been observed in 
Spain and that ISMP (Instituto para el Uso Seguro de los Medicamentos)-Spain had already sent 
out an alert in July, 2012.2 In the UK, four patients were also reported to have received overdoses 
of cabazitaxel. In October, 2013, the UK branch of the manufacturer (in association with the 
European Medicines Agency and the UK regulatory agency) sent out a warning, which identified 
adverse drug reactions, such as bone marrow suppression and gastrointestinal disorders, as 
potential complications of the overdose.3  
This sequence of events shows that national centres for medication errors can learn valuable 
lessons not only from the data that they collect themselves, but also from alerts issued by sister 
organisations. At first sight, the International Medication Safety Network might seem to be an 
obvious candidate to act as a coordinator.4 However, this organisation does not have the time or 
funding required to set up and maintain a system for the international monitoring, evaluation, 
and exchange of medication errors alerts. We propose that the European Medicines Agency 
would be a much better candidate for this role.  
The European Medicines Agency can provide European coordination and also has the authority to 
impose binding decisions. Furthermore, recent European legislation requires that all adverse drug 
reactions (including harm from medication errors) should be reported to the EudraVigilance 
database.5 The European Medicines Agency should now show further leadership by bringing all 
parties involved in medication errors together. Besides national pharmacovigilance centres, 
centres for medication errors (such as the CMR) should also participate, because they also cover 
medication errors without actual harm (an area still outside the scope of EudraVigilance), and 
because they disseminate medication error alerts in which they focus on the drug treatment 
process rather than on pharmacological properties. A global perspective could be added by WHO 
Uppsala Monitoring Centre, which collects adverse drug reactions (including harm from 
medication errors) in its worldwide VigiBase.6 
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: National reporting programmes usually collect and analyse medication error reports 
from healthcare providers in their own country and only disseminate guidance to healthcare 
providers within the borders of their country. It is unclear how much different national 
programmes could learn from each other. The aim of this study was therefore to explore to what 
extent alerts and newsletters about medication errors issued in other countries could also be 
relevant for The Netherlands.  
Methods: Ninety disseminated information items that had been issued by three national 
programmes (Canada, the US and the UK) in the period from June 2009 until June 2012 were 
collected. These items were compared with the national reporting programme Central 
Medication incidents Registration (CMR-NL) in The Netherlands. Each selected item was 
subsequently assessed independently with six assessment criteria: is the medicine available in 
The Netherlands? If so, could a similar error occur in The Netherlands? Did the CMR-NL reporting 
programme receive any reports about a comparable (or even identical) error? If so, did these 
reports include any errors with serious temporary or permanent harm? Did the CMR-NL 
disseminate output about it?; If so, what was the dissemination date of CMR-NL?  
Results: From the 90 items, 87.8 % (n=79) were relevant for Dutch healthcare. For 43 of the 90 
items (47.8 %), the CMR-NL had received comparable (or even identical) errors but had not 
disseminated any alert or newsletter about these errors. The CMR-NL had disseminated an alert 
or newsletter for 14 of the 90 items (15.6 %). 
Conclusion: This study showed for a broad range of errors that the Dutch national reporting 
programme could learn from the three reporting programmes in Canada, the US and the UK. 
National reporting programmes can benefit from sharing alerts and newsletters that enhance the 
learning between countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades, patient safety has become an important issue for healthcare providers. 
There are several strategies and policies for improving the safety of patients.1,2 The Institute of 
Medicine in the US encouraged healthcare providers to participate in error reporting systems in 
the report ‘To err is human: building a safer health system’.3 The US Institute for Safe Medication 
Practice (ISMP) was the first medication safety agency to set up a national reporting programme 
for medication errors in 1975.4 Many other countries have followed since then.4–9 
National reporting programmes usually collect and analyse reports from healthcare providers in 
their own country and only disseminate guidance to healthcare providers within the borders of 
their country. The rationale of a national reporting programme is that it helps to reduce 
medication errors by sharing reported errors through various dissemination channels and by 
providing guidance to healthcare providers on how to prevent or reduce these mistakes in 
practice. Although they share similar goals, systematic exchange of information between similar 
programmes in different countries is lacking. Yet, exchanging this information may very well 
expand the learning possibilities. At this moment, it is unclear how much national programmes 
could learn from each other. The primary aim of this study is therefore to explore to what extent 
alerts and newsletters about medication errors issued in one country could be relevant for other 
countries. More specifically, we compared the output (disseminated information items: alerts 
and newsletters) from three major national programmes (ISMP-Canada, ISMP-US, National 
Reporting and Learning Service in the UK [NRLS-UK]) with the input (reported medication errors) 
and output (disseminated information items: alerts and newsletters) of the Dutch national 
reporting programme (Central Medication Incidents Registration, CMR-NL). The secondary aim 
was to describe the characteristics of the reporting programmes that were included. 
 
METHOD 
Data sources 
A brief questionnaire was sent by email to the four national reporting programmes (CMR-NL, 
ISMP-US, ISMP-Canada, NRLS-UK) to collect the basic characteristics of the reporting 
programmes (see Appendix A for questionnaire). The questionnaires were sent back by email. 
The researchers also collected the number of reports that the CMR-NL was receiving from 2006 
to September 2013. 
 
Collecting disseminated information items 
For this study, one researcher (KC) collected 90 disseminated information items (in the rest of 
this article designated as ‘items’) that had been disseminated by three national reporting 
programmes (30 items from ISMP-Canada, 30 from ISMP-US and 30 from NRLS-UK) in the period 
from June 2009 until June 2012. The number of 30 items per programme was chosen in order to 
render analysis feasible within the time available for the research. For each reporting 
programme, the researcher started with the latest published item (in June 2012) and then 
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worked his way backwards in time until the 30 drug-related items per reporting programme had 
been collected. These items included alerts, subjects in newsletters or data reports, guidance, 
and signals which were presented on the website of the reporting programme. The inclusion 
criterion was that the item described an error which was related either to medication or to a 
device necessary to administer medication. The items from ISMP-Canada were taken from the 
ISMP Canada Safety Bulletins, which were available on the website http://www.ismp-
canada.org/ISMPCSafetyBulletins.htm. The items from ISMP-US were selected from its biweekly 
newsletter ‘ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Acute Care’. These newsletters were only available 
with a subscription and for this study ISMP-US sent them to the researcher on request. Many 
types of ISMP-US newsletters (acute care, community care, nurse advice, long-term care and 
consumers) are available, but for this research the newsletter for acute care was used, because 
this was the oldest (original) type of newsletter of ISMP-US. The NRLS-UK published the items on 
the website of the National Health System: http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/patient-
safety-topics/medication-safety/. The NRLS-UK publishes all kinds of items on the website, such 
as alerts, guidance, data reports and signals. 
 
The Netherlands Central Medication incidents Registration (CMR-NL) 
The CMR-NL publishes alerts and newsletters on its website (www.medicatieveiligheid.info). Two 
researchers (KC and AR) independently compared the disseminated CMR-NL alerts and CMR-NL 
newsletters separately with each set of items that had been collected from ISMP-Canada, ISMP-
US, and NRLS-UK. For the comparison, the researchers read the published CMR-NL alerts, CMR-
NL newsletters and the 90 items which contained basic information about the nature of the 
medication error including underlying causes. The researchers looked for medication errors with 
a similar medication or device necessary to administer a medicine, a comparable (or even 
identical) nature of error and comparable underlying cause(s). For this study, all alerts and 
newsletters were considered to be potentially relevant, because we were interested to find out 
what CMR-NL could have learnt from other countries. We explored all output items (alerts and 
newsletters) since the establishment of CMR-NL from January 2006 up to and including 
September 2013. In this period, the CMR-NL disseminated 19 alerts and 129 items in 10 
newsletters. 
The two researchers also searched independently in the database of CMR-NL for reports about 
medication errors that were comparable with the ones presented in the collected items from 
ISMP-Canada, ISMP-US, and NRLS-UK. The researchers used the above-mentioned aspects to 
search for comparable medication errors in the CMR-NL database. These reports had been sent 
by hospitals and community pharmacies to the CMR-NL reporting programme from January 2006 
up to and including September 2013.4 
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Analysis 
For each item of ISMP-Canada, ISMP-US and NRLS-UK, one of the researchers (KC) documented 
the date of dissemination. When the item was a repetition of an item published earlier, the 
researcher looked for the original publication (including the original dissemination date). Each 
selected item was subsequently assessed independently by two researchers (KC and AR), who are 
both pharmacists with several years of experience in the evaluation of CMR-NL reports. Each 
independently answered the following six assessment criteria for each item: is the medicine 
available in The Netherlands? If so, could a similar error occur in The Netherlands? Did the CMR-
NL reporting programme receive any reports about a comparable (or even identical) error? If so, 
did these reports include any errors with serious temporary harm, serious permanent harm or 
death? Did the CMR-NL disseminate output about it? If so, what was the dissemination date of 
CMR-NL? For the first assessment criteria, the researchers used the website of the Dutch 
Medicine Evaluation Board to check if a medicine was registered for sale in The Netherlands. For 
the second assessment criteria, both researchers have worked in pharmacy practice and could 
draw from this professional experience to decide if a process can occur in the Netherlands or not. 
They subsequently came together to compare their results and to reach consensus. For each 
disagreement, the two researchers discussed the item and the results that they found. A third 
researcher was available to solve remaining disagreements. 
 
RESULTS 
Appendix B presents the basic characteristics of the four reporting programmes in table format. 
The earliest reporting programme was set up in the US in 1975. The other reporting programmes 
started in the past 15 years. The ISMP-Canada and CMR-NL only collect medication errors, 
whereas the NRLS-UK registers all kinds of errors concerning patient accidents, 
treatment/procedure, access/admission/transfer/discharge, and infrastructure. The ISMP-US 
collects medication errors, device errors and hazardous conditions. All kinds of healthcare 
providers can report to ISMP-Canada, ISMP-US and NRLS-UK. The NRLS-UK receives confidential 
reports of patient safety errors from healthcare staff across England and Wales. 
In the period from January 2006 up to and including September 2013, the CMR-NL received 
55,490 medication errors. Healthcare providers working in community pharmacies submitted 
9,093 (16.4 %) errors and those in hospitals submitted 46,397 (83.6 %) errors. 
In the period going back from June 2012 to June 2009, ISMP-Canada disseminated 22 safety 
bulletins, ISMP-US sent out 76 ‘ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Acute Care’ newsletters, and NRLS-
UK published 39 items (e.g., alerts, guidance, data reports and signals) on its website. For this 
study, ISMP-Canada published 30 relevant items (news items in the safety bulletins) in a period of 
28 months. ISMP-US issued 30 relevant items (news items in the Acute Care newsletter) in 4 
months, and NRLS-UK (alerts, guidance, data reports and signals published on their website) 
published the 30 relevant items in 29 months. ISMP-US had by far the highest dissemination 
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frequency and the largest number of disseminated items in the period from June 2012 to June 
2009. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of 90 items (derived from ISMP-Canada, ISMP-US and NRLS-UK) 
over the six assessment criteria. The third researcher was not necessary to solve disagreements, 
as both researchers eventually reached consensus for all 90 items. Ten comparable items had 
been disseminated twice by different national reporting programmes. ISMP-Canada and ISMP-US 
had three comparable items. ISMP-Canada and NRLS-UK had four comparable items and ISMP-US 
and NRLS-UK had three comparable items. In three of these ten comparable items, the national 
reporting programme explicitly referred to output of another national reporting programme. 
 
Could the error occur in The Netherlands 
From the 90 items, 87.8 % (n=79) were relevant for Dutch healthcare, but ten comparable items 
had been disseminated twice by different national reporting programmes. Thus, 69 unique items 
were relevant for Dutch healthcare. Only three of 30 ISMP-Canada items were not relevant for 
healthcare providers in The Netherlands. An example of an item that was not relevant for Dutch 
healthcare was a mix-up between two different strengths of warfarin to facilitate titration of 
doses; warfarin is not available in The Netherlands. From the 30 items of ISMP-US, 76.7% (n=23) 
could have occurred in The Netherlands. An example of an item that could not have occurred in 
The Netherlands was a mix-up between propofol and bupivacaine, because in the US both 
medicines are a milky white emulsion used in the operating room. In The Netherlands this could 
not have occurred because the bupivacaine product approved by the Dutch Medicines Evaluation 
Board is a clear solution. One item of NRLS-UK could not have occurred in The Netherlands. This 
item was about mismatching spinal, epidural and regional devices with incompatible connectors. 
 
Comparable errors of CMR-NL 
In the period from January 2006 up to and including September 2013, 22 items (24.4 % of all 90 
items; 31.9 % of 69 relevant items) had not been reported to CMR-NL. For 43 items (47.8 % of all 
90 items; 62.3 % of 69 relevant items), the CMR-NL had received comparable (or even identical) 
errors but had not disseminated any alert or newsletter. Of these 43 items, the CMR-NL had 
received 24 reports with at least serious temporary harm (eight items from ISMP-Canada, four 
items from ISMP-US and 12 items from NRLS-UK). Nevertheless, the CMR-NL had not responded 
to these reports with any output (alert or newsletter). 
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Comparable items in different national reporting programmes 
The CMR-NL disseminated an alert or newsletter for 14 of the 90 items (15.6 %) of ISMP-Canada, 
ISMP-US and NRLS-UK. Table 1 provides a few examples of these 14 items. Taking the 
dissemination dates into consideration, the CMR-NL could have learned from two items from 
ISMP-Canada, two items from ISMP-US and seven items from NRLS-UK. All these items (78.6 %, 
11/14) were also disseminated by CMR-NL, but the items were disseminated many months 
earlier by ISMP-Canada, ISMP-US and NRLS-UK. ISMP-Canada disseminated the two items 20 and 
18.5 months earlier than CMR-NL, respectively. The two items from ISMP-US were disseminated 
117 and 27 months earlier, respectively. The seven items from NRLS-UK were disseminated 4–36 
months earlier than CMR-NL. Conversely, our study showed that ISMP-Canada and NRLS-UK 
could have benefited from three different items from the CMR-NL. For two items from ISMP-
Canada, the CMR-NL had disseminated these items 8 and 31 months earlier. CMR-NL had 
disseminated one comparable item 47 months earlier than NRLS-UK. 
 
Table 1. Examples of items from both CMR-NL and another national reporting programmes. 
 
 CMR-NL disseminated output later than: CMR-NL disseminated output earlier than:
ISMP-Canada In Canada and The Netherlands patients were 
administered insulin although these patient did 
not need insulin. ISMP-Canada sent out a safety 
bulletin in August 2010 and CMR-NL sent out a 
newsletter about incidents with insulin in March 
2012 
In 2008 (September and December) the CMR-
NL disseminated two alerts about erroneous 
exchange of the two formulations of 
amphotericin B (Fungizone® and AmBisome®). 
ISMP-Canada mentioned this incident in its 
safety bulletin of April 2011. 
ISMP-US In hospitals, patients who needed insulin were 
sharing the same pre-filled insulin pen. There was 
risk of blood-borne pathogen transmission, even 
when the needle was changed. ISMP-US sent out 
an newsletter in May 2012, but this was a 
repetition and the original message had been 
disseminated in March 2008. CMR-NL informed 
Dutch healthcare providers in a newsletter in June 
2010. 
No comparable items were disseminated 
earlier by CMR-NL in comparison with ISMP-
US. 
NRLS-UK The use of loading doses of medicines can be 
complex and error prone. NRLS-UK received all 
kinds of errors related to loading doses and sent 
out an alert in November 2010. CMR-NL 
disseminated a newsletter in March 2011 after 
receiving several errors.  
In October and November 2006, CMR-NL sent 
out two alerts about methotrexate dosages of 
once a day instead of once a week. In 
September 2009, CMR-NL worked out a list of 
recommendations for oral anti-cancer 
medicines, including methotrexate. NRLS-UK 
published guidance about anti-cancer 
medicines in October 2010.  
CMR-NL Central Medication incidents Registration-Netherlands, ISMP-Canada Institute for Safe Medication Practice-
Canada, ISMP-US Institute for Safe Medication Practice-US, NRLS-UK National Reporting and Learning System-UK. 
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DISCUSSION 
This is the first study to explore to what extent alerts and newsletters about medication errors 
issued in one country could be relevant for other countries. Our study showed for a broad range 
of errors that the Dutch national reporting programme could learn from similar programmes 
abroad. Furthermore, this study indicated that, conversely, ISMP-Canada and NRLS-UK could 
have benefitted from the CMR-NL. We also saw that not all alerts and newsletters were relevant 
for the Dutch healthcare setting, because the range of registered and marketed drugs (including 
over-the-counter drugs) is different between countries. Some alerts or newsletters were 
disseminated twice by different national reporting programmes so the net yield of relevant items 
was 69 instead of 79 items. CMR-NL did not always disseminate concrete output even though 
sister reporting programmes had disseminated guidance and even when it had received 
comparable (or even identical) error reports. Why CMR-NL did not disseminate any output about 
these medication errors still needs to be explored in a follow-up study. The research group has 
handed over all relevant items to CMR-NL. 
Only three items that were published twice by the three different national reporting programmes 
explicitly referred to output of another national reporting programme. This raises the question of 
how systematically they take such information into account. Our study shows that in several 
instances alerts had been disseminated earlier by one system than by another, implying that the 
latter system could have benefited from the earlier alert. During the course of our study, it 
became clear that several EU countries had issued a similar alert about the risk of overdosing the 
anticancer drug cabazitaxel due to insufficient clarity about the appropriate method of 
reconstitution in its Summary of Product Characteristics. ISMP-Spain already disseminated an 
alert about this problem mid-2012, but the CMR-NL did not send out such an alert until 
September 2013 and UK professionals were only warned in October 2013.10–12  
 
Strengths and limitations 
A strength of this study is that the analysis was structured (by means of six assessment criteria) 
and was carried out independently by two researchers, who both had hands-on experience with 
the analysis of CMR-NL error reports. Another strength is that the study assessed items from 
three different national reporting programmes for comparison with the CMR-NL. The sampling of 
the 90 items from these three reporting programmes was sufficient to cover a diversity of errors. 
A limitation is that we only investigated systematically what and how much the CMR-NL could 
learn from the items from three national reporting programmes (Canada, the UK and the US) and 
not the other way around. Yet we found that some items had been disseminated months earlier 
by the CMR-NL. It would be interesting to investigate more systematically what ISMP-Canada, 
ISMP-US and NRLS-UK could have learnt from the output of CMR-NL. 
In this study we only investigated the ISMP-US output through ‘ISMP Medication Safety Alert! 
Acute Care’ newsletters, because this was the oldest (original) output channel of ISMP-US. The 
ISMP-US has four other newsletters, namely Community Care, Nurse Advice, Long-Term Care and 
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Consumers. It is therefore possible that the total number of useful items could be higher and that 
we could have missed items. On the other hand, our analysis of the 30 selected ISMP-US items 
seemed sufficient to assess whether learning from this type of newsletter could be 
advantageous. 
The sampling method used (starting with the latest published item and working back in time) 
may have affected our results, as—depending on the frequency of dissemination of published 
items—this implies that different time windows were studied for the different reporting systems. 
For feasibility reasons, we collected 30 items per programme (90 items in total). Furthermore, 
only one researcher collected the 90 items and this could interfere with the inclusion of the 
items. This is most likely to result in an underestimation of what reporting systems can learn from 
each other. A final limitation was related to the questionnaire that was used to collect basic 
characteristics of the four national reporting programmes. The questionnaire was not validated, 
but we assumed that this would have a minimal effect because the questions and answers were 
straightforward (see Appendix A). 
 
Implications for practice 
National reporting programmes would be well advised to screen not only the reports they receive 
from individual healthcare providers, but also the newsletters and alerts of other national 
reporting programmes. Learning from other countries may also be an attractive option for 
countries which do not yet have an operational national reporting programme for medication 
errors. Of course, several practical barriers need to be overcome in order to realize these 
suggestions, for example, non-English speaking countries need to translate their alerts (and, if 
achievable, also their newsletters) into English. Other potential barriers are the various methods 
national reporting programmes use to disseminate the warnings to healthcare providers and 
differences in error taxonomies and definitions. 
Each national reporting programme could subscribe to all the different alerts and newsletters 
from other national reporting programmes, but probably the screening would become very time 
consuming. A more efficient solution would be if a central supranational organisation (such as 
the European Medicine Agency, the World Health Organisation, or the International Medication 
Safety Network [IMSN]) would collect and select alerts and newsletters for international 
distribution. The European Medicine Agency has an action plan to develop guidance about data 
sharing between national patient safety authorities and national regulators by September 2015.13 
Potential selection criteria should be based on the assessment criteria of this study plus our three 
basic criteria for the relevance of the error: (i) risk of recurrence; (ii) educational potential for 
other healthcare providers; and (iii) actual or potential risk of serious harm to the patient.4 
Besides sharing data between national reporting programmes, it is important to take into 
account the timely dissemination of feedback on medication errors to healthcare providers in 
practice. Benn et al.14 suggested that feedback is effective when the information is timely and 
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consists of corrective actions. The feedback should also be disseminated to a large group of 
healthcare providers to raise awareness. 
The exchange of data may also benefit systematic data collection, through audit and research. 
This may in turn drive the patient safety agenda in countries, which may be another valuable 
result of learning from each other.  
 
Implication for research 
This study provides insight into the potential relevance of exchanging items between national 
reporting programmes. Future research should also include the other four types of newsletter of 
ISMP-US (community care, nurse advice, long-term care and consumers). In addition, some 
national reporting programmes also disseminate annual reports, guidelines, etc., and this kind of 
output should also be investigated. The efficiency should be evaluated as well by comparing the 
additional yield of this approach with the extra time and effort it requires. 
Our study only compared the content of disseminated items without evaluating and comparing 
the specific ways in which national reporting programmes analyse and process the medication 
errors received. More insight into these underlying methods might also have an educative effect 
on other centers. Another interesting point to investigate is the association between the 
disseminated items and the type of medications (high alert medication, hospital or primary care, 
etc.), and in which phase of the medication process the medication errors occur. 
The current study investigated what the CMR-NL could learn from ISMP-Canada, ISMP-US and 
NRLS-UK. Our study suggests that it is also worthwhile to perform a vice versa analysis of items in 
the future. Finally, it will be necessary to investigate how large numbers of alerts and newsletters 
can be assessed most effectively and efficiently for dissemination to different healthcare settings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Reports from healthcare providers are not only useful for patient safety in one country. The 
Dutch national reporting programme could learn from the three reporting programmes in 
Canada, US and UK. In total, 69 unique items (76.7 %) of the 90 explored items were relevant for 
Dutch healthcare. Furthermore, this study indicated that these three national medication errors 
reporting programmes could have benefitted from the Dutch national medication errors 
reporting programme. National reporting programmes would be well advised to screen the 
newsletters and alerts of other foreign national reporting programmes. The current study only 
investigated how much CMR-NL could learn from the three national reporting programmes. 
Considering the indication that the three national reporting programmes could learn from CMR-
NL, it would be worthwhile to perform a vice-versa analysis of items. Future research should also 
focus on the usefulness of the other output of the reporting programmes, including the four 
types of ISMP-US newsletters. Insight is necessary about how the national reporting programmes 
analyse and process the medication errors that they receive. Clarifying these methods may have 
an educative effect on other national reporting programmes. 
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Appendix A. Questionnaire for basic characteristics 
 
Copy of questionnaire: 
 
With this document Ka-Chun will try to collect the basic information. The basic information about the four national 
reporting systems (CMR, ISMP, ISMP-Canada, NRLS) is needed for the article.  
 
If you have any questions you can email Ka-Chun on k.c.cheung.knmp.nl 
 
 
I have a request to make to you:  
- On page 1 you can fill in the contact information of the persons who answers the questions. 
 
- On page 2 you find an overview of the basic information for each national reporting system. Please 
check if the basic information about your national reporting system is correct. 
 
- On page 3 you will find some questions which needed to be answered.   
 
 
 
Please fill in the contact information of the person who answers the questions: 
 
Organisation: _________________________________________________ 
 
Name:_______________________________________________________ 
 
Email address:_________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking time to fill in the questions. 
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Overview of the basic information of the reporting systems in each country 
 
Country US Canada UK Netherlands
Name of reporting system ISMP 
Medication 
Errors 
Reporting 
Programme 
Canadian 
Medication 
Incident 
Reporting 
and 
Prevention 
System 
National 
Reporting 
and Learning 
System, NRLS 
Central 
Medication 
incidents 
Registration, 
CMR 
Year of the development 1975 1999 2005 2006
Organisation Independent 
organisation 
Independent 
organisation 
Government Independent 
organisation 
Other types of errors the system collects 
(beside medication errors) 
Device errors
Hazardous 
condition 
Only 
medication 
errors 
All types of 
errors 
Only 
medication 
errors 
Voluntary to report to the system ● ● ● ● 
Share information with government authorities ● ● ●  
Types of care organisations that could report  
Ambulance service ● ●  
Community pharmacy  ● ● ● ● 
Community optometry / optician service ●  
Dental service ●  
General practice ● ● ●  
Hospital ● ● ● ● 
Mental health care  ● ● ● ● 
Residential / home  ● ●  
Patients, relatives, cares ● ● ●  
Public ● ●  
Type of sharing information  
Alert ● ● ● ● 
Newsletter ●a ● ? ● 
Annual report ? ? ● 
List of ‘look-alike/sound-alike’-medicines ? ? ● 
Guidelines ● ? ?  
“High-alert” Tall-Man Lettering List ●  
Medium for sharing information  
Post ● ? ?  
Website ● ● ● ● 
Email ● ? ? ● 
Social media ● ? ?  
Conferences / meetings ●  
Frequencies of output  
Alert Ad hoc ? ? Ad hoc
Newsletter Biweeklya ? ? Quarterly
Annual report ? ? Yearly
List of ‘look-alike/sound-alike’-medicines ? ? Ad hoc
Guidelines Ad hoc ? ?  
“High-alert” Tall-Man Lettering List Ad hoc  
a ISMP USA has five types of newsletters: Acute care (biweekly), community care (monthly), nurse advise 
(monthly), long-term care (half yearly), and consumer (bimonthly). 
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Questions to collect basis information 
 
- What kind of output does your organisation disseminate? 
 Newsletter:   YES  /  NO 
 Alert:   YES  /  NO 
 Annual report:  YES  /  NO 
 ___________________________ 
 ___________________________ 
 ___________________________ 
 ___________________________ 
 
 
- What are frequencies of the different kind of output? 
o Newsletter:   yearly  / quarterly  /  half yearly /  bimonthly / monthly / ad hoc 
o Alert:   yearly  / quarterly  /  half yearly /  bimonthly / monthly / ad hoc 
o Annual report:  yearly  / quarterly  /  half yearly /  bimonthly / monthly / ad hoc 
o _________________ yearly  / quarterly  /  half yearly /  bimonthly / monthly / ad hoc 
o _________________ yearly  / quarterly  /  half yearly /  bimonthly / monthly / ad hoc 
o _________________ yearly  / quarterly  /  half yearly /  bimonthly / monthly / ad hoc 
o _________________ yearly  / quarterly  /  half yearly /  bimonthly / monthly / ad hoc 
o _________________ yearly  / quarterly  /  half yearly /  bimonthly / monthly / ad hoc 
 
 
- What are the factors for decision to disseminate output? 
o _____________________________________________ 
o _____________________________________________ 
o _____________________________________________ 
 
 
- Who is maintaining the reporting system? 
o Government  
o Independent organisation 
o Health professional association 
o _________________________ 
 
 
- What kind of medium is used for sharing information / guidance / output?   
o Post (mail) YES  /  NO 
o Website YES  /  NO 
o Email YES  /  NO 
o Social media YES  /  NO 
o ___________________________ YES  /  NO 
o ___________________________ YES  /  NO 
o ___________________________ YES  /  NO 
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Appendix B. General characteristics of the national reporting programmes 
 
Country US Canada UK Netherlands
Name of reporting system ISMP 
Medication 
Errors 
Reporting 
Programme 
Canadian 
Medication  
Incident Reporting 
and Prevention 
System 
National 
Reporting and 
Learning 
System, NRLS 
Central 
Medication 
incidents 
Registration, 
CMR 
  
Year of development 1975 1999 2005 2006
Organisation Independent 
organisation 
Independent 
organisation 
Government Independent 
organisation 
Other types of errors the system collects 
(beside medication errors) 
Device errors
Hazardous 
condition 
Only medication 
errors 
All types of 
errors 
Only 
medication 
errors 
Voluntary to report to the system ● ● ● ●
Share information with government authorities ● ● ● 
Types of care organisations that could report  
Ambulance service ● ● 
Community pharmacy ● ● ● ●
Community optometry / optician service ● 
Dental service ● 
General practice ● ● ● 
Hospital ● ● ● ●
Mental health care ● ● ● ●
Patients, relatives, cares ● ● ● 
Public ● ●  
Residential / home ● ●  
Type of sharing information  
Alert ● ● ● ●
Annual report  ●
Guidelines ● ● 
“High-alert” Tall-Man Lettering List ●  
List of ‘look-alike/sound-alike’-medicines  ●
Newsletter ●a ●  ●
Medium for sharing information  
Conferences / meetings ● ●  
Email ● ● ● ●
Post ●  
Website ● ● ● ●
Social media ● ●  
Frequencies of output  
Alert Ad hoc Ad hoc Ad hoc Ad hoc
Annual report  Yearly
Conference Ad hoc  
Guidelines Ad hoc Ad hoc 
“High-alert” Tall-Man Lettering List Ad hoc  
List of ‘look-alike/sound-alike’-medicines  Ad hoc
Newsletter Biweeklya Monthly  Quarterly
Workshops Monthly  
a ISMP USA has five types of newsletters: Acute care (biweekly), community care (monthly), nurse advise (monthly), 
long-term care (half yearly), and consumer (bimonthly). 
US United States; UK United Kingdom; NRLS National Reporting and Learning System; CMR Central Medication 
incidents Registration 
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ABSTRACT 
Objective: Many Dutch hospitals have established internal systems for reporting errors. However, 
such internal systems do not allow learning from errors that occur in other hospitals. Therefore a 
multicenter, information technology (IT) supported reporting system named Central Medication 
incidents Registration (CMR) was developed. This article describes the architecture, 
implementation and current status of the CMR in The Netherlands and compare it with similar 
systems in other countries. 
System description: Adequate IT is required to sufficiently support a multicenter reporting 
system. The CMR system consists of a website, a database, a webbased reporting form, an 
application to import reports generated in other reporting systems, an application to generate an 
overview of reported medication errors, and a national warning system for healthcare providers. 
Current status: From the start of CMR 90 of all 93 (96.8%) hospitals and 872 of 1,948 (44.8%) 
community pharmacies participated. Between March 2006 and March 2010 the CMR comprised 
15,694 reports of incidents. In the period from March 2010 to March 2011, 1,642 reports were 
submitted by community pharmacies in CMR and the hospitals submitted 2,517 reports. CMR is 
similar to various systems in other countries, but it seems to use more IT applications. 
Discussion: The CMR is developing into a nationwide reporting system of medication errors in The 
Netherlands, in which hospitals, community pharmacies, mental healthcare organisations and 
general practitioners participate. 
Conclusion: The architecture of the system met the requirements of a nationwide reporting 
system across different healthcare providers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine published the report ‘To err is human: building a safer health 
system’. This report placed patient safety high on the agenda and encouraged healthcare 
providers to participate in error reporting systems.1 Reporting of errors helps healthcare 
providers to learn from these errors and improve patient safety. A well functioning system for 
the reporting of medication errors is therefore a must.2 Reporting systems can provide 
information to healthcare providers and other stakeholders about types of errors, causes and 
risks, and preventive actions.3-8 To facilitate large-scale trend analyses multicenter reporting 
systems are necessary. In the Netherlands, the nationwide Central Medication incidents 
Registration (CMR) was set up for hospitals in 2006 and adapted for additional settings in 2010. 
The system uses information technology (IT) to facilitate both implementation in daily practice, 
and trend analysis and feedback to healthcare providers. The purpose of this paper is to outline 
its basic structure and performance and to compare these briefly with other nationwide error 
reporting systems (in the USA, Canada, the UK and Denmark). 
 
OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE CMR 
The CMR was developed as a multicenter reporting system for medication errors. The objectives 
of the CMR are to support risk management of medication processes by: 
• Sending out alerts and newsletters to prevent the reoccurrence of specific high-risk 
medication errors. 
• Generally informing healthcare providers and policymakers about risks, based on trend 
analyses within the CMR database. 
The CMR should fulfill the following requirements to be able to function as a multicenter 
reporting system: 
• The reporting system should be adequately supported by IT. 
• The system should be easily accessible and easy to use. 
• The system should be fit for nationwide implementation across different healthcare sectors. 
• The responsibility for reporting should remain with the practising healthcare providers. 
• Reporting should be safe for healthcare professionals (confidential and not punitive). 
• The reporting system should demonstrably contribute to medication safety. 
 
HISTORY OF THE CMR 
In the pilot phase hospital pharmacists reported medication errors derived from their internal 
reporting systems through a web-based CMR reporting form. After a successful pilot the CMR 
became available for all Dutch hospitals.9 Between March 2006 and March 2010 (phase I) CMR 
was only implemented in all Dutch hospitals. The CMR extended rather than replaced existing 
internal reporting systems in hospitals. From January 2009 to March 2010 the CMR was 
technically adapted and tested in 79 community pharmacies of a pharmacy franchise company. 
Since March 2010 the CMR has been available for all community pharmacies (phase II). Currently, 
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the CMR is further expanded to primary care. In January 2011, 20 general practitioners started a 
pilot to incorporate the CMR into their daily practice. Mental healthcare institutions have agreed 
to start implementing CMR. 
 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION OF THE CMR 
The CMR system (in phase II) consists of a website (http://www.medicatieveiligheid.info), a 
database, a web-based reporting form, an application to import reports generated in other 
reporting systems (including a real-time interface), an application to generate an overview of 
reported medication errors (including trend analyses), and a national warning system for 
healthcare providers (alerts and newsletters by email, which are also made available through the 
website). 
 
Web-based reporting form 
Users can access the reporting form on a secure part of the CMR website. The reporting form 
consists of four sections: administrative information; patient data; information about the 
medication error; and questions concerning the need to issue an alert.  
In the administrative information section the user needs to fill in the reporting date, the date of 
the medication error and the identification number of the healthcare organisation. Personal 
patient data are limited to gender and year of birth of the patient (when applicable). Based on 
the experience of the US Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) the description of the 
medication error starts with an open question to describe the medication error. The remaining 
questions are multiple choice questions with predefined answers in drop-down menus. The three 
most important questions are: What type of medication  error is it? What were the underlying 
cause(s)? What has been the harm to the patient? The fourth and final section of the reporting 
form consists of questions about the risk of recurrence, the educational potential for other 
healthcare providers and the perceived need for an alert (see Appendix A). 
 
Classifications in reporting form 
The CMR reporting form has three important classifications: a medication error classification; a 
classification of causes; and a classification of harm to the patient. For the CMR in phase II we 
adapted the initial classification system of medication errors (based on work by Van den Bemt 
and Egberts).10 For this revision we also used the WHO international classification for patient 
safety, earlier experiences of hospitals, and suggestions from a panel of eight community 
pharmacists.11 The revised classification distinguishes eight steps in the medication distribution 
process and each step contains several subcategories (see Appendix B).  
The classification of causes was based on the Eindhoven classification method, which was 
originally developed for the chemical industry.12 The Eindhoven classification method is also 
useful to identify failure factors of medication errors.13 This classification discriminates between 
technical, organisational, human, communication, and patient-related failure factors. 
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The CMR uses the Dutch coding system for patient safety, The Netherlands technical agreement 
8009, to classify harm. The Netherlands technical agreement divides the harm into five classes: 
none, minimal/mild harm, serious temporary harm, serious permanent harm, and death.14 In the 
case of a near miss the healthcare provider can estimate the potential harm (what if the patient 
would have been exposed to the error) on a five-point scale. 
 
Reporting routes 
One of the routes for reporting a medication error is the webbased reporting form. Most Dutch 
hospitals have their own internal system to register all kinds of reported events including 
medication errors. If the hospital does not use the web-based reporting form then the hospital 
can use one of the two computerized ways to send these reports to the CMR database. The first 
way is to extract these reports manually from the internal reporting system and the hospital 
manually uploads these reports to the CMR database through the CMR website. Since 2007, 
hospitals can also use a direct real-time interface between their internal reporting systems and 
the CMR database for submitting their internal reports about medication errors directly. Some 
community pharmacy chains are now also using internal reporting systems with a direct interface 
to the CMR. Both the manual upload function and the real-time interface prevent double 
reporting activity for the healthcare provider (reporting to two separate internal and multicenter 
reporting systems). For both functions the obligatory questions of the CMR have to be built into 
the internal reporting system. In the literature we have found that a state-wide reporting system 
in the USA (the Pennsylvania patient safety reporting system) is helping facilities to construct 
such an interface between existing reporting systems in hospitals and the Pennsylvania patient 
safety reporting system because of complaints that reporting to two separate systems (the 
internal and multicenter system) required extra work.3 
Besides these formal ways healthcare providers may also contact the CMR team (currently 
consisting of a clinical pharmacologist, two pharmacists, one nurse, and two pharmacy 
technicians) informally by telephone or email. 
 
Analysis and feedback 
The CMR team screens the submitted reports every week by hand to sort out which medication 
errors are potentially interesting. This is primarily done on the basis of three predefined general 
criteria: (1) risk of recurrence; (2) educational potential for other healthcare providers; and (3) 
actual or potential risk of serious harm to the patient. Reports may also be selected for further 
scrutiny when they concern a predefined topic of special interest (such as an accidental 
interchange of patients or of sound-alike and look-alike medicines). The CMR team decides which 
reports potentially qualify for an alert or as an item for the CMR newsletter, and which ones 
should be marked for further analysis of a special interest topic. The CMR team can also perform 
additional analyses of the entire database to track and define similar earlier cases.  
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Users can analyse their own reports and compare these with all the reported medication errors 
within a sector (hospitals, community pharmacies, mental care organisations). 
 
National warning system 
Alerts consist of reported medication errors with a high risk of recurrence, high educational 
potential for other healthcare providers, and/or actual or potential risk of serious harm to the 
patient. The healthcare providers can notify on the report form whether the medication error 
meets the requirements of an alert, but the CMR organisation forms its own opinion during the 
screening process. The CMR organisation is submitting the selected reports for further evaluation 
to a multidisciplinary expert panel (consisting of an experienced general practitioner, internal 
medicine physician, psychiatrist, hospital pharmacist, clinical pharmacologist, pharmacist in 
mental care, community pharmacist, nursing home physician, nurse and patient representative). 
If the panel decides that an alert is warranted, a CMR alert is prepared in accordance with a 
prespecified format (a brief summary of the medication error, general background information 
and comments, and specific recommendations to reduce the risk of recurrence). The CMR 
organisation sends the alerts out to healthcare professionals by email and they are also made 
available through the public part of the CMR website. 
Less urgent but relevant matters are communicated through a periodical electronic newsletter on 
the website and incidental publications in the Dutch Pharmaceutical Journal. The newsletter is 
sent out every 3 months by email and may be consulted through the public part of the CMR 
website. 
All practising pharmacists in The Netherlands receive (for free) the alerts and newsletters. To 
receive the alerts and newsletters it is not necessary for the pharmacists to participate or to 
report actively to the CMR. Other healthcare providers only receive the newsletters when they 
have actively subscribed  to them (also for free). If the alert is relevant for specific groups of 
other healthcare providers, the CMR organisation informs their scientific and professional 
associations. The CMR has chosen distribution by email because of the quick delivery and 
because all pharmacists can be readily reached by email. 
 
Security and confidentiality 
The hosting and IT security comply with the latest Dutch ICT standard (NEN 7510), which is based 
on the international standard ISO/IEC 17799.15 Healthcare providers always submit their report 
over a secure Internet connection. 
Each member of the CMR team has signed a contract of confidentiality. The CMR cannot publish 
any report without formal approval of the healthcare provider, even when the publication does 
not contain retraceable information. The database only records the ID number of the reporting 
healthcare practice. The analyst does not have information that is directly retraceable to the 
healthcare organisation or person who reported the medication error or was involved in it. 
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According to Dutch law, the CMR team is not obliged to hand over the content of the CMR 
database to public bodies like the Healthcare Inspectorate, Ministry of Health, etc. The 
healthcare provider always remains the legal owner of the submitted reports. 
 
Database structure 
The CMR database is a relational database that is maintained in a Microsoft SQL server. The 
applications use ColdFusion for data driving and the operating system is a Microsoft Windows 
server. The applications and data storage communicate use XML. The CMR database and the 
applications have been developed and are maintained by a software development firm (Ritense 
BV, Amsterdam http://www.ritense.com). 
 
CURRENT STATUS 
Participants 
In phase I, 90 of all 93 (96.8%) hospitals in The Netherlands applied for participation. Most of the 
hospitals used the web-based reporting form or the manual upload function to submit reports of 
medication errors. Thirteen participants reported more than 100 medication errors, 
11 participants reported between one and 50 errors and 67 participants did not report in the 
whole of phase I. In successive years in phase I, there was only a minimal shift between reporting 
and not-reporting participants. 
From the start of phase II until March 2011, 872 of 1,948 (44.8%) community pharmacies 
requested a username and password. Two community pharmacy chains (331 pharmacies in total) 
are using a real-time interface to submit reports. The other participating community pharmacies 
submit their reports through the web-based reporting form. Hospitals that were already 
participating in the CMR (phase I) are expected to switch over to CMR (phase II) in the period 
from March 2010 to March 2011 (intermediate stage). 
 
Reported medication errors 
On March 1 2010 (end of phase I), the CMR database comprised 15,694 reports of errors 
(including 651 reports collected in the pilot period from July 2004 to February 2006). When only 
these reports of phase I are considered, 44.2% are related to the administration of medication. 
Errors in the prescribing phase (21.0%) are the second most prevalent type of errors (table 1). 
The most commonly reported causes were classified as human performance failures (73.7%) 
(table 2). In the majority of cases (69.7%), the error reached the patients and the medication was 
administered to the patient; 12.3% of all reported errors required monitoring or another 
intervention and 6.1% were directly associated with harm to the patient including 0.1% (n=19) of 
deaths (table 3). 
In the period from March 2010 to March 2011, 1,642 reports were submitted by community 
pharmacies. The reported errors most often arose in the processing of prescriptions and 
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medication surveillance phase (42.5%). Errors in the dispensing phase (27.5%) were the second 
most prevalent type of errors (table 1).  
 
Table 1. Types of reported medication errors in CMR (phase I) and CMR (phase II). 
 
Classes of medication process Phase I 
(%) (H) 
n= 15,043 
Phase II  
(%) (H) 
n=2,517 
Phase II
(%) (CP) 
n=1,642 
Prescribing  21.0 29.2 11.3
Order entry of the prescription and medication surveillance a - 7.7 42.5
Transcription and logistics 15.8 7.4 b 11.8 b
Compounding  5.3 4.7 4.8
Dispensing  10.7 11.0 27.5
Administration  44.2 38.7 1.6
Across setting (transference between different healthcare settings) c 3.0 - - 
Patient monitoring a - 1.3 0.5
a New main category in the error classification of CMR (phase II) 
b In CMR phase II the errors related to ‘transcription’ and ‘storage and logistics’ are separated. For comparison these 
percentages have been added up. 
c Main category only available in the error classification of CMR (phase I) 
CMR= Central Medication incidents Registration, CP = community pharmacy, H = hospital 
 
Healthcare providers could select more than one cause per reported case. Behavioural factors 
(1,642/1,904: 86.2%) caused most of the medication errors. The rest of the selected causes 
spread over technical factors (5.3%), organisational factors (2.5%), communication factors (4.9%) 
and patient-related factors (1.1%) (table 2).  
 
Table 2.  Reported causes of the medication errors in phase I and phase II. 
 
Main category Phase I
(%) (H) 
n=43,003 a 
Phase II  
(%) (H) 
n=1,138 a 
Phase II 
(%) (CP) 
n=1,904  a 
Equipment/software domainb =Technical factorsc 2,149 (8.6) 144 (3.9) 101 (5.3)
Internal organisation domainb =Organisational factorsc 4,410 (17.7) 216 (5.8) 47 (2.5)
Human performanceb =Behaviour factorsc 18,391 (73.7) 3,047 (81.6) 1,642 (86.2)
Communication factorsc - 287 (7.7)  93 (4.9)
Patient related factorsc - 39 (1.0) 21 (1.1)
a Informant could select more than one cause per reported case  
b Main category was only available in the classification of causes of CMR (phase I) 
c New main category in the classification of causes of CMR (phase II) 
CMR= Central Medication incidents Registration, CP = community pharmacy, H = hospital 
 
Less than half of the medication errors (744/1,642: 45.3%) reached the patient. The healthcare 
providers indicated that 80.6% of these 744 medication errors were harmless for the patient. 
There were no cases of serious permanent harm or fatal harm (table 3). 
In the same period, the hospitals submitted 2,517 reports to CMR (phase II). Tables 1 and 2 
summarize the frequencies of error classification and causes. A few of these errors led to serious 
permanent harm (five, 0.2%) or fatal harm (eight, 0.3%) (table 3). 
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Table 3. Reported patient harm in the medication errors in CMR (phase I) and CMR (phase II). 
 
Category of harm Phase I 
(%) (H)  
n=15,043 
Phase II 
 (%) (H) 
n=2,517 
Phase II 
(%) (CP) 
n=1,642 
Error did not reach the patient 22.4 31.4 54.7 
  
No discomfort 59.1 34.5 36.5 
Minimal/mild harm 6.0 16.0 5.8 
Seriously temporary harm  - 4.1 1.5 
Seriously permanent harm - 0.2 0 
Death  0.1 0.3 0 
  
Monitoring / intervention was requireda 12.3 - - 
Unknownb - 19.7 7.1 
a Main category of harm was only available in the classification of CMR in phase I  
b New main category of harm in the classification of CMR in phase II 
CMR Central Medication incidents Registration, CP community pharmacy, H hospital 
 
CMR alerts 
Since the start of the CMR (including the pilot phase), 15 nationwide alerts with specific 
recommendations to prevent recurrence of the medication error have been sent out (see 
Appendix C). 
 
COMPARISON AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this section we briefly compare the CMR with other nationwide reporting systems and discuss 
the implications for practice and research. 
 
Comparison with other nationwide reporting systems 
For comparison we identified four nationwide reporting systems that collect medication errors in 
the USA, Canada, the UK and Denmark. State-wide reporting systems such as the one in 
Pennsylvania (USA) and the one in Australia were not included in the comparison.3,16,17 In 
Australia the advanced error management system has been in use since 1998 and four of the 
eight states use the advanced error management system.17 Little detailed information about the 
architecture and performance of most other nationwide reporting systems is available in the 
scientific literature or on the internet. Only the national reporting and learning system (NRLS) in 
the UK offers extensive documentation on its website.18 To collect detailed information about the 
architecture and performance we interviewed (by telephone) the organisations maintaining the 
nationwide reporting systems and during the interview we used a pre-formatted questionnaire 
(which was also mailed to the contact person if requested).  
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Table 4. Comparison nation-wide reporting systems. 
 
Country USA Canada Denmark UK Netherlands
Name of reporting system ISMP 
medication 
errors 
reporting 
programme 
Canadian 
medication 
incident 
reporting and 
prevention 
system 
Danish patient 
safety 
database–2, 
DPSD-2 
National 
reporting 
and learning 
system, 
NRLS 
Central 
Medication 
incidents 
Registration, 
CMR 
Year of development 1975 1999 2004 2005 2006
Other types of errors the system 
collects (beside medication errors) 
Device errors
Hazardous 
condition 
Only 
medication 
errors 
All types of 
errors 
All types of 
errors 
Only 
medication 
errors 
Voluntary to report to the system ● ● ● ●
Share information with government 
authorities 
● ● ● ● 
Types of care organisations that could 
report 
  
Ambulance service ● ● 
Community pharmacy ● ● ● ● ●
Community optometry/optician service ● 
Dental service ● 
General practice ● ● ● ● 
Hospital ● ● ● ● ●
Mental health care ● ● ● ● ●
Residential/home ● ● ●  
Patients, relatives, cares ● ● ● ● 
Public ● ●  
Cumulative numbers of medication 
errors per 1,000,000 inhabitants in:  
 
1st year 7a 1 185 605 137
3rd year 14a 24 803 3,078 607
5th year 23a 509 1,239 6,301 1,495
Methods for inputting reports in 
system 
  
Electronic interface/upload ● ●
Email ● ●  ●
Internet form ● ● ● ● ●
Paper form ● ●  
Phone ● ●  ●
Type of sharing information to 
participants 
  
Alert ● ● ● ● ●
Newsletter ● ● ● ● ●
Type of published reports  
Annual aggregate analysis ● ● 
Comparing different settings ● 
Highlighting a specific issue/setting ● ●  
Individual error ● ●  
Individual participating organisation  ●
Regional and/or local system ● 
a The numbers of reports are from the year 1998, 2000 and 2002. Around 1998 it was possible to report with an 
internet form to US Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) and the numbers of reports refer to this period. 
Chapter 5: A nationwide medication errors reporting system 
71 
Table 4 summarizes the comparison with the following organisations: ISMP in the USA, ISMP-
Canada in Canada, the Patientombuddet in Denmark and the National Patient Safety Agency in 
the UK. 
The earliest reporting system was set up in the USA in 1975. The other reporting systems were 
developed in the past 10 years. Between the nationwide reporting systems the cumulative 
numbers of reported medication errors per 1,000,000 inhabitants differed from one to 
6,301 cases. The CMR and the Canadian medication incident reporting and prevention system 
only collect medication errors, whereas the systems in the UK and Denmark register all kind of 
errors concerning patient accidents, treatment/procedure, access/admission/ transfer/discharge, 
and infrastructure. Most reporting systems are voluntary reporting systems except for the system 
in Denmark, where healthcare providers are legally obliged to report. 
Runciman et al. described the desirable attributes of an integrated system and the CMR meets 
some of these requirements.17 To meet the requirement of easy access, the CMR offers four 
reporting routes: a web-based reporting form; manual upload function; interface and the 
informal way by telephone and email. In 1975 the internet was not yet widely used so that it took 
substantially more effort to report an error to the US ISMP medication errors reporting program. 
All of the reporting systems now have an internet form to receive medication error reports. We 
believe that offering and maintaining this wide range of reporting routes, especially the 
automatic interface and upload function, have enhanced its utility. The NRLS offers a comparable 
interface between local reporting systems and the nationwide reporting system. 
In the period from 2005 to May 2010 the CMR has sent out 15 national alerts and three 
newsletters. The nature of this output is more or less comparable to that of other national 
reporting systems. There appears to be rather a substantial variation, however, in the frequency 
with which other reporting systems are distributing alerts. Since 31 October 2002 the NRLS has 
sent out 71 alerts about medical errors and the ISMP sent out 106 safety alerts (related to drugs 
and therapeutic biological products) in the period from March 2005 to December 2010.18,19 There 
is also a large variation in the frequency of distributing newsletters and other information. The 
ISMP medication errors reporting program issues a biweekly newsletter for hospitals; a monthly 
edition for community pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, nurses, physicians and other 
community health professionals; a monthly newsletter for nurses; and a monthly consumer 
health education newsletter.3,19 The NRLS publishes newsletters on its website with unknown 
frequency.3,18 Beside alerts and newsletters the USA, UK and Denmark also publish reports about 
annual aggregate analyses, specific issues or care settings, and individual errors. The CMR is 
capable of producing similar reports. At this moment the CMR only publishes annual reports for 
individual participating hospitals about their own reported medication errors (including a 
benchmark). To provide further guidance on specific medication safety issues the CMR has 
planned an analysis of large numbers of reported errors for the near future. 
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Implications for practice 
With the expansion of the CMR to community pharmacies, the collaboration with mental 
healthcare organisations and the pilot with general practitioners, the CMR is turning into a 
nationwide reporting system of medication errors for different healthcare settings. A likely 
implication is that the focus may shift from medication-related errors to healthcare-related 
errors in general. Plausibly, the healthcare providers prefer one reporting system for all kinds of 
patient safety errors. This is in accordance with Runciman et al., who recommended one 
integrated framework for the management of safety, quality and risk.17 
With the expansion of CMR it will become more difficult for the CMR team to screen every report 
in detail. One potential way forward is the development of prestructured methods to select 
relevant reports on the basis of the predefined classifications and to facilitate large-scale trend 
analyses to gain more insight into the risks of medication processes. Data mining techniques that 
have been developed for databases that collect spontaneous reports of adverse events might 
help to select relevant reports for further analysis.20,21 
 
Implications for research 
In phase I of the CMR the error reporting rate of hospitals showed high variability. This is in line 
with a US study about a reporting system in 23 intensive care units, in which five hospitals 
submitted 58% of the reports.22 In another US study the rate of reports per 1,000 inpatients also 
varied substantially among hospitals. The rates did not correlate with hospital size or the 
duration of reporting system use, although there was a trend towards less variation among 
hospitals that had used the reporting system for two or more years.23 In phase I of the CMR the 
number of reports per hospital did not clearly increase over time. 
Besides the large variability of reporting rates, our data and other studies suggest that there may 
be substantial underreporting.22-26 Further research into underreporting and the variability in 
reporting is needed to identify underlying factors. For instance, to what extent is the reporting of 
errors related to the safety culture or what characteristics of nationwide reporting systems (e.g. 
automatic upload function, obligatory reporting or not, etc.) may stimulate reporting. 
Although the data on phase II should be interpreted with appropriate caution due to the low 
number of reports, our first results suggest interesting differences in the characteristics of 
reports originating from hospitals and community pharmacies. The preliminary picture is that 
reports from community pharmacies are more often related to dispensing and order entry of the 
prescription and medication surveillance. Furthermore, more than half of the medication errors 
in community pharmacies did not reach the patient. Such reports may still be valuable because 
they draw attention to a potentially poor aspect of performance in the medication process. In 
hospitals 22% (phase I) to 31% (phase II) of the medication errors did not reach the patient and 
only 59% did not harm the patient. 
Chapter 5: A nationwide medication errors reporting system 
73 
The ultimate goal of CMR is to provide healthcare providers and other stakeholders with 
guidance on how to improve patient safety. Alerts are regularly sent out but their actual effects 
on practice and patient safety still have to be evaluated. 
Last but not least there may potentially be an important role for the patient in reporting 
medication errors. The current CMR does not include reports from patients, but experiences with 
patient reporting of adverse drug reactions suggest that they may well become a valuable source 
of information.27 More research can help to explore how patients can easily report errors that 
are professionally useful. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper is the first to describe the architecture, implementation, and results of a nationwide 
reporting system (CMR) in The Netherlands. The architecture of the revised CMR (phase II) has 
been implemented for use in hospitals and community pharmacies. Dutch hospitals were the first 
sector to start reporting errors followed by community pharmacies and mental care institutions. 
The strategy to expand the CMR to community pharmacists has been successful, and this 
approach will now be used to expand the CMR to the rest of primary care. In the near future the 
CMR also aims to attract general practitioners and residential care homes. The CMR is gradually 
turning into a nationwide reporting system that will be available for all healthcare providers. The 
next step for the CMR will be to gain insight into the risk of medication processes by large-scale 
trend analyses of the large numbers of reports in the CMR database. 
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Appendix A.  Chapters and items on the CMR reporting form. 
 
 Items Multiple choices and remarks 
Administrative information 
 Identification number of the healthcare practice -
 Date of reporting -
 Date on which the medication error occurred -
Data of patient 
 Year of birth of the patient -
 Sex of the patient Male 
Female 
Information about the medication error 
 Please describe what happened Open ended question
 Which medication was involved? -
 What was the error type • Prescribing error 
• Transcription error 
• Assembling the prescription and medication 
surveillance error 
• Compounding error 
• Dispensing error 
• Administration error 
• Patient monitoring error 
• Storage and logistic error 
 Did the medication event take place during 
a transfer of the patient (shared care)? 
• Yes, during admission to hospital 
• Yes, during discharge of hospital 
• Yes, between the wards in one hospital 
• Yes, during out-of-hours services in the primary care
• Yes, with the intensive care for thrombotic patients 
• Yes, namely:  
• No 
 What are the causes of the medication error? • Technical  
• Organisation 
• Behaviour 
• Communication 
• Patient 
 Who makes the first error in the medication error? List of healthcare providers. There are three different 
lists for the hospitals, community pharmacies and 
mental healthcare.  
 Which ward is this person involved? List of wards in a hospital. This question exists only in 
the form for hospitals.  
 Did the medication error reach the patient? • Yes 
• No 
 What is the harm of the medication error to the 
patient? 
• No discomfort 
• Minimal/mild harm 
• Seriously temporary harm 
• Seriously permanent harm 
• Death 
• Unknown 
 What could be the potential harm to the patient? • Scale from 1 to 5 or unable to estimate 
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 Items Multiple choices and remarks 
Questions to notify an alert 
 How much is the risk of recurrence? • Unlikely, less than 1 times a year 
• Rare, less than 5 times a year 
• Possible within a few months 
• Probably within a few days 
• Almost sure within a few hours/days 
• Unable to estimate 
 Can other healthcare providers learn from this 
reported medication error? 
• Scale from 1 to 5 or unable to estimate 
 Is this reported medication error suitable for an 
alert? 
• Yes, this is an alert, CMR organisation will contact 
the informant for detailed information. 
• No, this is not an alert. 
• Please let the CMR organisation contact the 
informant.  
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Appendix B.  Classification of type of medication errors 
 
Type of medication error 
Prescribing error 
o Prescription or medication order is not confirmed in writing 
o Prescription does not comply with the requirements 
o Wrong patient 
o Wrong counselling to the patient 
o Errors related to the choice of medicine 
• Obsolete medicine 
• Off label / unlicensed use of medicine 
• Absent of essential medicine 
• Wrongful choice of medicine 
• Erroneous exchange of medicine 
• Over treatment  
• Formulation of medicine 
• Administration route 
o Errors related to dosing, frequency and duration of therapy  
• Dose / frequency 
• Strength 
• Therapy duration / quantity 
• Administration time 
o Errors related to the medication surveillance 
• Allergy / intolerance 
• Side effect 
• Contra indication 
• Double medication 
• Interaction  
o Others, namely: 
Transcription error 
o Prescription of medication order did not arrive 
o Wrong patient 
o Exchange of medicines 
o Wrong administration formula 
o Wrong route of administration 
o Wrong dose / frequency 
o Wrong strength  
o Wrong therapy duration /amount 
o Wrong time of administration 
o Other, namely: 
Assembling the prescription and medication surveillance error 
o Prescription or medication order is not processed 
o No or wrong information of the patient available 
o Wrong patient 
o Wrong counselling to the patient 
o Errors related to the choice of medicine 
• Obsolete medicine 
• Off label / unlicensed use of medicine 
• Absent of essential medicine 
• Not prescribed medicine  
• Erroneous exchange of medicine 
• Over treatment  
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Type of medication error 
• Formulation of medicine 
• Administration route 
o Errors related to dosing, frequency and duration of therapy  
• Dose / frequency 
• Strength 
• Therapy duration / quantity 
• Administration time 
o Errors related to the medication surveillance 
• Allergy / intolerance 
• Side effect 
• Contra indication 
• Double medication 
• Interaction  
o Others, namely: 
Compounding error 
o Wrong method of preparation 
o Wrong patient 
o Wrong counselling to the patient 
o Exchange / missing of medicines 
o Wrong administration formula 
o Wrong route of administration 
o Wrong strength of medicine, component, additive 
o Wrong duration of therapy 
o Expiry date of medicine, component, additive 
o Condition of storage 
o Pharmaceutical quality of medicine, component, additive 
o Wrong packing 
o Other, namely: 
Dispensing error 
o Medicine is not dispensed 
o Wrong patient 
o Wrong counselling to the patient 
o Exchange of medicine, component, additive 
o Wrong administration formula 
o Wrong dose / frequency 
o Wrong strength 
o Wrong duration of therapy 
o Wrong time of administration 
o No reckon with interaction 
o Expiry date of medicine 
o Condition of storage 
o Pharmaceutical quality of medicine 
o Other, namely: 
Administration error 
o Medicine is not administrated / used 
o Error with infusion machine 
o Wrong patient 
o Wrong counselling to the patient 
o Administrating a not prescribed medicine 
o Exchange of medicine, component, additive 
o Wrong administration formula 
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Type of medication error 
o Wrong route of administration 
o Wrong dose / frequency 
o Wrong strength 
o Wrong duration of therapy 
o Wrong time of administration 
o No reckon with interaction 
o Expiry date of medicine 
o Condition of storage 
o Pharmaceutical quality of medicine 
o Other, namely: 
Patient monitoring error 
o Patient is monitored not enough 
o No reckon with the results of monitoring 
o Other, namely: 
Storage and logistic error 
o Expiry date of medicine, component, additive 
o Condition of storage for medicine, component, additive 
o Pharmaceutical quality of medicine, component, additive 
o Other, namely: 
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Appendix C. Alerts of CMR. 
 
Period Alert topics 
2005 Administration of Durogesic® 75 instead of Durigesic® 12
Physician write down on prescription ‘Durogesic 12 milligram’ instead of Durogesic 12 microgram/hour’ 
and pharmacy dispended Durogesic® 75 because Durogesic® 75 contains 12.6 mg of fentanyl.  
 Administration of medical air instead of oxygen
The couplings for medical air and oxygen are look alike and in an urgent situation the nurse mixed up the 
couplings. 
 Lethal metformin intoxication in a patient who had just received iodine contrast fluid 
Patient didn’t receive any message to interrupt the metformin use. During X-ray diagnostics there was an 
accumulation of metfomin and the patient died from the effects of lactate acidosis and failing organs.  
2006 Administration of Risperdal® liquid 25 mg instead of  0.25 mg
Due to a miscalculation the nurse administered 25 ml of Risperdal® liquid.  
 Administration of undiluted Addiphos® concentrate
On the prescription the nurse read ‘1 phial Addiphos® once-only intravenous’ and the nurse injected the 
undiluted Addiphos®. Within a few minutes the patient died from a cardiac arrest caused by high dose of 
potassium.  
 Administration of methotrexate with a labelled dosage of once a day instead of once a week 
During admission the nurse entered in the CPOE methotrexate once a day instead of once a week.  
 Fatal administration of methotrexate in a dosage of once a dag instead of once a week 
A nurse entered in the CPOE methotrexate once a day instead of once a week. 
2007 Administration of glucose 50% instead of glucose 5%
A resident received on the telephone from a cardiologist an order of 1 litre glucose 5%, but the resident 
hear wrong and he commissioned the nurse to administer 1 litre glucose 50%. 
2008 Administration of Fungizone® instead of Abelcet®
Both Fungizone® and Abelcet® consist amphotericin B, with the difference that Abelcet® is amphotericin 
B lipid complex. On the prescription the physician only put on the generic name amphotericin B. 
 Administration of Fungizone® instead of Ambisome® 
In the same ward one patient used Fungizone® and a new patient was prescribed Ambisome®. The nurse 
erroneously switched both medicines because the generic names were the same.  
2009 Wrong conversion of the dosage of methotrexate during computerised exchange of medical 
information between pharmacy systems 
During interface between two pharmacy systems the dosage of methotrexate had been changed from 
once a week to once a day.  
 Administration of Paronal® instead of Oncospar®
Paronal® is E. coli asparaginase and Oncospar® is PEG asparaginase. On the prescription the physician put 
down ‘asparaginase’ and the pharmacy deduced from the prescription that the patient needed E. coli 
asparaginase. 
2010 Dispensing Co-trimoxazole to patient on methotrexate
An interaction between co-trimoxazol and methotrexate was caused by an incomplete medicine record 
of the patient due to miscommunication between the hospital that has dispensed the methotrexate 
injections and the community pharmacy that has dispensed the co-trimoxazol.  
 Using melphalan for longer period than prescribed 
There was a prolonged use of melphalan because of a wrong text about the duration on the list of 
administration. The pharmacist assistant made a mistake and typed in the free text space of the list of 
administration a duration of 7 days instead of 4 days. The patient lives in nursing home and the nurses 
administrate medicine according to the list of administration.  
Using Capecitabine for longer period than prescribed 
A patient in a nursing home was using capecitabine for 14 days according to the prescription from the 
oncologist. After 14 days the staff of the nursing home thought capecitabine was for chronic use and 
they order a repeat prescription from the general practitioner. 
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: Information technology (IT) plays a pivotal role in improving patient safety, but can 
also cause new problems for patient safety. This study analysed the nature and consequences of 
a large sample of IT-related medication errors, as reported by healthcare professionals in 
community pharmacies and hospitals. 
Methods: The medication errors submitted to the Dutch Central Medication incidents 
Registration (CMR) reporting system were analysed from the perspective of the healthcare 
professional with the Magrabi classification. During classification new terms were added, if 
necessary. 
Main measures: The principal source of the IT-related problem, nature of error. Additional 
measures: consequences of errors, IT systems, phases of the medication process. 
Results: From March 2010 to February 2011 the CMR received 4,161 errors: 1,643 (39.5%) from 
community pharmacies and 2,518 (60.5%) from hospitals. Eventually one of six errors (16.1%, 
n=668) were related to IT; in community pharmacies more errors (21.5%, n=351) were related to 
IT than in hospitals (12.6%, n=317). In community pharmacies 41.0% (n=150) of the errors were 
about choosing the wrong medicine. Most of the erroneous exchanges were associated with 
confusion of medicine names and poor design of screens. In hospitals 55.3% (n=187) of errors 
concerned human–machine interaction-related input during the use of computerized prescriber 
order entry. These use problems were also a major problem in pharmacy information systems 
outside the hospital. 
Conclusions: A large sample of errors shows that many of the errors are related to IT, both in 
community pharmacies and hospitals. The interaction between human and machine plays a 
pivotal role in IT errors in both settings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2001 the Institute of Medicine Committee on the Quality of Health System for the 21st Century 
predicted that information technology (IT) would play a pivotal role in improving patient safety.1 
IT can facilitate access to medical and medication information, assist with calculations, perform 
checks (in real time or afterwards), assist with monitoring, and support communication between 
healthcare professionals.2-5 In particular, the introduction of computerized prescriber order entry 
(CPOE) systems created high expectations for enhancing patient safety in drug treatment. Not 
surprisingly, early studies of the introduction of IT in the healthcare sector focused only on the 
benefits of IT tools. For example, several studies investigated the implementation of CPOE in 
hospitals and its effects. Most of these studies showed a decrease in prescribing error rates 
(ranging from 29% to 96%) after implementation of CPOE.6 It was also found, however, that IT 
can cause new problems for patient safety.6-10 An example of an IT-related incident is the 
juxtaposition error in CPOE. In a juxtaposition error CPOE users may unintentionally select a 
wrong item or patient because the items are close to each other on the screen.11 Problems may 
also arise from the use of other technology such as health information systems, bar code 
scanning systems, automated dispensing cabinets, printers, and infusion pumps.  
To get an insight into such IT-related errors an instrument for measurement and analysis is 
needed. In a qualitative and quantitative study in a hospital Koppel et al. divided the errors into 
two groups: human–machine interaction-related problems and information errors generated by 
fragmentation of data.12 With interviews, focus groups, shadowing and observations they 
identified 22 situations in which CPOE increased the probability of prescribing errors. Magrabi et 
al. proposed a classification of IT-related errors based on an analysis of patient safety errors 
associated with computer use.13 They analysed 111 errors from hospitals that were derived from 
a voluntary reporting system in Australia to explore the unintended consequences related to IT. 
In a second study Magrabi et al. expanded their original classification after analysing 436 IT 
manufacturer errors, which had been submitted to the US Food and Drug Administration 
manufacturer and user facility device experience (MAUDE) database.14 Manufacturers in the USA 
are required to report medical device malfunction to MAUDE and manufacturers voluntarily 
report IT-related errors to MAUDE. The usefulness of the resulting classification across different 
healthcare settings has yet to be tested. This study therefore aimed at the analysis of the nature 
and consequences of a large sample of IT-related medication errors, as reported by Dutch 
healthcare professionals in community pharmacies and hospitals, using the most recently 
adapted version of the classification of Magrabi et al.14 
 
METHODS 
Setting 
In The Netherlands, there were 93 hospitals and 1,997 community pharmacies in 2012.15,16 
Hospitals and community pharmacies have a long history of implementing IT tools and both have 
started in 2006 and 2010, respectively, to report their medication errors to a nationwide Dutch 
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reporting system: Central Medication incidents Registration (CMR).17,18 The general picture is as 
follows, all hospital pharmacies and community pharmacies now have a computer system for 
entering prescriptions. CPOE is not yet fully implemented in all hospitals. In a recent study using 
questionnaires, CPOE was used or was being implemented by 64 of the 72 responding hospitals. 
In those hospitals 10 different CPOE systems were used.16 All primary care physicians use CPOE 
and electronic medical records. Despite the use of CPOE by primary care physicians not all 
prescriptions can be transmitted electronically to the pharmacy, because of a lack of system 
connectivity. Both hospitals and community pharmacies have integrated clinical decision support 
systems in their IT systems. The pharmacy staff generally use barcode scanning during 
dispensing. Compounding is generally supported by electronic protocols and in process controls 
(e.g. checking of batch numbers, monitoring the correct type and amount of ingredients with 
barcode scanning and linked weighing balances). 
 
Data source 
For this study we used a subset of the reported medication errors that were sent by hospitals and 
community pharmacies to the Dutch CMR database from March 2010 to February 2011. These 
errors had already been analysed for a general study about the CMR. The collection and analysis 
of the errors is exempt from medical ethical approval by Dutch clinical trial law as it does not 
compromise the integrity of patients. All data were handled according to the privacy legislation in 
The Netherlands.18 
 
Identification of relevant errors: development of a search tool 
A string of search terms referring to IT was developed for identifying text fragments in the free 
text description. An initial set of terms was derived from the literature and adapted on the basis 
of the experiences of members of the research team (KCC, PDS) with the weekly screening of 
errors to the CMR.18 This initial set of terms was applied to a set of 100 errors that had been 
randomly selected from the database. The same set of 100 errors was also analysed manually by 
researcher KCC. The researcher read the free text description and decided for each report 
whether the error was related to IT (see Appendix A for the chapters and items on the CMR 
reporting form). Both selections (after applying the set of search terms and after manual analysis) 
were compared, on the basis of which set of terms was adapted. Eventually this process was 
iterated five times until no new terms emerged. To check this set of terms, a second researcher 
(WVN) followed the same iterative method and if necessary the set of terms was expanded with 
new terms. Researcher WVN applied the set of terms once to a different set of 100 errors and 
manually checked these for comparison. The final set of search terms consisted of unique 121 
items and some words were repeated in misspellings or in a part of the word (see Appendix B for 
the list of 121 search terms). 
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Identification of relevant errors: application of the search tool 
The final set of search terms was applied to the CMR errors that had been reported in the period 
of March 2010 up to February 2011. The errors thus identified were independently reviewed by 
two researchers (KCC and WVN). They selected errors if they perceived that technology had 
somehow contributed to the error. The resulting errors were subsequently divided into three 
groups: 
• both researchers assessed that the error was suitable for inclusion 
• both researchers assessed that the error was not suitable for inclusion (exclusion) 
• one or both researchers had doubts about the suitability of the error. 
The latter category of errors was reviewed by a third researcher (PDS) to make a final decision on 
inclusion or exclusion. 
After reviewing duplicate errors were removed (seven errors from community pharmacies and 
one error from hospitals). During analysis our insight into IT errors deepened and eventually we 
removed six errors because they had been mistakenly selected initially (one error from a 
community pharmacy and five errors from hospitals). 
 
Classification of relevant errors 
The two researchers (KCC, WVN) analysed and classified 200 errors together to become 
accustomed with the analysing method and with the axes of the most recent Magrabi 
classification, which was published in 2012.14 The remaining errors were then independently 
analysed and classified by the two researchers. They subsequently came together to compare 
their results and to reach consensus on the classification of the errors. If an error described more 
than one IT-related error, the researchers classified all the problems separately. For the errors 
that were independently analysed, the percentages of agreement were calculated. The 
percentages of agreement were calculated for the two axes (the principal source of the IT-related 
problem and the nature of the error) and the additional category IT system and phases of the 
medication process. Within the errors from community pharmacies the percentages of 
agreement ranged from 85.8% to 93.3% and within hospital errors ranged from 52.7% to 80.0%. 
For both the community pharmacies and the hospitals the percentages of agreement were 
lowest for the axis of the nature of the error.  
This classification consists of two axes: the principal source of the IT-related problem (‘machine-
related error’ or ‘human-machine interaction-related error’) and the nature of the error 
(problem). Magrabi et al. subdivide the latter axis (the nature of the error) into errors related to 
input (data entry), to output (data retrieval), and to transfer (transfer of data between 
systems).14 In addition, Magrabi et al. had two separate items in the classification that were not 
linked to input, transfer or output (contributing factors and general technical).14 The contributing 
factors were not strictly related to IT and we did not find examples in our analysis. The general 
technical terms were rearranged during our classification and linked to input, transfers or output. 
In total the Magrabi classification consists of 32 preferred terms; for example, wrong input, 
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(machine) not alerted, data loss, etc. During classification of the CMR errors new preferred terms 
were added, if the Magrabi classification could not cover the error adequately. For the axis 
‘nature of the error’, the two researchers maintained the subdivisions input, transfer and output. 
The preferred term ‘wrong input’ was elaborated by adding nine new preferred subterms: wrong 
patient; wrong medicine; wrong dose; wrong duration of therapy; wrong time of administration; 
wrong pump speed; wrong prescriber; duplicate input; and other wrong input. An extra 
subdivision of five preferred terms for wrong medicine was considered necessary to classify the 
errors in sufficient detail.  
 
Table 1. Nature of the error 
 
 Problems in community pharmacies 
n (%) 
Problems in hospitals
n (%) 
Data entry and record manipulation  
No input  
Not donea  
Not done by humana 
 
 
 
9 (2.5) 85 (25.1)
Not possible to import recordb 
 
- 8 (2.4)
Not possible to change predefined recordb - 2 (0.6)
Wrong inputa  
Wrong medicineb  
Wrong identity medicineb
 
49 (13.4) 12 (3.6)
Wrong dosage formb 
 
26 (7.1) 6 (1.8)
Wrong route of administrationb 1 (0.3) 1 (0.3)
Wrong strength of productb 72 (19.7) 17 (5.0)
Selected  medicine not availableb 
 
2 (0.5) -
Wrong patientb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 (14.8) 18 (5.3)
Wrong dose/frequencyb 47 (12.9) 23 (6.8)
Wrong duration of therapy/quantity of the medicineb 13 (3.6) 3 (0.9)
Wrong time of administrationb 
 
2 (0.5) 23 (6.8)
Wrong infusion pump rateb
 
- 21 (6.2)
Wrong prescriberb 5 (1.4) 1 (0.3)
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For the preferred term ‘not done’ two new preferred subterms were added. The researchers also 
added five new preferred terms in the subdivision output (data retrieval) and two new terms in 
the subdivision transfer (data of transfer) (see table 1 and figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examples of errors in community pharmacies (CP) and hospitals (H)
 
 
 
 
The pharmacist received an e-mail with a prescription; due to an unknown reason the pharmacist assistant did not 
enter the prescription into the system. (CP) 
After the ward round the physician forgot to enter the prescriptions into the CPOE. (H) 
The physician was not familiar with CPOE and could not order the medicine with the CPOE. (H) 
Rifampicin was not listed in the CPOE. The consequence was that the physician could not order rifampicin in the 
CPOE. (H) 
The physician could not change the infusion rate of a predefined antibiotic order in the CPOE. (H) 
 
 
The pharmacist assistant entered ‘CHLOO25’ in the system and accidentally chose chlortalidone 25 mg instead of 
chlordiazepoxide 25 mg on the screen. (CP) 
An erroneous exchange between immediate release tablet and slow release tablet. The pharmacist assistant chose 
the wrong medicine from the list, which was presented by the pharmacy information system. (CP) 
For eye drops the right eye was entered in the pharmacy information system instead of the left eye. (CP) 
The pharmacy dispensed sifrol 3.75 mg instead of 0.375 mg. (CP)
The general practitioners repeated a prescription and the original identification record was cancelled. In the 
community pharmacy this repeat record can not be recognized by the pharmacy information system. (CP) 
Pharmacist assistant used date of birth to find a patient in the system. After entering the date of birth a list of patient 
names with the same day of birth was shown on the screen. A wrong patient was selected due to a poor design of 
screens. (CP) 
At the ward two patients had the same family name. The physician selected the wrong patient on the screen of the 
CPOE and entered a prescription for the wrong patient. (H) 
The physician entered a prescription into CPOE for a one-day-old newborn. During dispensing the pharmacist 
assistant noticed the birth day and called the ward. During the call they discovered the medicine should have been 
prescribed to the mother. (H) 
A pharmacist duplicated a record in the system and accidentally repeated an outdated dose in this process. (CP)
The pharmacist assistant entered 10 tablets of ondansetron 8 mg instead of 30 tablets of ondansetron. (CP)
A wrong time of administration was entered into the CPOE. The patient needed the medicine around 12:00h and the 
time of administration in the CPOE was 14:00h. (H) 
The rate of an infusion pump was accidentally set wrongly. Due to the low infusion pump rate the patient received 
only half of the dose. (H) 
The pharmacist assistant entered the wrong code of the prescriber into the pharmacy information system. (CP)
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 Problems in community pharmacies 
n (%) 
Problems in hospitals
n (%) 
Duplicate inputb 
 
8 (2.2) 10 (3.0)
Other wrong inputb 6 (1.6) 12 (3.6)
Failure to communicate after inputa 
 
- 5 (1.5)
Data retrieval  
No output  
System slow/downa 
 
 
- 14 (4.1)
Not done by human (did not look)a 
 
 
 
14 (3.8) 11 (3.3)
Not alerted/no outputa 
 
 
 
9 (2.5) 7 (2.1)
Wrong output  
Output errora 5 (1.4) 9 (2.7)
Unclear output  
Different output online and printedb 
 
1 (0.3) 2 (0.6)
Differences between two filesb 
 
- 3 (0.9)
Other unclear outputb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 (1.6) 35 (10.4)
Failure to react on signalb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 (7.4) 5 (1.5)
Other outputb 2 (0.5) 1 (0.3)
Data transfer  
Mistranslation of data between 2 systemsb 
 
4 (1.1) -
No data transfer between 2 systemsb 
 
3 (0.8) 4 (1.2)
a this preferred term was also available in the Magrabi Classification 
b this preferred term is new  
CP = Community pharmacies; CPOE = Computerized physician order entry; H = hospitals 
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Examples of errors in community pharmacies (CP) and hospitals (H)
 
The pharmacist assistant entered the prescription two times in the pharmacy information system. (CP) 
The physician entered the same medicine twice into the CPOE. (H) 
The physician entered diclofenac into the CPOE for a patient for whom diclofenac was contraindicated. (H)
The physician entered the medication order into the CPOE but he forgot to brief the nurses about the new 
medication. (H) 
 
 
Physicians and nurses could not reach the CPOE because there was a large-scale IT malfunction. (H) 
The nurse did not administer  the antibiotic because the printer was down and she could not print out the 
administration list. (H) 
The pharmacist assistant did not look into the notes of the patient file and missed the information that the patient 
needed a home delivery of the medicine.(CP) 
Nurses did not realize the physician had entered a note in the electronic patient file and thereby missed the 
administration of an antibiotic. (H) 
A cardiologist accidentally prescribed a high dose of flecainide for a patient in primary care and the pharmacy 
computer system did not alert the community pharmacist about it. There was no alert because formally it was not 
an overdose, but according to the cardiologist the dose was too high for the patient in the primary care. There 
should have been an alert. (CP) 
 
The infusion pump alerted the nurses too late about an obstruction in the tube. (H)
 
 In the CPOE the nurse read that the aspirin needed to be administered with a high loading dose, but on the paper 
medication list the information about the high loading dose was missing. (H) 
In the CPOE the nurse read from the medication list that the patient needed tolbutamid. In a separate memo field in 
the CPOE the nurse read that tolbutamid should not be administered to the patient. (H) 
A community pharmacist printed out a medication list for a patient going to hospital. The printout was unclear and 
the consequence was that a physician in the hospital misinterpreted this medication list. He thought the patient 
only used 50 mg losartan per day instead of 2 times 50mg. (CP) 
A nurse administered 5 times more bisoprolol than prescribed. On the medication list she read that the patient 
needed bisoprolol and on the list the number 5 was printed without unit (mg or tablet). Eventually she administered 
5 tablets of bisoprolol 5 mg to the patient. (H) 
The nurse missed a new prescription order because the printer had printed out all the orders at once with the new 
prescriptions at the bottom of the pile of paper (even after orders that had already been stopped). (H) 
Due to alert fatigue a pharmacist assistant overruled the signal from the pharmacy barcode scanning system that the 
wrong medicine had been chosen. (CP) 
The general practitioner ignored a drug-drug-interaction signal. (CP) 
The infusion pump made an alarm sound. The nurse could not identify the problem and eventually switched off the 
alarm of the infusion pump. (H) 
A pharmacist assistant did not respond correctly to alerts of the pharmaceutical clinical decision support system, such 
as allergy warnings or drug-drug-interaction warnings. For example, an order for a cephalosporin was executed 
despite an alert for an allergy. (H) 
For dispensing the pharmacist assistant printed out a list, which was not up-to-date anymore. (H) 
 
An incomplete transfer of an e-prescription between the computers of the general practitioner and the community 
pharmacist. The information of the brand of the medicine was missing. (CP) 
A physician could not use the CPOE because of a technical malfunction in the connection between the CPOE and the 
medical record system in the hospital. (H) 
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Figure 1. Adapted diagram of Magrabi et al. 2012 classification and added terms from central medication 
incidents registration (CMR) errors.14 
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After categorizing the IT errors using the Magrabi classification as described above, further 
characterization of the errors was performed by designating the IT-related problem to the IT 
system involved (table 2) and the specific phase of the medication process into which the 
medication error had occurred (table 3). Information about the consequences of the errors was 
collected directly from the error report forms (see Appendix A). 
 
Table 2. Overview of IT systems involved. 
 
IT systems Involved in the problems in: 
Community pharmacies
n (%) 
Hospitals
n (%) 
Automated dispensing cabinets 2 (0.5) - 
Computerized physician order entry 21 (5.8) 250 (74.0)
Order system websitea 1 (0.3) - 
Electronic health record - 21 (6.2)
Fax - 1 (0.3)
Infusion pump - 27 (8.0)
Laboratory diagnostic analyserb - 1 (0.3)
Medication administration registration - 5 (1.5)
Pharmacy bar code scanning system 13 (3.6) - 
Pharmacy information system 326 (89.3) 28 (8.3)
Prescription scannerc 1 (0.3) - 
Printer 1 (0.3) 5 (1.5)
a  Website used by pharmacies to purchase medicine 
b  Automatic devices used by diagnostic laboratories to analyse blood, urine, etc. 
c  Community pharmacies scan the prescriptions after dispensing to digitally archive the prescriptions 
 
Table 3. IT problems in the different phases of the medication process. 
 
Phase in medication process Problems in community pharmacies
n (%) 
Problems in hospitals
n (%) 
Prescribing  23 (6.3) 225 (66.6)
Transcription - 2 (0.6)
Entering of prescriptions into the pharmacy 
information systema 
322 (88.2) 22 (6.5)
Compounding  - - 
Dispensing  16 (4.4) 4 (1.2)
Administration - 82 (24.3)
Patient monitoring  - 3 (0.9)
Storage and logistics  4 (1.1) - 
a This is including pharmaceutical clinical decision support 
 
RESULTS 
Identification of relevant errors 
In the period of March 2010 up to February 2011, the CMR received 4,161 errors. Healthcare 
providers working in community pharmacies submitted 1,643 (39.5%) errors and those in 
hospitals submitted 2,518 (60.5%) errors. The set of IT-related search terms yielded 624 errors 
from community pharmacies and 877 errors from hospitals. After reviewing by two researchers 
 Chapter 6: Medication errors associated with information technology  
95 
(KCC, WVN), 16.1% (668/4,161) of all CMR errors were somehow related to technology. In the 
batch of errors from the community pharmacies, 21.5% (351/1,636) of the errors were related to 
technology and in the batch from the hospitals this percentage was 12.6% (317/2,517). The 
researchers (KCC, WVN) extracted 365 problems from the 351 community pharmacy errors and 
338 problems from the 317 hospital errors (see Appendix C for the flow chart of this process). 
 
Consequences of errors 
Community pharmacies reported 167 (47.6%) errors, which had reached the patient. Most of 
these errors (82.0%, n=137) were harmless to the patient; 12.0% (n=20) of errors caused minimal 
harm, 2.4% (n=4) caused serious temporary harm, and for six (3.6%) errors the outcome for the 
patient remained unknown. In the hospitals 193 (60.9%) errors reached the patient; 46.6% (n=90) 
of these 193 errors were harmless to the patient, 23.8% (n=46) of errors caused minimal harm, 
8.3% (n=16) of errors caused serious temporary harm, two (1.0%) errors were associated with the 
death of a patient, and for 20.2% (n=39) of the errors the outcome was unknown. 
 
Classification of relevant errors 
Table 4 shows a combination of two axes, e.g. the principal source of the IT-related problem and 
the nature of the error (only subdivided as input, transfer and output). Most of the errors were 
classified as human-machine interaction-related errors. 
In the community pharmacies 92.9% (n=339) of all the errors concerned interactions between 
humans and the IT system. Table 4 shows that most problems (79.7%, n=291) were classified as 
human-machine interaction-related input (data entry). A relatively common problem was a 
healthcare provider choosing the wrong patient when entering the prescription into  the 
pharmacy computer system.  
Fewer problems (85.8%, n=290) reported from hospitals belonged to an interaction between a 
human and a machine. Within this group data entry (input) was the most classified problem and 
16.6% (n=56) of the errors were classified as human-machine interaction-related output. Most of 
these errors were about unclear printouts. 
 
Table 4. Principal source of IT-related problem and nature of the error. 
 
 Problems in community pharmacies
n (%) 
Problems in hospitals
n (%) 
Human-machine interaction-related input 291 (79.7) 234 (69.2)
Human-machine interaction-related output 48 (13.2) 56 (16.6)
Machine-related input 3 (0.8) 15 (4.4)
Machine-related output 16 (4.4) 29 (8.6)
Machine-related transfer 7 (1.9) 4 (1.2) 
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Nature of the errors 
The axis of the nature of the errors ultimately comprised 28 preferred terms (see table 1 and 
figure 1). In community pharmacies 41.0% (n=150) of the errors were about choosing the wrong 
medicine. Most of the erroneous exchanges were caused by confusion of medicine names and 
poor design of screens. The second most frequent problem was choosing the wrong patient. In 
community pharmacies errors related to output (data retrieval) were not common. 
A quarter (25.1%, n=85) of the errors in hospitals dealt with healthcare providers who did not 
enter (‘not done by human’) data in the systems (e.g. CPOE). It was not always clear why the 
physicians did not enter the prescription(s) into the CPOE. The errors classified to ‘output 
unclear’ concerned problems with printouts of medication lists for administration. The machine-
related output errors in hospitals were about printers with technical malfunction so that nurses 
could not print out medicine lists any more. 
 
IT system 
The IT system category consisted of 12 different IT systems (see table 2). Most IT systems were 
used in hospitals and community pharmacies, but some IT systems (infusion pumps) were only 
mentioned in the errors from hospitals. Sometimes systems were linked to each other, for 
example, a printer connected to a computer with a software programme (CPOE or pharmacy 
information system). In the hospital the CPOE was generally linked to the pharmacy information 
system so that physicians, pharmacists and nurses could use the same system for prescribing, 
dispensing and administration. In the community pharmacies, the pharmacy information system 
and the pharmacy bar code scanning system were linked to each other. Clinical decision support 
systems are always incorporated in CPOE systems or pharmacy computer systems. In this study 
we classified all errors concerning clinical decision support as CPOE or pharmacy information 
system. 
In community pharmacies 74.0% (n=270) of the errors were related to the pharmacy information 
system and concerned human–machine interaction-related input. Other errors with the 
pharmacy information systems were related to human-machine interaction-related output (9.9%, 
n=36) and machine-related output (3.6%, n=13). In the machine-related output a pharmacy 
information system gave incorrect and confusing advice to the pharmacy assistant. 
In hospitals the CPOE was the most frequently implicated IT system and 55.3% (n=187) of the 
errors concerned human-machine interaction-related input in combination with CPOE; 9.2% 
(n=31) of the errors concerned CPOE and human-machine interaction-related output. One 
example was a large-scale malfunction of the CPOE, during which physicians and nurses could not 
reach the system any more. Physicians and nurses could not prescribe or administer. Errors with 
pharmacy information systems were not so common but when they occurred most of them 
concerned human–machine interaction-related input (5.6%, n=19). 
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Phases of the medication process 
Table 3 shows the classification of problems into the different phases of the medication process. 
In community pharmacies 88.2% (n=322) of the errors occurred during the entering of 
prescriptions into the pharmacy information system. Obviously all errors in this phase were 
related to the pharmacy information systems. 
In hospitals 66.6% (n=225) of the errors occurred during the prescribing process, the second 
place was taken by the administration phase (24.3%, n=82). In the prescribing phase the CPOE 
had a prominent position (63.6% (n=215) of all errors). The CPOE also played a role in the 
administration phase (10.1% (n=34) of all errors). Most of these latter errors related to the 
printing of medication lists, for example, physicians forgot to print the list after entering 
prescriptions into the CPOE. Errors in the transcription phase, patient monitoring phase and 
storages and logistics were hardly reported from hospitals and community pharmacies. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This is the first study on the nature and frequency of medication errors related to IT in a large 
sample of IT-related errors reported by healthcare providers in community pharmacies and 
hospitals. We found that one of six reported errors (16.1%, n=668) were related to IT and that 
more errors were related to IT in the community pharmacies (21.5%, n=351) than in hospitals 
(12.6%, n=317). As far as we know, this is also the first study analysing medication errors related 
to all kinds of IT systems, thereby showing the pivotal role of CPOE and pharmacy information 
systems in medication errors. 
Within the Magrabi classification we expanded the ‘input’ group with a subdivision to make the 
errors more specific and concrete. Magrabi et al. primarily chose an IT perspective, which seems 
especially important for IT professionals who develop healthcare-related IT systems.14 Our angle 
was guided by the proposal of Sittig and Singh to define IT errors not only from the technical 
viewpoint of manufacturers, developers, and vendors but also from the social technical 
viewpoint of end users.19 The underlying principle is that healthcare providers wish to learn 
about IT-related risks by considering when and what they can do wrong with what type of IT 
system. We analysed  the errors from a healthcare provider’s perspective and we combined it 
with the technical items. Eventually, we related the technical items to input or output problems. 
Magrabi et al. also had ‘contributing factors’, which consisted of organisational or individual 
causes of errors.14 We were focussed on the nature of the error and we did not use these items. 
Interestingly, our study showed that the input problems occurring with CPOE also occurred with 
pharmacy information systems outside the hospital. Most studies that we found were about the 
impact of CPOE and there were no studies about the impact of pharmacy information systems.6-
10 Despite the use of CPOE in primary care many of the community pharmacists still need to enter 
the prescriptions manually into their pharmacy information systems. One of the reasons is that 
generally not all prescriptions can be electronically transmitted from the CPOE system to the 
pharmacy information system. 
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Although frequencies have to be interpreted carefully in this study, it is interesting to compare 
our results with those of other studies. In their first study, Magrabi et al. identified 111 errors 
from a database with 42,616 errors (0.3%, n=111) and in the second study 678 errors were 
selected from a database with 899,768 errors (0.1%, n=678).13,14 IT was much more frequently 
involved in our sample of errors. One reason may be that the latter consisted entirely of 
medication errors. Another contributory factor could be the long history of implementing IT tools 
in Dutch healthcare. Since the 1970s, community pharmacists have applied IT in their daily 
practice (followed later by primary care physicians).17 In hospitals the shift from a paper-based to 
a computerized system began 10 years later. 
In the first study of Magrabi et al. 45% (n=53) of the errors were human-machine interaction-
related problems.13 In their second study this number was lower and only 4% (n=30) were 
human-machine interaction-related problems.14 The MAUDE database contains errors from 
manufacturers in the USA and probably these errors were more focussed on pure IT aspects (only 
machine-related problems), such as software problems. In contrast, our study showed that a 
majority of the errors were human–machine interaction related. Healthcare providers reported 
directly to CMR and although it may be difficult for them to identify the underlying technical 
causes of IT-related errors, they can readily recognize the nature and clinical consequences of 
such errors. The predominance of errors concerning data entry and record manipulation (input) is 
in line with the results of Magrabi et al., who classified 31% (n=36) of the errors as information 
input problems.13 A USA national voluntary medication error-reporting database showed 
comparable CPOE input problems. Half of the errors involved dosing errors such as wrong 
doses.20 Zhan et al. concluded that CPOE-related medication errors are not only caused by faulty 
computer interfaces but also by common use errors such as typing errors.20 Most studies about 
CPOE have shown comparable input problems.6,8,12,21-23 
Our low proportion of transfer problems was in contrast with Magrabi et al. who classified 20% 
(n=23) of all errors as transfer problems in their first study.13 Magrabi et al. classified errors 
related to computer network, systems integration issues and inaccessibility of systems, from as 
little as 15 min to as long as 8 h, as information transfer problems.13 In their second study, 
however, only a small proportion of problems (2%, n=13) was related to transfer of 
information.14 With the healthcare provider’s perspective we focused on how the problems 
affected the work processes, and eventually errors were classified as input or output problems. 
This could explain our low proportion of transfer problems. We only assigned two types of 
transfer problems: ‘mistranslation of data’ and ‘no data transfer’. These kinds of problems were 
also mentioned in a literature study about the transferring and displaying of pathology data in 
electronic health records.24 
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Strengths and limitations 
The main strengths of this study were the comparison between the different healthcare settings 
and the high number of errors, as well as the use of a classification system that is in accordance 
with the healthcare provider’s perspective. This study proved that one classification could be 
used for both settings. 
For this study we analysed a large number (668) of errors from community pharmacies and 
hospitals. Lewis states in an article about post-marketing surveillance that the number of studied 
drug users must be three times as high as the frequency of an adverse drug reaction to have a 
95% chance that the reaction will actually occur in the study population.25 For instance, 300 
subjects have to be studied to have 95% confidence to detect an adverse drug reaction with an 
incidence of one in 100.26 This means that the number of analysed errors in our study was more 
than sufficient to get an insight into the most frequent unintended consequences associated with 
IT errors. 
Despite the rigorous validation process a potential limitation of this study is that the adapted 
classification was only applied to one set of errors. A logical next step would be its validation in a 
new set of data. Another limitation was the variable quality of the descriptions of the errors. Not 
all the errors were described well and some of them hardly contained enough information for 
further analysis. To minimize the risk that the researcher would infer some details of the error 
that were not actually reported, the two researchers analysed the errors independently and met 
afterwards to reach consensus. A third limitation was the difficulty to classify the errors in the 
axis of the nature of the error. The IT systems were easier to classify because they were more 
concrete. 
Last but not least, the errors came from a voluntary reporting system and it could be possible 
that healthcare providers primarily focused on errors that they considered important or out of 
the ordinary. Especially after the introduction of a new IT system healthcare providers might 
focus more on the use of this new IT system.27 On the other hand, errors that were not 
recognized by healthcare providers will thereby have remained unreported. So the real number 
of unintended consequences with IT could also be higher. 
 
Implications for practice 
Considering the percentage of errors related to IT, it is necessary to pay attention to this new 
field of errors in healthcare. IT was introduced with the idea of preventing errors and healthcare 
providers may trust IT too much in supporting their daily practice. This study helps healthcare 
providers to become more aware of the unintended consequences related to IT. 
Our study identified all kinds of IT problems and healthcare workers need to be aware that such 
problems can occur. Healthcare providers must know how to intercept or respond to these IT 
errors to prevent patient harm. Interceptions may be performed from the human perspective 
(e.g. training of individuals) or from the technical/organisational perspective (e.g. system design 
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and workflow changes). In general, the latter are preferred because they form a system solution 
instead of an individual solution.28 
This study suggests a few interceptions. An accessible back-up of patient records is required 
when a large-scale malfunction of the CPOE prevents physicians and nurses from reaching the 
regular system. When printers are not able to print any more nurses should be aware that they 
have to access patient information by other means. The input problems that were caused by 
poor design of screens need to be discussed with the software vendors. The implementation of 
complex CPOE or any IT system should be accompanied by adequate training in the use and 
possibilities of such IT systems. Healthcare organisations should consider the relevant work 
processes when installing a new IT system. The problem ‘not done by human’ could sometimes 
be related to the introduction of a new IT system, which does not fit well into an existing work 
process. Finally, the classification system used in this study may help to increase the information 
value of errors. 
 
Implications for research 
Future research should be carried out in collaboration with users, vendors and error-analysis 
experts to get a more intensive insight into IT-related errors. The classification of Magrabi et al. 
was useful after we had added some preferred terms, but for more information about the errors 
we believe that subsequent analysis of underlying causes, harm to the patient and which 
healthcare profession was involved, might be helpful.14 This should be the subject of further 
study and the final classification system should be validated using different sets of errors. 
Technology is changing fast and every day new IT system can be introduced that will entail their 
own unintended consequences. The introduction of new IT system should be accompanied by 
prospective risk analysis.16 Research on the performance and effect of such risk analyses is 
necessary. 
Information transfer problems are an important new area for research. At this moment these 
problems are not yet common but more and more computers will be linked to each other. Thus a 
malfunction in one setting can rapidly spread to other departments or healthcare 
organisations.29,30 
This study was focussed on the determination of IT-related errors and compared these in 
community pharmacies and hospitals. Some interceptions were suggested to prevent 
reoccurrence of the errors. Research is needed to investigate the interceptions on human 
perspectives and technical/organisation perspectives. Probably a combination of both sorts of 
interception is necessary to prevent IT-related errors. 
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CONCLUSION 
This is the first study that shows how many of the errors in the CMR database are related to IT in 
both community pharmacies and hospitals. The interaction between human and machine plays a 
pivotal role in the IT errors. In community pharmacies the pharmacy information system was 
most frequently involved while in hospitals the CPOE was most frequently involved. The 
classification of Magrabi et al. was a very useful starting point but we added some new preferred 
terms during analysis.14 In subsequent analysis we introduced the IT system category in this study 
and phases of the medication process. The slightly adapted Magrabi classification will help 
healthcare providers in picturing the errors, as these axes help to put the errors in the context of 
healthcare practice. This classification system seems useful for reporting and analysing IT errors 
in healthcare in general, but further research will have to prove this. 
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Appendix A.  Chapters and items on the CMR reporting form. 
 
  Items  Multiple choices and remarks 
Administrative information 
  Identification number of the healthcare practice ‐
  Date of reporting  ‐
  Date on which the medication error occurred ‐
Data of patient 
  Year of birth of the patient  ‐
  Sex of the patient  Male 
Female 
Information about the medication error 
  Please describe what happened  Open ended question
  Which medication was involved?  ‐
  What was the error type  • Prescribing error 
• Transcription error 
• Assembling the prescription and medication 
surveillance error 
• Compounding error 
• Dispensing error 
• Administration error 
• Patient monitoring error 
• Storage and logistic error 
  Did the medication event take place during 
a transfer of the patient (shared care)? 
• Yes, during admission to hospital 
• Yes, during discharge of hospital 
• Yes, between the wards in one hospital 
• Yes, during out‐of‐hours services in the primary care
• Yes, with the intensive care for thrombotic patients 
• Yes, namely:  
• No 
  What are the causes of the medication error? • Technical  
• Organisation 
• Behaviour 
• Communication 
• Patient 
  Who makes the first error in the medication error? List of healthcare providers. There are three different 
lists for the hospitals, community pharmacies and 
mental healthcare.  
  Which ward is this person involved?  List of wards in a hospital. This question exists only in 
the form for hospitals.  
  Did the medication error reach the patient? • Yes 
• No 
  What is the harm of the medication error to the 
patient? 
• No discomfort 
• Minimal/mild harm 
• Seriously temporary harm 
• Seriously permanent harm 
• Death 
• Unknown 
  What could be the potential harm to the patient? • Scale from 1 to 5 or unable to estimate 
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 Items Multiple choices and remarks 
Questions to notify an alert 
 How much is the risk of recurrence? • Unlikely, less than 1 times a year 
• Rare, less than 5 times a year 
• Possible within a few months 
• Probably within a few days 
• Almost sure within a few hours/days 
• Unable to estimate 
 Can other healthcare providers learn from this 
reported medication error? 
• Scale from 1 to 5 or unable to estimate 
 Is this reported medication error suitable for an 
alert? 
• Yes, this is an alert, CMR organisation will contact 
the informant for detailed information. 
• No, this is not an alert. 
• Please let the CMR organisation contact the 
informant.  
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Appendix B. List of 121 Dutch search terms. 
 
Aangeschreven 
Aanklikken 
Aanschrijfbuffer 
Aanschrijven 
accu 
Afdruk 
AIS 
Alarmeerde 
Aposys 
Automatisch 
Barcode 
Batch 
Beacom 
Beeld 
Bestand 
Bewaking 
care O Line 
Chipsoft 
Code 
Compu* 
Data 
Decursus 
Diamante 
Digitale 
Doorgevoerd 
Draai 
Elektro 
EPD 
EPIC 
EVS 
Ezis 
Format  
Gehangen 
Gekoppeld 
Genereert 
Georderd 
Geprin 
Geselecteerd 
Getypt 
Gewist 
Glims 
GPK 
Herhaalservice 
HIS 
ICU-lijst 
In te voeren 
Index 
Infuus* AND *stand* 
Ingesteld 
Ingetypt 
Ingevoerd 
Ingevuld 
Inkt 
Intranet 
Intrazis 
Invoer 
Inzage instelling 
Kea 
Keuze 
Kiest 
Klinikom 
Koppel 
Lag eruit 
Laptop 
Lijsten 
Medicatiebonnen 
Medicatielijst 
Medicator 
memo 
Menu 
Metavision 
Mira 
Mirador 
Module 
MTR 
MVK 
Navision  
Netwerk 
OMO 
Op te schonen 
Opdrachtenblad 
Opgelicht 
Opgestart 
Order 
Overzicht 
OZIS 
 
Pc
Perfusor 
Pharmacom 
Pompstand 
Pos 
Print 
Profile 
Programma 
Registratie 
Rollen 
Rugetiket 
Scan 
Select 
Serie 
Signaal 
Signal 
Spuit* AND (*stand* OR *pomp*) 
Stopcontact 
Storing 
Stuurt 
System 
Taaklijst 
Taxe 
Typen 
Uitdraai 
Uitgedraai 
Update 
Vakje 
Vast gelopen 
Versie 
Voert 
Vrije tekst 
Waarschuwing 
zichtbaar 
zinummer 
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Appendix C. Flow chart of identification and inclusion of the reports. 
 
 
Community 
pharmacies (CP)
CMR database
Period March 2010 – Februari 2011
Total number of reports: n = 4,161
Hospitals (H)
CP: n = 624 H: n = 877
n = 1,643 (39.5%) n = 2,518 (60.5%)
Identification of 
relevant reports 
with search terms
n = H: n = 323
Review of the 
reports by KCC, WV 
and PS
CP: n = 352 H: n = 322
Deletion of duplicate reports
CP: n = 7
H: n = 1
CP: 359
CP: n = 351 H: n = 317
Deletion of reports, unrelated to IT 
(during data analysing)
CP: n = 1 
H: n = 5
Number of reports for data analysing
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: Automated dose dispensing (ADD) is being introduced in several countries and the 
use of this technology is expected to increase as a growing number of elderly people need to 
manage their medication at home. ADD aims to improve medication safety and treatment 
adherence, but it may introduce new safety issues. This descriptive study provides insight into 
the nature and consequences of medication errors related to ADD, as reported by healthcare 
professionals in community pharmacies and hospitals. 
Methods: The medication errors that were submitted to the Dutch Central Medication incidents 
Registration (CMR) reporting system were selected and characterized independently by two 
researchers. 
Main outcome measures: Person discovering the error, phase of the medication process in which 
the error occurred, immediate cause of the error, nature of error from the healthcare provider’s 
perspective, nature of error from the patient’s perspective, and consequent harm to the patient 
caused by the error. 
Results: From January 2012 to February 2013 the CMR received 15,113 errors: 3,685 (24.4%) 
errors from community pharmacies and 11,428 (75.6%) errors from hospitals. Eventually 1 of 50 
reported errors (268/15,113: 1.8%) were related to ADD; in community pharmacies more errors 
(227/3,685: 6.2%) were related to ADD than in hospitals (41/11,428: 0.4%). The immediate cause 
of an error was often a change in the patient’s medicine regimen or relocation. Most reported 
errors occurred in two phases: entering the prescription into the pharmacy information system 
and filling the ADD bag. 
Conclusion: A proportion of errors was related to ADD and is reported regularly, especially by 
community pharmacies. In two phases, entering the prescription into the pharmacy information 
system and filling the ADD bag, most errors occurred. A change in the patient’s medicine regimen 
or relocation was the immediate causes of an error. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aging is strongly associated with polypharmacy.1,2 In The Netherlands four in five people over 
75 years use five times more medicines compared to the general population.2,3 Home-dwelling 
elderly patients can have several problems when managing medicines, such as vision or cognitive 
impairments, which make it difficult to differentiate between medicine packages.4 Patients need 
support tools to use their medicines appropriately. Automated dose dispensing (ADD), also 
known as multi dose dispensing, is an example of such a tool. ADD provides patients with robot-
dispensed unit doses. All medicines intended for one dosing moment are gathered in disposable 
bags and labelled with patient data, medicine contents and the date and time for intake.5-7 
Specific dosage forms (e.g. suppositories, oral liquid formulations) cannot be dispensed with this 
system.8 ADD is frequently used in hospitalized patients across the world and has been 
introduced in primary care for the home-dwelling elderly patients in a range of countries, such as 
Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.2,5,9-11 
ADD has been introduced aiming to improve medication safety and treatment adherence, 
particularly in elderly patients with multiple medications. Additional advantages of ADD are a 
reduced workload for the pharmacy dispensing staff and nurses administering the medication, 
avoidance of old stockpiles of medication at home, and decreased medication costs.12 Early 
studies have confirmed that automated medication dispensing systems minimise medication 
dispensing errors and save time for the pharmacy dispensing staff.13-16 Low error rates between 
0.07% and 0.10% of automated dose dispensing machines have been observed during a 6-
months follow-up period.17 Other studies focused on treatment adherence and medication 
knowledge of the patient.7,9,11,18 Kwint et al. showed that ADD users have a substantially higher 
self-reported adherence compared to non-ADD users (91% versus 58%).7 
In addition to these positive effects, ADD may also introduce new types of medication 
errors.8,17,19,20 Two studies have shown that patients using ADD are at increased risk of receiving 
inappropriate medicines like long-acting benzodiazepines, anticholinergic medicines, and three or 
more psychotropic medicines.5,19 Van den Bemt et al. studied the administration of medications 
in nursing homes that used ADD. From 2,025 medication administrations they detected 428 
(21.2%) medication errors; the most frequently occurring types were wrong administration 
technique (e.g. incorrect crushing of medication) (n=312, 73%) and administering the medication 
at least one hour early or late (n=77, 18%).8 These studies focused on errors occurring in the 
medication administration phase. Overall insight into medication errors related to ADD across the 
full range of phases of the medication process (from prescribing to dispensing, storage and 
administration) is still missing. 
In The Netherlands a nationwide reporting systems for medication errors, Central Medication 
incidents Registration (CMR), is available.21 Medication errors associated with ADD are reported 
relatively often to the CMR. This triggered us to explore this subject in more detail. In this 
descriptive study, we aim to provide insight into the nature and consequences of medication 
7 
Section II: The basic functioning of the CMR as a reporting system including analysis of reports 
114 
errors related to ADD, as reported by healthcare professionals in community pharmacies and 
hospitals. 
 
METHODS 
Data source 
In The Netherlands, 93 hospitals and 1997 community pharmacies operated in 2012.2,21,22 For this 
study we collected medication errors that were reported in community pharmacies or hospitals 
between January 2012 and February 2013. The retrospective collection and analysis of the errors 
are exempt from medical ethical approval by Dutch Clinical Trial law as they do not compromise 
the integrity of patients. All data were handled anonymously according to the privacy legislation 
in The Netherlands.21 
 
Setting 
In The Netherlands hospital pharmacies generally serve both hospital beds and beds in nursing 
homes. Especially for the beds in nursing homes the hospital pharmacies use ADD to support the 
nurses in the administration of medicines. For the home-dwelling elderly patients using multiple 
medications the community pharmacies often dispense their medication using ADD. 
The ADD dispensing robots can be located in the hospital or community pharmacy itself, but 
especially community pharmacies tend to purchase this service from a pharmacy that is 
specialized in ADD (the latter will be referred to as the ADD supplier). The hospital pharmacist or 
community pharmacist will always remain responsible for entering the prescriptions into the 
pharmacy information system. Subsequently, the pharmacist transmits the ADD file electronically 
to the ADD supplier. Using this ADD file the ADD supplier fills the ADD bags. In the next step the 
hospital pharmacist dispenses the ADD bags to the nursing homes and the nurse administers the 
medicines to the patient according to an administration list. In the community pharmacies the 
ADD bags are dispensed directly to the patient and the community pharmacist provides 
counselling about the medicines and how to use the ADD bags. Some patients are supported in 
their administration of the medicines from the ADD bag by home care nurses. When an alteration 
(e.g. new or changed prescription) occurs the pharmacist has two options: the alteration can be 
effectuated in the next ADD supply or the pharmacist collects the ADD bag from the patient and 
manually changes the ADD content. See figure 1 for scheme of the ADD process. 
 
Identification of relevant errors 
The CMR team analyses all submitted medication errors reports every week to identify potential 
alerts and other outputs like an item in a newsletter.21 The CMR team uses a homemade 
software programme during analysis and links notes to the report without changing the original 
description of the medication error. Since October 2011 the CMR team has marked all the errors 
that are associated with ADD and these errors were selected for this study. Some reports were 
excluded from this study because these reports had been marked incorrectly by the CMR team 
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due to an unclear description of the error and/or confusing terms. From the errors obtained from 
community pharmacies one duplicate was removed and from the hospital reports five duplicates 
were removed. 
 
Figure 1. Scheme of the ADD process. 
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support
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Preparing the adjusted 
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Adjustment in ADD 
bag 
Generic phase of 
medication process
New phase of 
medication process 
for ADD bag
 
 
Analysis of errors 
For each error, one researcher (KC) collected directly from the error report the patient’s 
characteristics of the error: gender, and birth year of the patient. Gender and year of birth of the 
patient (see Appendix A for the chapters and items on the CMR reporting form) were not 
mandatory to fill out by healthcare providers. For further analysis one researcher (KC) analysed 
all relevant errors first. Each error was classified using six main categories: person discovering the 
error; phase of the medication process in which the error occurred; immediate cause of the 
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error; nature of error from the healthcare provider’s perspective, nature of error from the 
patient’s perspective and the consequent harm to the patient resulting from the error. 
The category ‘person discovering the error’ was deduced from the description of the errors as far 
as possible. The subcategory ‘unknown’ was used when the report did not contain enough 
information to establish this characteristic. 
The phase of the medication process in which the error could have occurred was subcategorized 
into 9 phases: prescribing; entering the prescription into the pharmacy information system 
including using clinical decision support (e.g. managing drug-drug interactions, drug-disease 
interactions, etc.); compounding; logistics/storage of the medicines; filling ADD bag; adjustment 
of ADD bag; dispensing; patient monitoring and administration. These phases were derived from 
the classification which was used by the CMR to classify the specific phases of the medication 
process in which the medication error had occurred.21 We added new phases which were related 
to ADD, namely filling ADD bag and adjustment of ADD bags. Entering the prescription into the 
pharmacy information system was divided into three additional sub phases: entering prescription 
into pharmacy information system and applying clinical decision support, processing the ADD 
module of the pharmacy information system, and sending the ADD file to the ADD supplier. 
During the processing of the ADD module the pharmacy team fills in the number of medicines 
and times of intake. 
Immediate cause is defined as a circumstance, action or influence that has triggered the error. 
For the category ‘immediate cause’ no predefined subcategories were used. The researchers 
used the description of the error to classify the immediate causes. 
The nature of the error was described both from the healthcare provider’s perspective and from 
the of patient’s perspective. Again, the nature of the error (from either perspective) was 
classified using the description of the error. The nature of the error from the healthcare 
provider’s perspective was defined as the actual error committed by the healthcare provider (e.g. 
entering wrong prescription). The nature of the error from the patient’s perspective was defined 
as the actual dispensing error (e.g. too many tablets within one ADD bag). 
A second researcher (JS) classified all errors independently. Both researchers were pharmacists 
and participated in the CMR team for screening errors. Figure 2 summarized the analysis of the 
medication error report in a flowchart. The percentages of initial agreement between the two 
observers concerning the different aspects of the errors from community pharmacies ranged 
from 44.1% to 61.2% and for hospital-based errors from 29.3% to 63.4%. They subsequently 
came together to compare their results and to reach consensus about the errors, which was 
possible for all errors. For both the community pharmacies and the hospitals the percentages of 
initial agreement between the researchers were lowest (44.1% and 29.3% respectively) 
concerning the phase of the medication process in which the error had occurred. In the 
community pharmacy-based errors the highest percentage of agreement was for the nature of 
the error from the healthcare provider’s perspective. In the hospital-based errors the highest 
percentage of agreement was for the person discovering the error. 
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Figure 2. Flowchart of analysis medication error reports. 
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RESULTS 
In the study period the CMR received 15,113 errors. Healthcare providers working in community 
pharmacies submitted 3,685 (24.4%) errors and those in hospitals submitted 11,428 (75.6%) 
errors. In total 268 (1.8%) errors were related to ADD: 227 (227/3,685: 6.2%) errors from 
community pharmacies and 41 (41/11,428: 0.4%) errors from hospitals. In almost half (48.9%, 
n=111) of the errors in the community pharmacies a female patient was involved and in the 
hospitals 26.8% (n=11) of the errors a female patient was involved. In the errors derived from the 
community pharmacies 71 (31.3%) patients were 81 year and older, 64 (28.2%) patients were 
64 year and younger and 48 (21.1%) patients had an age between 65 and 80 year. Only for three 
hospital errors the age could be calculated: two (4.9%) patients had an age between 65 and 80 
year, one (2.4%) patient was 81 year and older. For 41 community pharmacy errors (18.1%) the 
gender of the patient was not filled in and in another 44 (19.4%) errors the healthcare provider 
did not fill in the year of birth. In the hospitals the healthcare care providers did not fill in the 
gender and birth year for respectively 22 errors (53.7%) and 38 errors (92.7%). 
 
Person discovering the error 
Of the errors reported by community pharmacies 23.8% (n=54) were discovered by the patients 
or their family members. Other errors were discovered by the pharmacists (12.3%, n=28) and 
home care workers (7.0%, n=16). In one error both the pharmacist and the home care worker 
discovered the error. From 119 (52.4%) errors reported by community pharmacies the 
researchers could not deduce who discovered the error. 
For 73.2% (n=30) of the hospital-based errors, it was not clear who discovered the error. In 
4 (9.8%) errors the nurses discovered the mistake in the ADD bag. Only in three (7.3%) errors the 
patient had discovered the error. 
 
Phase of the medication process 
Table 1 shows the number of errors occurring in the different phases of the medication process. 
No errors occurred in the compounding, patient monitoring, and logistics/storage phases of the 
medication process. Many (43.6%, n=99) errors reported by community pharmacies occurred in 
the phase of entering the prescription into the pharmacy information system. 
 
Immediate cause 
In community pharmacy-based errors a frequent immediate cause was an alteration of the 
medication regimen (24.2%, n=55). Examples of alterations were the addition of a new medicine, 
a change in the strength, dosage, or administration time of a medicine and stopping the use of a 
medicine. For 16 errors (7.0%) a switch to another brand or generic label caused the error. In 10 
errors (4.4%) a discharge from or admission to hospital or nursing home led to an error. For 116 
(51.1%) errors the researchers could not deduce the immediate causes from the reports. 
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In hospital-based errors, the admission to hospital, discharge from hospital and transfer to 
another ward were immediate causes for 15 errors (36.6%). For 3 errors (7.3%) the switching to 
another brand or generic label contributed to the error. Alteration of the medicine regimen was 
the immediate cause for one error (2.4%). For 22 (53.7%) errors the immediate causes remained 
unknown. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of errors occurring in the phases of medication process. 
  
Phase of medication process Community pharmacies n (%) 
n=227 
Hospitals n (%)
n=41 
Prescribing 4 (2) 3 (7)
Entering into pharmacy information system  
- entering into system and applying clinical decision support 47 (20.7) 7 (17.1)
- processing ADD systema 49 (21.6) 3 (7)
- sending ADD file to ADD suppliera 3 (1) -
Filling of ADD baga 43 (18.9) 11 (26.8)
Adjustment of ADD baga 19 (8.4) -
Dispensing 23 (10.1) 1 (2)
Administration 4 (2) 4 (10)
Unknown 35 (15.4) 12 (29.3)
a Additional phase of medication process for errors concerning ADD 
 
Nature of error from the healthcare provider’s perspective 
Table 2 shows the different natures of error from the perspective of the healthcare provider. In 
76 (33.5%) community pharmacy-based errors and 21 (51.2%) hospital-based errors, the 
researchers could not deduce any nature from the description of the error.  
 
Table 2. Nature of error from the healthcare provider’s perspective. 
 
Nature of error Community pharmacies n (%) 
n=227 
Hospitals n (%)
n=41 
Fail to retrieve information about the patient 8 (3.5) 3 (7)
Selecting wrong patient 14 (6.2) - 
Choosing wrong medicine:  
- erroneous exchange 3 (1) - 
- strength 5 (2) 1 (2)
- formulation 3 (1) 1 (2)
Choosing wrong dose/frequency 13 (5.7) 2 (5)
Choosing wrong administration time 8 (3.5) - 
Choosing wrong start/end date 10 (4.4) - 
Choosing wrong duration/quantity 1 (0) - 
Entering medicine twice 1 (0) 1 (2)
Entering wrong information on administration list 5 (2) - 
Prescription was/is not processed 9 (4.0) 2 (5)
No or wrong file sent to ADD supplier 3 (1) - 
Wrong processing order in system 19 (8.4) 2 (5)
Wrong response to alert 2 (1) - 
Wrong counselling 5 (2) - 
Forgot to take out tablet of ADD bag 10 (4.4) - 
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Nature of error Community pharmacies n (%) 
n=227 
Hospitals n (%)
n=41 
Forgot to put tablet into ADD bag 3 (1) - 
Forgot to stop order in system 9 (4.0) 1 (2)
Wrong tablet taken out of ADD bag 3 (1) - 
No or wrong cut in ADD roll 4 (2) 2 (5)
Medicine is not dispensed 2 (1) - 
Did not send stop message to pharmacy - 1 (2)
Other 11 (4.8) 4 (10)
Unknown 76 (33.5) 21 (51.2)
 
Nature of error from the patient’s perspective  
The different natures of the errors from the patient’s perspective as listed in table 3. In 
community pharmacies 27.8% (n=63) errors resulted in too few tablets in the ADD bag and 
slightly less errors (25.6%, n=58) resulted in too many tablets in the ADD bag. Other natures of 
error were about dispensing or administering the ADD bag to the wrong patient (4.8%, n=11) and 
wrong information on the administration list (4.8%, n=11). Another nature was not taking into 
account that the patient was using ADD bags and the patient received medicines outside the ADD 
bag that should have been included in the bag (5.3%, n=12). In hospitals, many errors involved 
too few or too many tablets in the ADD bag, 39.0% (n=16) and 24.4% (n=10).), respectively. 
 
Table 3. Nature of error from the patient’s perspective. 
 
Natures of error Community pharmacies n (%) 
n=227 
Hospitals n (%)
n=41 
Too many tablets in ADD baga 58 (25.6) 10 (24.4)
Too few tablets in ADD baga 63 (27.8) 16 (39.1)
Wrong tablet in ADD baga 20 (8.8) 4 (9.7)
Tablet was broken in ADD baga 3 (1) 1 (2)
Tablet in wrong time ADD bag 5 (2) - 
No ADD rolla for patient 9 (4.0) 1 (2)
Extra ADD rolla for patient  7 (3.1) - 
Wrong information on ADD baga  4 (2) - 
No or wrong cut in the ADD rolla 1 (0) - 
Wrong patient  11 (4.8) 1 (2)
Wrong information on administration list  11 (4.8) - 
Providing separate medicine beside the ADD baga 12 (5.3) 2 (5)
Not providing separate medicine beside the ADD baga 3 (1) - 
Delivering problems  3 (1) - 
Patient used separate medicine beside the ADD baga 2 (1) - 
Did not use the medicine on the right time  - 1 (2)
Other  3 (1) 3 (7)
Unknown 12 (5.3) 2 (5)
a In an ADD bag all medicines intended for one dosing moment are gathered in disposable bags and labelled with 
patient data, medicine contents and the date and time for intake. Not all medication can be dispensed by the 
distribution robot, because specific dosage forms (e.g. suppositories, oral liquid formulations) cannot be dispensed 
with this system. In an ADD roll the bags with medicine (e.g. tablets) for one or two weeks are attached to each 
other. 
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Harm to the patient 
Table 4 shows the harm to the patient according to the healthcare provider who reported the 
error to the CMR reporting system. In three community pharmacy-based errors the healthcare 
providers reported serious temporary harm to the patient: one patient was admitted to hospital, 
another patient was feeling groggy and could not stand anymore, and in the third error there was 
merely an indication of dizziness. The hospital-based error with temporary serious harm did not 
contain enough information to deduce the type of harm to the patient. 
 
Table 4. Harm to the patient. 
 
Harm to the patient Community pharmacy n (%) 
n=227 
Hospital n (%)
n=41 
Error did not reach the patient 88 (38.8) 26 (63.4)
No discomfort  98 (43.2) 7 (17.1)
Minimal/mild harm  34 (15.0) 2 (5)
Serious temporary harm  3 (1) 1 (2)
Serious permanent harm  - -
Death - -
Unknown 4 (1) 5 (12)
 
DISCUSSION 
As far as the authors know this is the first comprehensive study with descriptive data on the 
nature and consequences of medication errors related to ADD reported by healthcare providers 
in community pharmacies and hospitals. A low proportion of reported medication errors was 
related to ADD and especially in reported medication errors from hospitals. Adopting the ADD in 
the pharmacy has introduced four new (sub) phases within the medication process. Despite the 
overall low number of error reports we believe that this study adds valuable information on ADD 
in the pharmacy. We found that most errors were concentrated in two typical pharmacy phases: 
entering the prescription into the pharmacy information system and filling the ADD bag. From 
our analysis we have an indication that the immediate cause of an error was often a change in 
the patient’s medicine regimen or relocation. The changes in the patient’s medicine regimen 
contributed to errors occurring in the phase of adjusting the content of the ADD bag. Such 
adjustments were time consuming and had to be done manually and under pressure of time by 
the pharmacy team. 
Sinnemaki et al. performed a systematic review on the outcomes of ADD: appropriateness of 
medication use, medication safety and costs in primary healthcare.9 The conclusion was that 
controlled studies about the outcomes of the ADD bags are rare and that evidence for ADD’s 
influence on appropriateness and safety of medication use is limited. Van den Bemt et al. looked 
at the errors in the administration phase and Palttala et al. investigated the filling of ADD bags by 
ADD robots.8,17 The latter group observed product-dependent tablet defects during the phase of 
filling ADD bags. Tablet defects (tablet entirely or partially crushed, sliced, eroded, or divided into 
two parts) occurred in 0.15% to 0.20% of dispensed medicines.17 In our study we found 
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comparable errors with broken tablets. Palttala et al. also discovered unintended migration of 
the medicinal product to the wrong ADD bag (e.g. tablet into the afternoon ADD bag instead of 
the morning ADD bag). This may be comparable to our findings of too many tablets, too few 
tablets and wrong tablets in the ADD bag. Palttale et al. found that unintended tablet migrations 
depended on the ADD machine used.17 
Van den Bemt et al. observed 428 errors such as wrong administration techniques, wrong time 
errors, and omission errors, while we only identified eight errors in the administration phase.8 
Such errors should be compared, however, to the administration errors that occur without the 
use of ADD. A study in the nephrology pediatric unit of a French hospital compared 
administration error rates related to ADD (plus computerized prescribing) with those occurring in 
the ordinary ward stock distribution system (plus handwritten prescribing). The former 
administration error rate was significantly lower than the latter: 22.5% (888 of 3,943) versus 
29.3% (189 of 646).23 Furthermore, underreporting may play an important role: Van den Bemt et 
al. used disguised observation to discover errors which is known to result in much higher error 
frequencies.  
Larsen et al. investigated the effects of the use of ADD on the users’ handling and consumption of 
medication with qualitative interviews. They discovered that for 7 of the 9 interviewed patients’ 
excess medication was not removed from users’ homes after the introduction of the ADD.11 In 
our study two errors concerned the use of separate medicines besides the use of ADD. Both 
patients had a stock pile of medicines and did not know that their medicines were already 
contained in the ADD. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
A main strength of this study is the large number of errors from both community pharmacies and 
hospitals reported to the CMR. A second strength is the independent descriptive analysis of 
errors by two researchers who were both pharmacists with hands-on experience in the analysis 
of CMR errors. In addition the comparison between the different healthcare settings is a plus. 
A limitation is that the errors came from a voluntary reporting system, implying that healthcare 
providers may have primarily focused on errors that they considered extraordinary or especially 
important. And underreporting may also be present.24 The absolute number of errors with 
respect to ADD was relatively low, especially within hospitals. An issue within underreporting is 
selective reporting. Serious medication errors may be reported quicker and this may lead to over 
presentation of some types of medication errors. 
A second limitation is that not all the errors were described in sufficient detail and that some of 
them hardly contained enough information for analysis. For that reason we could not perform in 
depth analysis for each error to classify all the six main categories and some categories remained 
unknown. The quality of the reports can be enhanced by educating healthcare providers about 
reporting or the CMR organisation can offer a manual about good reporting practice.  
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A third limitation was that healthcare providers could only report their error once and could not 
supplement the reported error with extra information after reporting. It is possible that 
healthcare providers report the errors just after discovery and that not all the information about 
the error (e.g. final harm to the patient, underlying causes) is available at that moment. This can 
explain why some reports hardly contain enough information. To minimise the risk that the 
researcher would infer details of the error that were not actually reported, the two researchers 
analysed the errors independently and met afterwards to reach consensus. 
 
Implications for research 
This study provides a descriptive insight into the nature of the errors associated with ADD. Future 
research should also focus on observations and inspections of the ADD bags. This kind of research 
will give insight into the absolute numbers of errors and may provide insight into specific risk 
factors determining errors. 
Furthermore, the reporting of errors should also be done by patients, general practitioners and 
home care nurses to get deeper insight into ADD related errors in all phases of the medication 
process. The current errors were reported by community pharmacists and in the hospitals by 
nurses, physicians and hospital pharmacists. Home care nurses may have a better overview of 
the use and administration of ADD bag in patients’ home situations. Comparing the number of 
ADD related errors with the total number of ADD prescriptions could provide additional insight 
into the risk of using ADD. Therefore, research to retrieve the number of ADD prescriptions is 
necessary, although the actual risk can never be determined from reported errors due to 
underreporting. In the current identification method the researcher used the flagging by the CMR 
team that marked all ADD errors during the weekly screening. This identification method has not 
been validated and the CMR organisation needs a standard method to identify relevant errors. 
Research into identification methods is necessary. 
Finally, more research is needed to study the impact of ADD on elderly people, as was done in 
two Dutch studies.6,7 
 
Implications for practice  
ADD has implications for the workflow of the pharmacy and these new operations also need to 
be accompanied with prospective risk analysis and with health technology assessment (HTA). The 
absolute percentage of errors related to ADD may seem low, but the use of ADD will increase 
further and it is necessary to pay attention to this new type of errors in healthcare. In the 
implementation of ADD, healthcare providers may have focused on the advantages, but new 
technologies can also have unintended consequences. This descriptive study will help healthcare 
providers to become more aware of the most vulnerable aspects of ADD so that they can take 
targeted measures to reduce their unintended consequences.  
To reduce the reoccurrence of ADD errors it should be considered to perform double checks on 
the entering of the prescriptions and orders into the pharmacy information system, postpone 
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alteration of patients’ medication regimen when possible, avoid manual adjustments of ADD 
bags, follow training in the processing of ADD and to report ADD errors adequately. 
 
Conclusions 
ADD is just being introduced in some countries and this technology will be used more and more. 
Therefore it is of paramount importance that healthcare providers are aware of this kind of 
errors to optimize ADD in practice. This is the first study providing descriptive data about 
medication errors related to ADD in community pharmacy and hospital settings. The errors were 
concentrated in two phases of the medication process: entering into the pharmacy information 
system and filling the ADD bags. An important recommendation for preventing reoccurrence of 
ADD related errors is to perform a double check on data entering into the pharmacy information 
system. Furthermore extra care should be taken during and after relocation of the patient. 
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Appendix A.  Chapters and items on the CMR reporting form. 
 
 Items Multiple choices and remarks 
Administrative information 
 Identification number of the healthcare practice -
 Date of reporting -
 Date on which the medication error occurred -
Data of patient 
 Year of birth of the patient -
 Sex of the patient Male 
Female 
Information about the medication error 
 Please describe what happened Open ended question
 Which medication was involved? -
 What was the error type • Prescribing error 
• Transcription error 
• Assembling the prescription and medication 
surveillance error 
• Compounding error 
• Dispensing error 
• Administration error 
• Patient monitoring error 
• Storage and logistic error 
 Did the medication event take place during 
a transfer of the patient (shared care)? 
• Yes, during admission to hospital 
• Yes, during discharge of hospital 
• Yes, between the wards in one hospital 
• Yes, during out-of-hours services in the primary care
• Yes, with the intensive care for thrombotic patients 
• Yes, namely:  
• No 
 What are the causes of the medication error? • Technical  
• Organisation 
• Behaviour 
• Communication 
• Patient 
 Who makes the first error in the medication error? List of healthcare providers. There are three different 
lists for the hospitals, community pharmacies and 
mental healthcare.  
 Which ward is this person involved? List of wards in a hospital. This question exists only in 
the form for hospitals.  
 Did the medication error reach the patient? • Yes 
• No 
 What is the harm of the medication error to the 
patient? 
• No discomfort 
• Minimal/mild harm 
• Seriously temporary harm 
• Seriously permanent harm 
• Death 
• Unknown 
 What could be the potential harm to the patient? • Scale from 1 to 5 or unable to estimate 
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 Items Multiple choices and remarks 
Questions to notify an alert 
 How much is the risk of recurrence? • Unlikely, less than 1 times a year 
• Rare, less than 5 times a year 
• Possible within a few months 
• Probably within a few days 
• Almost sure within a few hours/days 
• Unable to estimate 
 Can other healthcare providers learn from this 
reported medication error? 
• Scale from 1 to 5 or unable to estimate 
 Is this reported medication error suitable for an 
alert? 
• Yes, this is an alert, CMR organisation will contact 
the informant for detailed information. 
• No, this is not an alert. 
• Please let the CMR organisation contact the 
informant.  
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ABSTRACT 
For the treatment of children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL), Dutch pediatric 
oncologists use the Dutch Childhood Oncology Group ALL 10 protocol. This protocol is complex, 
as it comprises many different drug regimens. One of the drugs is asparaginase which is available 
in different forms with different pharmacokinetics: Escherichia coli asparaginase, Erwinia 
asparaginase, and pegylated E. coli asparaginase [polyethylene glycol (PEG) asparaginase]. Here, 
we report the case of a 3-year old patient treated with ALL who was 8 times erroneously treated 
with E. coli asparaginase instead of PEG asparaginase. As E. coli asparaginase was administered to 
the patient in the lower dosage regimen of PEG asparaginase, she was undertreated, but at the 
end of the treatment the patient was in complete remission. This case report describes the actual 
course of treatment, the reasons why it went wrong, and possible preventive measures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL) can be cured with intensive combination 
chemotherapy.1 In The Netherlands, pediatric oncologists use the ALL 10 protocol of the Dutch 
Childhood Oncology Group (DCOG) for this purpose. The treatment according to the ALL 10 
protocol is usual care in The Netherlands and is based on the available literature, best practices, 
and clinical experiences (the ALL 10 protocol was approved by an accredited Medical Review 
Ethics Committee,2 and can be retrieved from the website of the DCOG (www.skion.nl) if one has 
a password to login). The protocol is complex, because it recommends different medicines with 
different dosages, depending on the stage of the treatment and the risk category of the patient.3 
One of these medicines is asparaginase, which is available in 3 different forms, with different 
origin, pharmacokinetics, and indications (table 1).4,5  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of different types of Asparaginase.4, 5 
 
Type of Asparaginase E. coli asparaginase Erwinia asparaginase PEG asparaginase 
Biological source  Escherichia coli Erwinia carotovora (later 
renamed E.chrysanthemi)
Escherichia coli – modified 
by covalent attachment of 
polyethylene glycol (PEG) 
Generic name Asparaginase Asparaginase Pegaspargase 
Dutch brand name Paronal® Erwinase® Oncaspar® 
Dosage according to 
general information 
(Dutch Informatorium 
Medicamentorium) 
50-200 IU/kg body weight max. 
1,000 IU/kg body weight 
Every day or every 2 days for a 
period of 10 to 28 days 
6,000 IU/m2 body surface 
(200 IU/kg body weight) 3 
times a week for 3 week 
If body surface is > 0.6 m2: 
2,500 IU/m2 every 2 weeks 
If body surface is < 0.6 m2: 
82.5 IU/kg body weight  
Dosage according to ALL 
10 protocol 
5,000 IU/m2 every 3 day 10,000 IU/m2 body 
surface 3 times a week 
2500 IU/m2 every 2 weeks
Elimination half life (d) 1.27 0.65 5.73  
Available as licensed 
medicinea:  
Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belgium, China, Cuba, Estonia, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam 
UK, Austria, Portugal, 
Netherlands 
Canada, Germany, Russia 
and USA 
Licensed in The 
Netherlands 
Yes (Nov 1993) Yes (May 2009) No (physician’s statement 
necessary) 
Incorporated in Dutch 
national drug database 
Yes No (request submitted 
May 2009) 
No 
Use in ALL 10 protocol Protocol I; protocol II; sometime 
in HR therapy 
If patient is 
hypersensitive to PEG 
asparaginase 
Protocol IV; intensification / 
continuation of MR therapy 
If patient is hypersensitive to 
E. Coli asparaginase 
a Information coming from manufacturer, pharmaceutical company or subcontractor.  
ALL indicates acute lymphoblastic leukemia; E. coli Escherichia coli; HR high-risk; MR medium-risk; PEG polyethylene 
glycol; PEG asparaginase pegylated E. coli asparaginase 
8 
 Section III: The output of the CMR 
134 
All 3 forms of asparaginase are common in the treatment of ALL, but in different stages of the 
treatment. Depending on the situation of the patient and the clinical outcomes, the ALL 10 
protocol clearly recommends 1 of the 3 forms of asparaginase. Pegylated Escherichia coli 
asparaginase (polyethylene glycol (PEG) asparaginase) has been chosen because of its better 
pharmacokinetic and toxicity profile, especially the lower risk of allergic reactions.6 In case of 
allergic reactions to one of the asparaginase forms, a switch to another form is recommended. In 
this case report, we describe a case, in which E. coli asparaginase was erroneously given instead 
of PEG asparaginase to a patient with ALL on 8 different occasions. We summarize 4 additional 
cases in which different forms of asparaginase were inadvertently switched. Enhanced awareness 
of the existence of different forms of asparaginase may prevent the erroneous switching of these 
forms. 
 
CASE REPORT 
In April 2007, a 3-year-old girl visited a local hospital with symptoms of pain in the joints, malaise, several 
bruises, and fever (39.11C). She was diagnosed with pre-B cell ALL. In accordance with the protocol ALL 
10, the patient was started on remission induction chemotherapy. The initial therapy consists of 8 doses 
of E. coli asparaginase which were appropriately given to the patient. After complete remission, she 
continued with medium-risk intensification/continuation therapy which requires 15 doses of PEG 
asparaginase every 2 weeks in the first 30 weeks. This medium-risk intensification/continuation therapy 
was started in October 2007 in the academic center, where the patient correctly received her first dose of 
PEG asparaginase. The subsequent PEG asparaginase gifts were administered in the local hospital, where 
neither the prescriber nor the dispensing pharmacy team was familiar with the existence of different 
forms of asparaginase. The physician prescribed “asparaginase 1,750 IU” and enclosed the individual 
treatment scheme of the patient with the prescription. The pharmacy technician did not deduce from the 
prescription that the patient required PEG asparaginase and did not check the individual treatment 
scheme to verify this. As a result, an infusion with 1,750 IU E. coli asparaginase was compounded and 
administered. The further course of events are summarized in table 2. On week 9, the physician of the 
local hospital started to prescribe “PEG asparaginase 1,750 IU,” but the pharmacy technician continued to 
compound an infusion with 1,750 IU E. coli asparaginase. In week 15, the pharmacist in the local hospital 
noticed that the prescription mentioned “PEG asparaginase 1,750 IU” and called the physician, because he 
was only familiar with E. coli asparaginase and its generic name asparaginase. As the local physician and 
pharmacist were both unfamiliar with the existence of different forms of asparaginase and did not consult 
the individual treatment scheme or the ALL 10 protocol, they decided to administer E. coli asparaginase 
1,750 IU. 
In February 2009, after receiving a second report about the risk of erroneous exchange of PEG 
asparaginase and E. coli asparaginase, the DCOG sent out a cautionary notice to all pediatric oncologists 
that pharmacists were not always aware of the different forms of asparaginase. This warning was also 
seen by the pharmacist in the local hospital. As he remembered having dispensed E. coli asparaginase in 
2007 and 2008, he searched his dispensing history files and eventually found the file of the patient of this 
case report. She was still under treatment, but had already received her last planned dose of PEG 
asparaginase. In April 2009, her ALL treatment was completely finished and, at the time of this case report 
(July 2010), she is in complete remission. 
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DISCUSSION 
An erroneous switch of E. coli asparaginase and PEG asparaginase was made in the prescribing 
and dispensing phases of ALL. Although the clinical consequences remained unclear in this case, 
this does not make it less educative in our eyes. We suspect that this kind of medication error 
entails a substantial risk of going by unnoticed in daily practice. Besides the case presented in 
detail here, we have found 4 additional cases of confusion between E. coli asparaginase and PEG 
asparaginase in the Dutch nationwide database of medication errors (table 3).  
 
Table 3. Reports on the switching of different asparaginase forms in the medication error database of the Dutch 
Association of Hospital Pharmacists (NVZA). 
 
Case Description Classification 
of error 
Patient outcome 
1  Described in detail in this report. 
 
Prescribing and 
dispensing error 
To the present day, ALL has not 
recurred, but the potential risk of 
a recurrence still exists (see the 
Discussion). 
2 Occurred in same local hospital as case 1 (and was 
likewise discovered retrospectively by the pharmacist). 
The nature and course were comparable with those of 
case 1 
Prescribing and 
dispensing error 
To the present day, ALL has not 
recurred, but the potential risk of 
a recurrence still exists (see the 
Discussion). 
3 A patient, who had been diagnosed with ALL in an 
academic centre, went to a local hospital for shared care. 
The local physician prescribed PEG asparaginase, but the 
pharmacy technician compounded and dispensed an 
infusion with E.coli asparaginase, because this was the 
only form of asparaginase listed in the computerized 
pharmacy system. The exchange was discovered in time 
(i.e. before administration) by the physician.  
Dispensing error No harm 
 
4 Occurred in same local hospital as case 3. After discovery 
of case 3, physician and pharmacist remembered a 
similar exchange in another patient who had also come 
from an academic centre. Due to the long distance, the 
patient went a few times to the local hospital. In this 
latter case, the switch was not discovered before 
administration and the patient received a few doses of 
E.coli asparaginase instead of PEG asparaginase. 
Dispensing error To the present day, ALL has not 
recurred, but the potential risk of 
a recurrence still exists (see the 
Discussion). 
5 A patient treated in an academic centre developed an 
allergic reaction to E. coli asparaginase after the first 2 
doses. The treating physician switched to PEG 
asparaginase, but chose the wrong item in the CPOE 
system for its sixth dose. This hospital has incorporated 
manually the protocol in CPOE system. As a result, the 
pharmacy compounded E.coli asparaginase instead of 
PEG asparaginase, but this exchange was discovered in 
time (i.e. before administration) by another physician. 
Prescribing error
 
No harm  
ALL acute lymphoblastic leukemia; E. coli Escherichia coli; CPOE computer prescription order entry; 
NVZA Netherlands Association of Hospital Pharmacists; PEG polyethylene glycol; PEG asparaginase pegylated E. coli 
asparaginase 
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For comparable depletion of asparagine, E. coli asparaginase requires a higher dose and higher 
administration frequency than PEG asparaginase (table 1), because it has a shorter half-life.1,4,5,6 
As a result, the 3 patients who accidentally received E. coli asparaginase instead of PEG 
asparaginase were undertreated, because the E. coli asparaginase was administered to them in 
lower doses and dose frequencies (which were appropriate for the PEG form only). The 2 other 
erroneous exchanges of E. coli asparaginase and PEG asparaginase were near misses. 
Several mechanisms may have contributed to the confusion in this case. The communication 
between the academic center and the local hospital was not optimally organised. The academic 
center and local hospital updated the treatment status by fax, but the content and layout of 
these faxes were not well structured. Physicians sometimes could not deduce which dose had 
been given last or in which week of the treatment the patient was. Four of the 5 cases in table 3 
(including the case reported here) occurred in a local hospital that provided shared care in 
collaboration with an academic center. A local hospital does not  have the same degree of 
experience with ALL treatment and healthcare providers of local hospitals are not always 
specifically trained for the use of this complex protocol. In 3 cases, E. coli asparaginase was the 
only form of asparaginase listed in the computerized pharmacy system and this form was 
dispensed instead of the PEG asparaginase that should have been selected. In 2 cases, selecting 
the correct form of asparaginase was also hampered by the prescription of asparaginase by its 
generic name only (e.g. without specification of the PEG form). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
A recent study has shown that 7% of adult cancer outpatient visits and 19% of pediatric cancer 
outpatient visits were associated with medication errors.7 As this study did not identify any 
medication error with asparaginase, we believe this to be the first reported case of a patient who 
was erroneously administered E. coli asparaginase. This case report shows the risk of such an 
erroneous exchange and the following recommendations are derived to prevent this kind of 
medication errors. Every physician, nurse, pharmacist, and pharmacy technician involved in the 
treatment of ALL should be aware of the existence of 3 different forms of asparaginase and that 
selection of an incorrect form entails a health risk. Healthcare providers should be vigilant when 
prescribing and dispensing asparaginase. More specifically, they should be trained in the correct 
application of the ALL 10 protocol in its different stages. To reduce the risk of erroneous 
exchange, we recommend that all forms of asparaginase registered and/or described in 
treatment protocols should be incorporated in the drug database that is used in hospitals for 
drug identification. We also recommend computerized warnings about the existence of 3 forms 
of asparaginase, should be generated whenever asparaginase is ordered, compounded, or 
dispensed. On every occasion, a supervisor/colleague should check whether the exact type and 
dose of asparaginase is prescribed and dispensed. Special attention is needed when 2 hospitals 
share the care for a patient with ALL. In such cases, the pediatric oncology center initiating the 
treatment should communicate clearly and unequivocally to the shared care local center by 
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means of precise, accurate, and written prescriptions, which form of asparaginase has to be given 
in which dose at different stages of the treatment. This information should be registered in a 
format that is accessible for physicians and pharmacists on both sides. 
Although the ALL 10 protocol is intended to guide usual care, it has been approved by an 
accredited Medical Review Ethics Committee. As the DCOG will compare its results with the 
results of a former treatment protocol and those of other international treatment schemes, the 
application of the protocol can be considered as the conduction of a prospective experiment or 
trial. As such, its application requires extra attention and quality control by means of Good 
Clinical Practice. 
Last but not least, an erroneous exchange such as described here is not specific for asparaginase, 
so comparable measures are warranted for other drugs which entail similar risks. Special 
attention should be paid to medicines which are available in different formulations or which are 
biosimilars.8-10 In general most of the recommendations in this case report can also be applied to 
prevent medication errors with these other drugs, but each case should be analysed to see 
whether specific recommendations are also needed. 
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: In the Netherlands, a Central Medication Incidents Registration (CMR) system is 
operational. To prevent recurrence of reported medication errors the CMR sends medication 
error alerts with recommendations. It is up to the healthcare workers whether or not to 
implement the recommendations in clinical practice, which may lead to variations in degrees of 
uptake of the recommendations. 
Objective: The aim of this study was to explore the degree of self-reported uptake of the 
recommendations and to identify potential determinants associated with successful uptake. 
Design: This is a cross-sectional study conducted within a convenience sample of 33 Dutch 
hospital pharmacies. The study was carried out from April 2009 to September 2010. 
Measurements: Three alerts were selected for the study: administration of methotrexate in a 
dosage of once a day instead of once a week, administration of undiluted potassium-sodium-
phosphate concentrate, and administration of glucose 50% instead of 5%. The primary outcome 
was the degree of self-reported uptake of the specific recommendations and the associations of 
the degree of uptake with several potential determinants. 
Results: Twenty-one hospitals (63.6%) had adopted all recommendations about methotrexate. A 
quarter of the hospitals (24.2%) had adopted all recommendations related to potassium-sodium-
phosphate concentrate. For the alert about glucose 50%, none of the hospitals had implemented 
all the recommendations. No statistically significant associations between potential determinants 
and the degree of uptake were found. 
Conclusions: This study is the first to investigate the degree of uptake of the recommendations of 
three different CMR alerts. The alerts varied in the degrees of self-reported uptake of the 
recommendations, with the methotrexate alert having the highest degree of uptake. No 
significant associations with potential determinants were found. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patient safety has gained worldwide attention and many actions have been taken to reduce 
medical errors. One of the key strategies is the establishment of nationwide reporting systems 
for adverse events and errors, which combine reports from different sources and can be used to 
evaluate error types and their underlying causes. Strong features of a spontaneous reporting 
system are its potential function as a rapid warning system and its relatively inexpensive 
approach to collect and learn from submitted reports. Potentially weak features are 
underreporting, the variable quality of the reports and the lack of clarity of the denominator for 
quantitative indicators.1-3 With respect to the early warning function, national organisations 
across the world have implemented systems for dissemination of alert messages to healthcare 
providers.4 Examples are the Institute for Safe Medication Practice in the USA and the National 
Patient Safety Agency in the UK.5-8 In the Netherlands the Central Medication Incidents 
Registration (CMR) system was set up in 2006.9 Up to June 2011 the CMR sent 17 alerts by email 
to healthcare providers about a reported medication error with high risk of recurrence, potential 
risk of serious harm to the patient and high educational value. These CMR alerts also included 
recommendations to prevent recurrence of the error. 
The CMR organisation disseminates alerts including recommendations, but it has no legal power 
to enforce implementation of recommendations in clinical practice. This may lead to variations in 
degrees of uptake of recommendations. However, limited evaluations of the uptake of alerts in 
practice have been performed. A few studies found variations in the awareness of the alerts 
among healthcare providers and in the uptake of recommendations.8,10-14 For instance, in a 
survey of healthcare providers in the USA most of them were aware of the overall labelling and 
packaging recommendations for intravenous vincristine. Awareness and implementation were 
lower regarding more specific recommendations.14 A study in the UK showed that awareness of 
Rapid Response Reports by the National Reporting and Learning System varied from 50% to 84% 
among medical, nursing and clinical governance directors.12,13 Seventy-five per cent of the 
directors indicated that the recommendations could ‘always’ or ‘usually’ be implemented, but 
this was in contrast with the results that 61-85% of relevant trusts had still not completed 
implementation.12 After a latex allergy alert with a recommendation to replace latex-containing 
equipment only 19% of the nurses were aware that they had access to latex-free specific 
equipment in their practices.11 In a multi-method study in the UK, Lowson et al. studied the 
receipt of the alert, dissemination of the alert, implementation of the alert and monitoring of 
action. With a survey, (telephone) interviews, and site visits they concluded variations in how 
trusts disseminate, implement and monitor the alerts. Sixty-five per cent of respondents have a 
formal procedure for the dissemination of patient alerts and 22% of respondents stated there 
was no formal procedure. An audit was never undertaken by 32% of respondents and only once 
by 11%.8 In another UK study the uptake of recommendations following a medication safety alert 
seemed to be very effective. As a result of inappropriate administration of concentrated 
potassium chloride, the National Patient Safety Agency sent out an alert with the 
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recommendation to remove it from clinical areas. In this study 80 of the 87 (92%) wards and 
departments stored the strong potassium chloride in a controlled drug cupboard or a separate 
locked cupboard.10 
Most studies focused on awareness of the distributed alerts among healthcare providers and 
only few studies looked at the actual degree of adoption of recommendations. 10-14 Furthermore 
insight into potential determinants associated with the degree of uptake of recommendations 
has not been investigated yet. Implementation may be influenced both by the nature of the alert 
(including the recommendations) and by the characteristics of the intended users and the 
healthcare settings. Therefore, the aim of this study was to explore the degree of uptake of the 
recommendations that were issued in three medication safety alerts and to identify potential 
determinants associated with successful uptake. 
 
METHODS 
Study design 
A survey was performed in a convenience sample of 33 hospital pharmacies in the Netherlands. 
The study was carried out from April 2009 to September 2010 and was focused on the 
medication safety alerts that were disseminated to hospital pharmacies only. In the study period 
the CMR disseminated the alerts solely to hospital pharmacies because only hospitals 
participated in the CMR. 
 
Study population 
A convenience sample of 33 Dutch hospital pharmacies in the Utrecht Pharmacy Practice network 
for Education and Research (UPPER) of the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Utrecht 
University was invited to participate in this study. The hospitals received an invitation for the 
study when a traineeship pharmacy student was scheduled in the study period by the UPPER 
organisation. UPPER is a network consisting of hospital pharmacies and community pharmacies 
that regularly participate in research and traineeships for pharmacy students of this department. 
The Netherlands has 93 hospitals and almost all Dutch hospital pharmacies are part of the UPPER 
network. The hospital pharmacy has a role in medication surveillance and dispensing in the 
hospital. In all hospitals the pharmacy technicians visit the wards to replenish the ward stocks 
daily and the hospital pharmacies are responsible for the ward stock list. Routine visits by clinical 
pharmacists are not generally performed, but they review all prescriptions in the hospital and 
apply medication surveillance by using a clinical decision support system of the pharmacy 
medication system. Hospitals always have a pharmacy medication system for entering the 
prescription whether a hospital has implemented computerized physician order entry (CPOE) or 
not. This is a centralized activity (performed in the hospital pharmacy) and does not require daily 
ward visits. The hospitals do not differ in these procedures. 
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Data collection 
The researchers selected three CMR alerts by using the following criteria: the alert should be 
targeted primarily to hospital pharmacists, the alert had been disseminated at least 2 years ago 
(in the period 2006 and 2007) and clear recommendations were issued with the alert or could 
easily be derived from the alert. All the CMR alerts have been published on the website of the 
CMR organisation.9,15 The selected alerts concerned the following errors: the daily administration 
of methotrexate after incorrect labelling of once a day instead of once a week; the administration 
of undiluted potassium sodium-phosphate concentrate; and the administration of glucose 50% 
instead of glucose 5%. From these three CMR alerts and recommendations the researchers 
prepared a structured questionnaire referring to the practical implementation. The research 
team developed the questions (indicators for correct implementation) directly from the 
recommendations in the three alerts. Table 1 summarizes the selected CMR alerts, their 
recommendations and the derived indicators for the correct implementation (ie, questions in the 
questionnaire). Within the UPPER network 33 pharmacy students went to their hospitals (n=33, 
each student went to one hospital) for their internship. During the internship each student was 
assigned to perform face-to-face interviews with the hospital pharmacist who supervised the 
student. The students used a structured questionnaire during the interview. Hospital pharmacists 
responsible for the training of residents and interns were generally interviewed. These hospital 
pharmacists have at least 5 years working experience and they belong to the senior staff of the 
hospital pharmacy. If necessary the students could perform onsite observations to support the 
answers in the questionnaire, but whether or not observations were carried out was not 
documented. The onsite observations were not compulsory and the students independently 
decided whether the observations were necessary. Both the face-to-face interview and the onsite 
observations were performed during the traineeship in the hospitals. Before the start of the 
traineeship the students received a briefing about this research at the university. 
 
Measures 
The indicators for the degree of uptake of the three CMR alerts varied from four to five per alert 
(table 1). The indicators concerned the presence of medication in the pharmacy stock, a protocol 
and cautionary text added to the pharmacy stock. Some indicators were related to the operating 
procedures during prescribing and dispensing. 
On the basis of common sense and their knowledge of the field, the researchers selected the 
following potential determinants which could be associated with the uptake: the number of beds 
(including nursing homes and other institutions where the hospital pharmacy dispensed 
medication), the number of employees in the hospital pharmacy (divided into pharmacists, 
pharmacy technicians, and others, e.g. management staff), the use of CPOE for prescribing 
medication and the number of medication errors reported to the CMR in the last 12 months. 
Additionally, some characteristics of the hospital (type of hospital (university, teaching, general) 
and its region (north, east, south and west)) were collected. 
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Table 1. CMR alerts.  
 
Description of the medication error which was 
published in the CMR alert (year of dissemination of 
the CMR alert) 
Recommendations as a result of the described 
medication error in the CMR alert 
Administration of methotrexate with a labelled dosage 
of once a day instead of once a week (2006) 
During admission the nurse entered the home 
medication of the patient in the CPOE as provisional 
prescriptions. For methotrexate 7.5 mg the nurse 
entered a dose of one tablet per day instead of one 
tablet per week. The physician forgot to authorize the 
provisional prescriptions of the patient in the CPOE. In 
spite of this, the patient received the medication and 
methotrexate 7.5 mg had been administrated for 9 days 
in a row. The patient died after a few days. 
• Withdraw all methotrexate tablets in the stocks of the 
wards.  
• Dispense methotrexate tablets only for one day to the 
wards.  
 
Administration of undiluted potassium-sodium-
phosphate concentrate (2006) 
A patient on intravenous drip feed on the pulmonary 
ward was prescribed potassium-sodium-phosphate 
concentrate. The nurse read ‘one phial potassium-
sodium-phosphate concentrate once-only intravenous’. 
The nurse administrated the undiluted potassium-
sodium-phosphate concentrate intravenously to the 
patient. Within a few minutes the patient died from a 
cardiac arrest caused by high dose of potassium. 
• No specific recommendation was mentioned in the 
alert. In the alert the hospital pharmacists could read 
that the hospital has changed the potassium-sodium-
phosphate concentrate to glycerophosphate 
concentrate in the stock, and removed the potassium-
sodium-phosphate concentrate from the ward stocks. 
Furthermore, from the error description it is also clear 
that one should have a protocol containing information 
on the maximum infusion rate. 
Administration of glucose 50% instead of glucose 5% 
(2007) 
A resident received an order from a cardiologist over the 
telephone for 1 litre of glucose 5% for a patient with 
dehydration. The resident did not hear what the 
cardiologist said and he thought the cardiologist wanted 
1 litre of glucose 50%. The resident  commissioned the 
nurse to administer 1 litre of glucose 50% in 6 h. 
Although the nurse mentioned that it was an unusual 
dose the resident insisted it was an order from the 
cardiologist. The nurse used the free text space in the 
CPOE to order 1 litre of glucose 50%. The 100 ml glucose 
50% phials were available in the ward and 10 phials 
were infused. During the night the patient had agonal 
respiration, bradycardia, low tension and high blood 
sugar level. The patient died the next morning. 
• Make instruction about how to handle an order over 
the telephone (repeat the order). 
• Avoid using the free text space in the computer system 
because of the absence of medication surveillance. 
Though a check by the pharmacist is necessary. 
• Education about therapy to physicians and residents. 
• Change glucose 50% to glucose 40% in the stock of the 
wards. 
• Mention in the procedure that the pharmacy should be 
consulted if there are any doubts. 
• Pay attention to the hierarchy and attitude between 
physicians, supervisor, residents and nurses. 
a Questions were developed by the research team. The questions were derived directly from the recommendations. 
b Weighting of each response to the questions.  
CMR Central Medication incidents Registration; CPOE computerized physician order entry. 
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Questions for the hospital pharmacist a  (questionnaire) 
 
 
Weightingb
• Is there any methotrexate in the stock of the wards?  No = 20%
• Is there any caution text to warn personnel about the high dispensing volume of methotrexate 
tablets or injections in the central stock of the hospital pharmacy? 
Yes = 20%
• Is there any medication surveillance of the methotrexate dose in the pharmacy computer system?  Yes = 20%
• Does the pharmacy dispense methotrexate in a once per week dose?  Yes = 20%
• Does the pharmacy record the date of dispensing methotrexate? 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes = 20%
• Does the hospital pharmacy have glycerophosphate as the only phosphate for injection ?  
(if yes, the following three questions don not need answering) 
Yes = 100%
• Is there any stock of phosphate injection with potassium at the wards? No = 33.3%
• Does the protocol about parenterals describe a maximum concentration of phosphate to 
administer?  
Yes = 33.3%
• Does the protocol about parenteral describe a maximum rate of infusion? 
 
 
 
 
Yes = 33.3%
• Is there a protocol about how to handle an order by telephone?  Yes = 25%
• Is it allowed to prescribe (CPOE) or enter (Pharmacy Medication System) a dose in the free text 
space?  
(if it is allowed, still a score of 25% is possible if the following question was answered yes: does the 
pharmacist check all free text information?) 
No = 25%
 
Yes = 25% 
• Is there any glucose 50% in stock of the wards?  No = 25%
• Is there a protocol with the advice to call the pharmacy if there is any doubt on the number of 
phials to administer?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes = 25%
 
The primary outcome was the degree of uptake of the specific recommendations per alert. For 
analysis the indicators that were derived from the recommendations were scored (weighted) as 
to whether or not the specific recommendation had been adopted (see table 1 for potential 
weighting in % for each indicator). For each alert the hospital pharmacy was able to score a 
maximum of 100% (complete uptake). 
For the number of employees as a potential determinant, the researcher calculated the ratio of 
the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) of pharmacists or pharmacy technicians or total 
personnel (including other staff like management staff) per 100 beds. The total number of beds 
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consisted of beds in the hospital, nursing homes and other institutions to which the hospital 
pharmacy dispensed medication. Beds in the hospital are more time consuming and therefore 
these beds were given double weight in the calculation of the ratio. Another potential 
determinant was the use of CPOE, which was considered to be actively used when at least 80% of 
the prescriptions were entered in the CPOE by the physicians. The last potential factor was the 
number of medication errors reported to the CMR in the last 12 months.9 
 
Data analysis 
Data were documented in Microsoft Office Excel 2003 SP3 sheets. The students could upload the 
results on a dedicated website, which were downloaded by the researchers. The separate Excel 
sheets were merged into a single data file, which was analysed with IBM Predictive Analytics 
SoftWare (PASW) Statistics V.18. 
The degree of uptake was divided into two groups: complete uptake (score 100%) and non-
complete uptake (score 0-99%). The potential determinants were also divided into two groups 
for further statistical analysis. We used the median as a cut-off value to divide FTE pharmacist per 
100 beds, FTE pharmacy technicians per 100 beds, total FTE pharmacy staff per 100 beds into two 
categories: hospital with low FTE per 100 beds and hospital with high FTE per 100 beds. The use 
of CPOE was divided into two groups: hospitals using CPOE and hospitals not using CPOE. A 
hospital was considered to use CPOE when at least 80% of the prescriptions were entered in the 
CPOE by the physicians. The reporting to CMR was also divided into two groups: hospitals actively 
reporting medication errors to the CMR and hospitals not actively reporting. Hospitals can report 
all kinds of medication errors to the CMR.9 The researchers used the median of the number of 
reported medication errors to divide this potential determinant into two groups and the hospitals 
that did not report any reports were excluded from the calculation of the median because these 
hospitals were already included as not actively reporting. 
Descriptive statistics were used for the degree of uptake of the recommendations and the 
general characteristics. For analysis of the association between the degrees of uptake and the 
potential determinants, Fisher’s exact test with risk estimate was used. 
 
RESULTS 
Characteristics 
All 33 invited hospitals were visited by the pharmacy students and provided data. Table 2 
describes some characteristic of these hospitals. More than half (54.5%) of the hospitals were 
located in the western part of The Netherlands. Data were only available from one hospital in the 
North of The Netherlands. Almost half (45.5%) of the hospitals were teaching hospitals, 39.4% 
were general hospitals and 15.2% were university hospitals. A university hospital is linked to a 
medical school, but both university hospitals and teaching hospitals train residents. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of hospitals. 
 
Characteristics Hospitals: n (%), Median (range)
Region 
 West 
 East 
 South 
 North 
18 (54.5) 
7 (21.2) 
7 (21.2) 
1 (3.0) 
Hospital type 
 Teaching  
 General 
 University centre 
15 (45.5) 
13 (39.4) 
5 (15.2) 
Beds for which pharmacy service is provided 
 ≤ 1,000 
 ≥ 1,001 
1,069 (642 – 3,217) 
14 (42.4) 
19 (57.6) 
Beds (weighted) for which pharmacy service is provided
≤ 2,000 
≥ 2,001 
1,930 (904 – 4,776) 
18 (54.5) 
15 (45.5) 
FTE hospital pharmacists 
≤ 8.0 
> 8.0  
8.0 (2.1 – 26.1) 
17 (51.5) 
16 (48.5) 
FTE pharmacy technicians  26.5 (10.0 – 86.0) 
FTE total staff in hospital pharmacy 49.8 (16.6 – 148.5) 
FTE pharmacist per 100 beds
< 0.4 
≥ 0.4 
0.4 (0.2 – 1.0) 
17 (51.5) 
16 (48.5)  
FTE pharmacy technician per 100 beds 
< 1.5 
≥ 1.5 
1.5 (0.3 – 2.4) 
16 (48.5) 
17 (51.5) 
Total FTE pharmacy staff per 100 beds 
 < 2.6 
 ≥ 2.6 
2.6 (1.0 – 7.1) 
16 (48.5) 
17 (51.5) 
Using CPOE for prescribing ≥ 80% of medications
 No 
 Yes 
16 (48.5) 
17 (51.5) 
Number of reported medication errors to the CMR in last 12 months
0 ≤ 66 
≥ 67 
66 (1 – 613) 
25 (75.8) 
8 (24.2) 
CMR Central Medication incidents Registration; CPOE computerized physician order entry; FTE full-time equivalent 
 
Potential determinants 
Table 2 also summarizes the potential determinants and the medians. Within the potential 
determinant reporting to CMR, the two groups are not equally divided because half of the 
hospitals (48.5%) did not report any medication errors to the CMR in the last 12 months and 
12 (36.4%) hospitals reported 25 or more medication errors in the last 12 months. 
 
Degree of uptake 
Table 3 shows the number of hospitals and the adoption of the specific recommendations.  
For analysis we used the total number of recommendations that each hospital has adopted for 
each of the three alerts. Twenty-one hospitals (63.6%) had adopted all five CMR 
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recommendations about methotrexate (complete uptake and score is 100%). Two hospitals 
(6.1%) adopted only three recommendations and 10 hospitals (30.3%) adopted four out of five 
recommendations. All hospitals had adopted at least three of the five recommendations related 
to methotrexate. 
 
Table 3. Implementation of the specific recommendation. 
 
CMR alert (year of dissemination 
of the CMR alert) 
   Number of hospitals that adopted the recommendation n (%)
Administration of methotrexate 
with a labelled dosage of once a 
day instead of once a week (2006) 
• Is there any methotrexate in the stock of the wards? No 32 (97)
• Is there any caution text to warn personnel about the high 
dispensing volume of methotrexate tablets or injections in the 
central stock of the hospital pharmacy? 
Yes 23 (70)
• Is there any medication surveillance of the methotrexate dose in 
the pharmacy computer system?  
Yes 32 (97)
• Does the pharmacy dispense methotrexate in a once per week 
dose?  
Yes 32 (97)
• Does the pharmacy record the date of dispensing methotrexate? Yes 32 (97)
Administration of undiluted 
potassium-sodium-phosphate 
concentrate (2006) 
• Does the hospital pharmacy have glycerophosphate as the only 
phosphate for injection ? (if yes, the following three questions 
don not need answering) 
Yes 4 (12)
• Is there any stock of phosphate injection with potassium on the 
wards? 
No 10 (30)
• Does the protocol about parenterals describe a maximum 
concentration of phosphate to administer?  
Yes 17 (52)
• Does the protocol about parenteral describe a maximum rate of 
infusion? 
Yes 19 (58)
Administration of glucose 50% 
instead of glucose 5% (2007) 
• Is there a protocol about how to handle an order through 
telephone?  
Yes 16 (49)
• Is it allowed to prescribe a dose in the free text space?  
(If it is allowed, still a score of 25% could be possible, if the 
following question was answered yes: does the pharmacist check 
all free text information?) 
No 
 
 
Yes 
5 (15)
 
 
12 (36) 
• Is there any glucose 50% in stock of the wards?  No 6 (18)
• Is there a protocol with the advice to call the pharmacy if there is 
any doubt on the amount of phials to administer?  
Yes 1 (3)
CMR Central Medication incidents Registration 
 
For the alert about administration of undiluted potassium-sodium-phosphate concentrate a 
quarter of the hospitals (24.2%) had adopted all the recommendations (complete uptake and 
score of 100%). Fourteen hospitals (42.4%) adopted two recommendations and eight hospitals 
(24.2%) adopted only one recommendation. Three hospitals (9.1%) did not adopt any 
recommendations. 
For the alert about the accidental administration of glucose 50% instead of glucose 5%, only 
three hospitals (9.1%) had a score of 75% (uptake of three out of four recommendations) and 
none of the hospitals had a complete uptake. Almost half of the hospitals (45.5%) adopted only 
one recommendation. Eight hospitals (24.2%) adopted two recommendations and seven 
hospitals (21.2%) did not adopt any recommendations. Because of the low degree of uptake of 
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these recommendations, the researcher did not analyse the association with potential 
determinants for this alert. 
 
Association of degree of uptake with potential determinants  
No statistically significant associations of the degree of uptake of the recommendations with 
potential determinants were found (table 4), but a non-significant trend towards an association 
with actively reporting to the CMR and a better uptake of the recommendation could be 
identified. Some potential determinants like FTE pharmacy employees per 100 beds and the use 
of CPOE tended to be associated with reduced uptake of recommendations related to the 
administration of undiluted potassium-sodium-phosphate concentrate. 
 
Table 4. Association with degree of uptake and potential determinants 
 
 Complete (100%) and non-complete (0-99%) implementation of the CMR alert 
 Administration of methotrexate with a 
labelled dosage of once a day instead of 
once a week  
Administration of undiluted 
potassium-sodium-phosphate 
concentrate  
 OR (CI 95%) p-value OR (CI 95%) p-value
FTE pharmacists per 100 
weighted beds 
  
< 0.4 
≥ 0.4 
Ref.  
0.9 (0.2 - 3.8) 1.00 
Ref. 
0.6 (0.1 - 2.8) 
 
0.69 
FTE pharmacy technicians per 
100 weighted beds 
  
< 1.5 
≥ 1.5 
Ref. 
0.7 (0.2 - 2.7) 0,72 
Ref.
0.5 (0.1 - 2.4) 
 
0.44 
FTE total personnel per 100 
weighted beds 
  
< 2.6 
≥ 2.6 
Ref.  
0.7 (0.2 - 2.7) 0.72 
Ref. 
0.2 (0.0 - 1.3) 
 
0.12 
Use of CPOE  
No 
Yes 
Ref.  
0.7 (0.2 - 2.7) 0.72 
Ref. 
0.2 (0.0 - 1.3) 
 
0.12 
Actively reporting medication 
errors to the CMR 
  
0 ≤ 66 
≥ 67 
Ref. 
2.0 (0.3 - 12.0) 0.68 
Ref.
2.4 (0.4 - 13.6) 
 
0.37 
CMR Central Medication incidents Registration; CPOE computerized physician order entry; FTE full-time equivalent 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study the recommendations of the three alerts had different degrees of uptake across 
hospitals, with the methotrexate alert having the highest degree. Statistically significant 
associations of the degree of uptake with potential determinants were not found, but a non-
significant trend towards an association between the degree of uptake and some of the potential 
determinants was found. 
A variation of uptake across hospitals was also shown in a UK study after disseminating a national 
safety alert emphasizing that correct surgical sites should be marked. During the baseline period 
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48% of the surgeons marked the patient routinely and after disseminating the alert 85% were 
marking routinely. By contrast the compliance with the recommended procedures for marking in 
detail, such as how to mark, who should mark and the visibility of the marking after draping the 
patient, was variable.16 Another survey showed variation in the awareness of different 
recommendations that were disseminated in the same guidance about intravenous vincristine. 
Most respondents were aware of overall recommendations but less aware of more specific 
recommendations. The compliance for the overall recommendation about a clear warning label 
was 86.1% and the lowest compliance was 31.4% for the specific recommendation about not to 
administer vincristine doses in a syringe.14 
The nature and the consequences of the recommendations could explain the variation of uptake. 
Qualitative studies among medical and nursing directors, clinical governance directors, chief 
pharmacists and junior doctors in the UK suggest that a good alert consists of clear advice, the 
action to be taken should be straightforward and evidence based. The researchers concluded 
that recommendations to control access to a drug are easier to implement than 
recommendations that require behavioral changes.12 The CMR recommendation about changing 
glucose 50% to glucose 40% required physicians to change their prescribing behaviour. 
Withdrawing methotrexate tablets and replacing a phosphate product in the ward stocks are 
easier recommendations to implement. 
Another possible explanation for the variation of uptake was that, since 2006, the Health Care 
Inspectorate has sent out several warnings about incorrect dosing of methotrexate tablets. 
Rhodes et al. suggested that the reputation of the sender of the alerts could be related to the 
uptake of alerts. A central organisation that belongs to an authority may influence the healthcare 
provider to adopt the recommendations.16 
Beside the Health Care Inspectorate, several professional associations also paid extra attention to 
the safe use of methotrexate in the same period. In addition, the CMR sent out a second alert 
about the dosing of methotrexate in 2006 and a third one in 2009. This extra attention may have 
enhanced awareness of the safe use of methotrexate. 
The statistical analysis showed no statistically significant associations between the degree of 
uptake of the recommendations and potential determinants. However, a non-significant trend 
towards an association between the degree of uptake and actively reporting errors to the CMR 
was detected. 
The other potential determinants had a non-significant trend towards an inverse association with 
the degree of uptake of the recommendations related to the administration of undiluted 
potassium-sodium-phosphate concentrate. More FTE pharmacy technicians or total personnel 
per 100 beds seemed to be related to a lower degree of uptake of the recommendations. It is 
possible that the high number of staff in an organisation leads to more frequent 
miscommunication. This could lead to an unawareness of the CMR alerts with the result that the 
pharmacy staff did not carry out the recommendations.  
 Chapter 9: Self-reported uptake of recommendation alerts  
153 
Finally, the use of CPOE showed a non-significant trend with a lower degree of uptake of the 
recommendation related to the administration of undiluted potassium-sodium-phosphate 
concentrate. During the study most of the hospitals were in the implementation phase of CPOE 
into clinical practice. Implementation of CPOE in a hospital is time consuming and medical staff 
may be focused too much on the CPOE instead of other patient safety issues. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
The main strength of this study was the comprehensiveness of the interview. Hospital 
pharmacists may have presented a rather positive picture of their adherence, but the onsite 
observations may have counterbalanced this. None of the students mentioned a difference 
between interview and observations. However, we cannot be sure about this counterbalance 
because the observations were not mandatory and they were not documented, which is a 
potential limitation. 
The questions were not tested to assess their formulation and the questionnaire was also not 
tested to assess whether students were well trained. We assume this limitation had a minimal 
effect because the questions and answers were straightforward and developed directly from the 
recommendations. Furthermore the students also received a briefing about this research. 
Another limitation was the long study period, which was due to the training schedule of the 
pharmacy students. Most pharmacy students preferred a traineeship in hospitals in the West of 
The Netherlands (relatively close to their university). The non-random sampling of hospitals and 
their small number may have reduced the statistical power to detect significant associations. We 
did not perform a formal a priori power calculation as this was an exploratory study. To acquire 
an estimate of sample size we calculated a post hoc power with the most predictive determinant 
(reporting errors to the CMR as a determinant of the degree of uptake of the recommendation of 
the CMR alert about administration of undiluted potassium-sodium-phosphate concentrate). The 
result was an estimated sample size of 208 hospitals which exceeded by far the 93 hospitals that 
are currently operational in The Netherlands. Apparently, a study such as ours can probably only 
detect very strong associations. 
Finally, no baseline measurements were performed in our cross-sectional study, which makes it 
impossible to establish causal effects. 
 
Implications for research 
This is the first study to explore the degree of uptake of recommendations that were issued in 
alerts relating to medication errors and to identify potential determinants associated with the 
degree of uptake. In this study we only analysed a handful of potential determinants related to 
the pharmacy which were chosen on the basis of common sense and our knowledge of the field. 
Apart from staffing levels and workload, we selected the degree of participation in the CMR 
reporting system as a potential determinant, as reflected by the number of reported medication 
errors to the CMR. Another potential determinant was the implementation of CPOE, which was 
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one of the national hospital patient safety goals during our study. Achievement of this goal and 
the uptake of the recommendations were activities that were both disseminated by external 
organisations. More and larger studies are now necessary to investigate the current potential 
determinants and to identify other potential determinants. Although the CMR alerts are targeted 
to hospital pharmacists, nurses and medical staff are also involved in the process of medication 
use. Most of the recommendations were relevant for nurses and medical staff and without their 
support it would be impossible to adopt all recommendations successfully. Therefore it is also 
necessary to identify the determinants that are related to nurses and medical staff. 
The degree of uptake varied among recommendations in the same alert. Rhodes et al. identified 
three approaches to implementation of recommendations: no dissemination or implementation, 
dissemination and passive implementation, and active dissemination and implementation.16 
It is necessary to investigate these approaches and the variances in uptake to enhance the uptake 
of future recommendations. 
 
Implications for practice 
The degrees of uptake of the recommendations varied. Although the CMR organisation has no 
legal power to enforce implementation of recommendations, the degree of uptake is taken into 
account when hospitals or individual healthcare workers are audited after a serious error. 
The CMR organisation should consider ways to increase the uptake of recommendations. For 
example, the recommendations should concentrate on what should be done but the reasons why 
it should be done are also important.16 A higher degree of uptake may also be possible when the 
recommendations are based on solid evidence.17 Another way to enhance the awareness and 
uptake is to increase the frequency of dissemination. This study showed that uptake may 
increase when an alert is repeatedly sent out, as was the case with the methotrexate alert. 
Furthermore, an active participation in CMR seems to be associated with alert uptake, so 
participation needs to be stimulated. 
Reporting medication errors has gained much attention and the number of reports is growing. A 
possible consequence is that more alerts with recommendations could be sent out and need to 
be implemented. To set off the high number of alerts the practice needs tools to facilitate the 
implementation. One of these tools could be an efficient communication channel to disseminate 
recommendations. At this moment the hospital pharmacists and community pharmacists receive 
the CMR alert by a personal email. Physicians and nurses are involved in the medication process 
and most of the CMR alerts are also relevant for them. To broaden the dissemination of the CMR 
alerts the CMR organisation needs to collaborate with the professional bodies of physicians and 
nurses.  
Last but not least, it is important to realize that distributing alerts to the relevant healthcare 
providers is not enough. Integrated change management is necessary for successful 
implementation.18 
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CONCLUSION 
This study is the first that investigated the degree of uptake of the recommendations of three 
different CMR alerts. The alerts varied in the degrees of uptake of the recommendations, with 
the methotrexate alert having the highest degree of uptake. No significant associations with 
potential determinants were found. 
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 Chapter 10 
 
 
General discussion 
Learning from medication errors through a nationwide reporting programme 
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The research presented in this thesis focused on a particular nationwide system to report, 
analyse and alert medication errors in healthcare. In this final chapter the main findings will be 
summarized and discussed, followed by suggestions for future developments.  
In recent years, risk management programmes have been introduced in healthcare across the 
world. Recognition, reporting and analysis of medication errors is an important strategy towards 
the reduction of errors to gain insight into the nature, underlying causes, potential or actual 
consequences, outcomes and risk factors of medication errors. Ideally, not only the recognition 
and reporting of medication errors but also the analysis is first done by healthcare providers at 
the local level. In a second step medication errors can be collected and shared at the national 
level to facilitate learning across local settings. According to Santell, a nationwide medication 
error reporting programme can uncover previously unknown information and trends. Such a 
reporting programme can also reaffirm problem-prone areas over a large population.1 The 
principal role of these national reporting programmes is to ensure a consistent and coordinated 
national approach to the collection, identification and analysis of errors so that lessons can be 
learnt and shared nationally.2 
 
CENTRAL MEDICATION INCIDENTS REGISTRATION 
In The Netherlands, medication errors can be reported to a nationwide reporting programme 
named Central Medication incidents Registration (CMR). Healthcare providers who work in 
hospitals or community pharmacies can report medication errors via their local reporting 
programmes or directly to the CMR. The CMR organisation has been set up to collect, select, and 
analyse the reports and to disseminate feedback in the form of alerts and newsletters with 
recommendations to healthcare providers in clinical practice.  
Establishing and maintaining such a reporting programme in a country raises several issues such 
as IT compatibility, connectivity, and comparability of fields between local reporting systems in 
hospitals. These technical issues may hamper the implementation of a national reporting 
programme.2,3 Other aspects also require attention when implementing a national reporting 
programme, such as information bias caused by underreporting, low quality of the reports, time-
consuming analyses of incoming reports, determining the best target group for 
recommendations and the risk of overloading healthcare providers with recommendations. 
 
USEFULNESS OF CMR REPORTING SYSTEM 
This thesis focused on the CMR and contains a variety of studies that provide insight into the 
basic functioning and usefulness of the CMR as a safety-enhancing tool for Dutch healthcare 
providers. The studies highlight specific aspects of the CMR: input of data to the CMR; basic 
functioning of the CMR system including the selection and analysis of reports of medication 
errors; and creation and uptake of relevant output. 
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MAIN FINDINGS  
Input of data to the CMR  
The main route of input of medication errors is currently the reporting of individual healthcare 
providers via a web based reporting form and redirection of reports collected from local 
reporting programmes by hospitals or community pharmacies. Other routes for the CMR to 
receive additional input can be consulting scientific literature (chapter 2) and alerts and/or 
newsletters issued by national reporting programmes abroad (chapters 3 and 4).  
Chapter 2 reviews studies about dispensing errors in Pubmed® that can be used as input for the 
CMR. This chapter concludes that this type of literature studies can enrich the picture of specific 
subjects and/or risks in the medication process which have been reported to the CMR.  
Chapter 3 illustrates the need for better mutual use of warnings issued by national centres for 
medication errors in the European Union (EU). This chapter concludes that similar medication 
errors can occur in several countries in the EU and that national centres for medication errors can 
learn valuable lessons from alerts issued by EU sister organisations. 
In chapter 4 the added value of alerts and newsletters issued by three national reporting 
programmes in English speaking countries (Canada, United States of America (USA), United 
Kingdom (UK)) is studied as input for the CMR. In this study we found that the CMR certainly 
could have learnt from alerts and newsletters of these other three national reporting 
programmes. 
 
Basic functioning of the CMR system  
To facilitate national reporting and analysis, a nationwide reporting programme (chapter 5) is 
necessary, to which healthcare providers can report their medication errors. In The Netherlands 
such a reporting programme is the CMR. After reporting, the CMR needs to screen, select, and 
analyse the reports (chapters 6 and 7) for writing newsletters and alerts with recommendations. 
Chapter 5 describes the architecture, implementation and current status of the CMR in the year 
2011. This chapter concludes that the architecture of the CMR system meets the requirements of 
a general nationwide reporting programme. Community pharmacies and hospitals report 
different kinds of medication errors. The reports from community pharmacies often concern the 
processing of prescriptions and medication surveillance phase while in hospitals most reported 
errors are related to the administration phase. Probably healthcare providers are reporting 
medication errors that are related to their own work process. In this chapter we also notice that 
the reporting rate from hospitals was low. Although the data about community pharmacies 
should be interpreted with appropriate caution due to the short participation period of 
community pharmacies, there is an indication that the reporting degree of community 
pharmacies is also low. 
In chapter 6 a subset of reported medication errors are selected and analysed to gain insight into 
the risks of a specific trend in the medication process. The main findings of this study are that 
one of six reported medication errors were related to information technology (IT) and that more 
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errors were related to IT in community pharmacies than in hospitals. Another main finding is that 
the selection method with a string of search terms referring to IT to identify text fragments in the 
free text description is useful to select relevant reports for future analysis. 
Chapter 7 analyses a batch of medication errors reports in the CMR database and the specific 
subject for this analysis is automated dispensing dosing (ADD). This chapter concludes that one 
out of 50 reported errors was related to ADD, the immediate cause of an error was often a 
change in the patient’s medicine regimen or location. Furthermore the weekly screening of all 
submitted medication errors and the marking of the errors that are associated with ADD, is useful 
to preselect relevant reports for future analysis. 
 
Creation and uptake of output 
The main output of the CMR consists of alerts and newsletters with recommendations. We 
explored a new form of output through publication of a case report in scientific literature 
(chapter 8). After disseminating alerts, it is important to monitor how healthcare providers 
implement the recommendations (chapter 9).  
Chapter 8 illustrates how a single medication error can be transformed into a scientific case 
report that warns other healthcare providers through the scientific literature. A conclusion is that 
the publication of this medication error in a case report requires considerably more time and 
effort in comparison with publication in the CMR newsletter, but on the other hand it can directly 
reach an international audience. 
Chapter 9 explores the degree of self-reported uptake of CMR recommendations and looks at 
potential determinants associated with the successful uptake of the recommendations from 
three disseminated CMR alerts. This study concludes that the recommendations of the three 
alerts had variable degrees of uptake across hospitals.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
A general limitation of the presented research is that the CMR cannot provide complete insight 
into all medication errors occurring in Dutch healthcare. The CMR is a voluntary reporting 
programme and individual healthcare providers will not report every medication error. 
Healthcare providers tend to focus on errors that they consider important or out of the ordinary. 
Errors that are not recognized as such by healthcare providers will also remain unreported. 
Furthermore not all types of healthcare providers are reporting to the CMR in equal numbers. 
Hospital-based nurses are more active reporters of medication errors in the CMR than physicians, 
which may explain the high number of administration errors.4 A voluntary reporting system can 
suffer from substantial underreporting and the denominator of the number of medication errors 
is hard to retrieve. An issue within underreporting is selective reporting. Serious medication 
errors may be reported quicker and this may lead to over presentation of some types of 
medication errors. For adverse drug reactions this is a well described limitation.5 Despite the over 
presentation we assume that even for serious events, underreporting remains important. As 
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described by Stricker et al. a serious event such as glafenine-associated anaphylaxis was 
substantially underreported and only 3.7% of the cases were reported to the Dutch national 
adverse drug reactions reporting system.6 
A second general limitation of the current CMR is that the descriptions in the medication error 
reports have variable quality. Not all errors are described sufficiently well and some of them 
hardly contain enough information for analysis.  
These limitations of the CMR influence the limitations of this thesis. In chapters 5, 6 and 7 
insights on reported medication errors are presented. It is possible that due to underreporting 
and underrepresentation or even absence of certain types of healthcare providers as active 
participants of the CMR (e.g. general practitioners) we missed specific medication errors. 
Secondly the variable quality of the reports impeded analysis and often hampered a detailed 
reconstruction of the error. Overall the number of reports about the selected subjects was high 
enough to compensate for these limitations and one well-described relevant medication error 
report can be enough to highlight a problem (sentinel case), especially when it is accompanied by 
reports of lesser quality about similar errors.  
 
IMPLICATIONS: INPUT OF DATA TO THE CMR 
Underreporting  
The number of hospitals and community pharmacies participating in the CMR reporting 
programme is high, but the actual reporting by healthcare providers is highly variable and overall 
low. Within hospitals the reporting rates between different types of healthcare providers are 
variable as well. Underreporting has also been seen in other studies and the Dutch healthcare 
inspectorate fears that ‘systematic underreporting’ occurs and that the current number of 
reports is just ‘the tip of an iceberg’.7-9 A higher reporting rate will increase the chance that a new 
relevant medication error is reported sooner and it will also increase the number of duplicate 
medication errors. The number of such duplicate reports can be used as an indication of the risk 
of recurrence. 
An important precondition to improve the reporting rate is providing guarantees of 
confidentiality and blame free reporting of errors.7,10 Under Denmark’s patient safety act 
healthcare providers have a duty to report errors but can do so without fear that sanctions will 
be taken against them.11 However, a ‘no blame’ culture is not always desirable. According to the 
Dutch healthcare inspector general a balance between the ‘no blame’ approach and 
accountability is needed, since the ‘no blame’ approach should not become a license for careless 
work.7 We agree that a balance between blame free reporting and reckless handling is needed. A 
good example is that Danish patients can file a complaint about their treatment and their 
healthcare providers can still be punished for serious or fatal mistakes for which they are 
culpable.11 Currently in The Netherlands legislation about blame free reporting is lacking. It may 
be a difficult task to arrange a safe reporting culture without such legislation. We do not believe 
that a national organisation like the CMR or individual hospitals can produce a safe reporting 
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culture by themselves. Healthcare authorities (e.g. healthcare inspectorate) and government also 
need to stimulate a safe reporting culture through their inspection and legislation. 
By only focussing on improving the reporting rate could be a pitfall for the CMR, because this 
entails the potential risk that healthcare providers report too much duplicate and well-known 
medication errors. We believe it would be more efficient and effective to improve the reporting 
of relevant medication errors instead of just enlarging the number of reports to the CMR in 
general. A relevant medication error can be defined as an error that meets the three basic 
selection criteria of the CMR for analysis: (1) risk of recurrence; (2) educational potential for 
other healthcare providers; and (3) risk of serious harm to the patient. To enhance the reporting 
of such relevant medication errors, the CMR should provide a manual and training course for 
healthcare providers about what kind of medication errors should preferably be reported. In 
2012 the CMR already disseminated a manual, but a manual alone is not enough and should be 
combined with training. In this training healthcare providers can practise the recognition, analysis 
and reporting of relevant medication errors. We believe that the impact of such training would 
benefit from having a dedicated person in each organisation, who passes on this knowledge to 
colleagues, and who coaches and monitors them. Preferably, every hospital or community 
pharmacy would have at least one dedicated person who is responsible for the collecting, local 
analysis and reporting of medication errors to the CMR. This dedicated person has an overview 
about the reporting degrees of different types of healthcare providers (e.g. physicians, nurses, 
etc.) within a hospital and he can especially focus on these groups of healthcare providers who 
are not reporting yet.  
 
Disproportionateness in reporting 
Another issue is the disproportionateness in the reports that the CMR receives. It seems that 
healthcare providers are inclined to report errors in that part of the medication process for which 
they are responsible themselves (e.g. pharmacists will primarily report dispensing errors and 
hospital-based nurses will primarily report administration errors). These findings about different 
types of healthcare providers reporting different kinds of medication errors and having different 
reporting degrees have also been seen by researchers in a study in England.12 In another study in 
north eastern Scotland the majority (80.4%) of 2,666 errors were reported by nurses. Most 
(58.9%) of these medication errors were related to the administration or preparation of 
medicines in clinical areas.4 
The CMR needs to respond to the disproportionateness in reporting, otherwise relevant types of 
medication errors may be missed. The CMR should elicit the full range of medication errors in the 
medication process, starting from prescribing to the administration of medication and to 
monitoring its effects. To broaden the variety of reports, the CMR should expand its reporting 
programme to other healthcare providers such as general practitioners, dentists and home care 
nurses, who are not able to report to the CMR yet. A likely implication is that the focus may 
gradually broaden from medication-related errors to healthcare-related errors in general. In 
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England and Wales all healthcare providers report to one reporting system and all kinds of 
healthcare-related errors (including medication errors) can be reported to this system.13,14 The 
expansion to other healthcare providers needs to be monitored to find out how the 
disproportionateness of reports is influenced by the addition of different types of healthcare 
providers. In addition, we believe that patients should also be actively involved in the reporting 
of medication errors. Patients can discover different medication errors from their patient 
perspective and they are usually the last actor in the healthcare chain. Patients are already 
involved in the reporting of adverse drug reactions to pharmacovigilance centres and the results 
are positive.15 Research about how the CMR can facilitate patients to report medication errors is 
necessary before really permitting patients to participate directly in the CMR reporting 
programme. It is necessary to explore first what technical aspects (easy to use reporting 
programme) and communicational and motivational aspects are needed to stimulate patients to 
report medication errors and how the reporting programme should deal with the fact that 
patients often have less medical knowledge of the healthcare system than professionals. 
 
Quality of reports 
In our research we observe that the current quality of the CMR reports is inconsistent and this is 
in line with the picture that emerges from the weekly screening of the CMR reports. Due to the 
low quality it is often very hard to retrieve the exact nature, causes and relevancy of the reported 
medication errors. This low quality has also been observed in other studies. An assessment of the 
Australian Incident Monitoring System found that the information in the reports was often too 
generic for a root cause analysis.16 Research is needed to investigated the causes of the low 
quality of reports in the CMR database. Many reasons exist to explain the low quality, like 
healthcare providers do not have enough time to analyse and report medication errors. It is also 
possible that the reporting programme is not user friendly. A study in north eastern Scotland in 
primary care service, community hospitals, acute hospitals and mental health services, showed 
that 20.3% of reports were reported as ‘other medication errors’. The probable reason was that 
the reporting healthcare providers were not always able to classify actual errors due to limited 
choices in the reporting programme.4 
From other studies we believe that a dedicated healthcare provider who is responsible for 
reporting to the CMR and a response system consisting of direct feedback to the reporter to 
confirm the facts related to the error, to ensure the completeness of the report, to uncover 
underlying systems failures, and to resubmit extra information may substantially enhance the 
quality and reporting rate of the reports.17-19 Currently the CMR does not have any web based 
response system and healthcare providers are called personally by one of the CMR team 
members if more information about a medication error is needed. This is a time-consuming 
process. Introducing a web based response system should facilitate healthcare providers to add 
new information to a report that they have already submitted. In the current situation healthcare 
providers report medication errors immediately after discovery and at that moment not all the 
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information about the error (e.g. remaining harm to the patient, analysis of underlying causes, 
local measures to prevent recurrence) is already available. We know that hospitals have special 
patient safety committees which are involved in the analysis of medication errors. These 
committees focus on the relevant medication errors that are likely to meet the CMR selection 
criteria. These analyses by local patient safety committees take time, but provide indispensable 
extra information. It would be practical that after such analysis this extra information can be 
uploaded through the response system. Such a web based response system can enhance the 
quality of the reports, but offering such system is not the only solution for the inconsistent 
quality of the reports. Beside the response system organisations should assign dedicated 
healthcare providers, who coordinate the reporting of medication errors. Local dedicated 
professionals can coordinate the reporting of medication errors in two ways. Firstly, healthcare 
providers may report the medication errors to the dedicated person and this person decides if 
and when a medication error is reported to the CMR, and assures the informational quality of 
these reports. The advantage of this method is that the CMR does not need to change the 
current reporting system and a web based response system will be less essential. The 
disadvantage is that medication errors can be withheld for a long period in the hospital before 
the CMR will notice them. In the second approach healthcare providers can still report the 
medication errors directly to the CMR and the dedicated person coordinates the collection of 
extra information. The dedicated person can submit the extra information to the web based 
response system. In both approaches the dedicated persons should also train their colleagues in 
recognizing and analysing relevant medication errors and reporting them in the correct way. We 
advise the CMR to introduce the combination of a dedicated person and a web based response 
system to enhance the quality of the reports. 
 
New input for the CMR 
The output from other national reporting programmes can help the CMR to recognize similarities 
and trends more timely. The CMR would be well-advised to screen the newsletters and alerts of 
other national reporting programmes. International newsletters and alerts point towards risks of 
concrete errors and this information can be used to warn Dutch healthcare providers, if such 
errors are likely to occur also in The Netherlands. This kind of international input can also be used 
for searching reports in the CMR database retrospectively. It is possible that reports have been 
on hold after screening and analysing, and that new input like international newsletters and 
alerts may trigger a reconsideration in this decision process. The CMR needs a structural method 
to incorporate the newsletters and alerts of other national reporting programmes. It is unfeasible 
to screen all newsletters and alerts and we advise the CMR to concentrate on the output of 
United Kingdom first, because this output matches best with Dutch healthcare. Subsequently the 
CMR should explore how it can collaborate more intensively with other national reporting 
programmes about exchanging newsletters and alerts. The International Medication Safety 
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Network would be an obvious starting point for collaboration with other national reporting 
programmes.  
In addition the CMR should consider the possibility to expand and underpin its analyses of 
selected reports more systematically with searches in the scientific literature. Such literature 
searches cannot only be used to strengthen a suspected risk derived from a medication error 
report, but may also help to identify new points of attention. It should be investigated, for 
instance, what would be the yield of screening Pubmed weekly or monthly with the search string 
(“Medication Errors/adverse effects”[Mesh] OR “Medication Errors/prevention and 
control”[Mesh]).  
 
IMPLICATIONS: BASIC FUNCTIONING OF THE CMR SYSTEM  
Analysis of reports 
Currently the CMR uses weekly screening to select the relevant medication errors. This screening 
is especially designed to deal with the incoming medication errors. For the reports in the CMR 
database that already have been screened in the past we explored two different selection 
methods. These two studies show that it is possible to select relevant reported medication errors 
efficiently. Each selection method has advantages and disadvantages. Both selection methods 
can only be used when the subject is known. Selecting relevant reports with a list of search terms 
gives the opportunity to search for any subject in the CMR database. It is an easy to use method 
and after drawing and testing a list of search terms the reporting system can automatically select 
the reports for analysis. A disadvantage is that the drawing of the list of search terms needs to be 
thorough otherwise potentially relevant reports may be missed. A second issue is that after the 
first selection by means of the listed terms it is still necessary to screen the selected reports 
because some search terms may produce ambiguous results. The selection method in which the 
screening team marks reports related to a specific topic prospectively is more rapid and accurate 
and can be incorporated in the weekly screening process. An advantage is that marked reports 
can be selected easily. A disadvantage is that reports which have been screened in the past will 
not be marked and selected any more if the CMR decides that a new topic needs attention. It will 
consume too much time to screen these reports for a second time. In that case the CMR can 
perform a retrospective selection of reports by developing and using a list of specific search 
terms. Both selection methods may also be combined with the screening of newsletters and 
alerts from other national reporting programmes. The latter raise new topics for the CMR and the 
CMR can select retrospectively reports about these topics by using the list of search terms 
method. If the CMR is not yet convinced by an international newsletter or alert it can mark new 
reports prospectively during the weekly screening. The two selection methods explored in this 
thesis were used separately without studying them in a head-to-head comparison, in sequence or 
in combination. Further research is necessary to explore the sensitivity and selectivity of these 
selection methods. This will help the CMR to decide which selection methods are most useful in 
general and which ones for specific subjects. 
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The current weekly screening is still necessary, but manual case-by-case screening is time-
consuming and as a result of the growing number of reports it will become more and more 
difficult for the small CMR team to screen every report in detail. To cope with the growing 
number of reports the CMR will need to explore supplementary methods to screen and select 
relevant reports. Research is necessary to establish which supplementary selection methods are 
useful and how these can be incorporated within the weekly screening. With the results of this 
research the CMR can decide how to supplement the weekly screening in response with the 
growing number of reports. Pharmacovigilance centres apply data mining to identify potential 
alerts from the many reports.21 Research about how to use data mining in the CMR database is 
needed, because it has not yet been tested if these same methods (e.g. Bayesian) can also be 
applied to reported medication errors. In this research the selection by means of data mining 
methods should be compared with the conventional weekly case-by-case screening by the CMR 
team. Another supplementation to the weekly screening is to ask the reporting healthcare 
providers to indicate the relevance of the medication error and to base the CMR selection for 
analysis on this verdict. In the current CMR reporting system healthcare providers can mark the 
report if the medication error is a potential alert. This indication system is not working well, 
because healthcare providers often assume too soon that the medication error is a potential 
alert. Research is needed to investigate how healthcare providers can be involved more reliably 
in preselecting relevant reports for analysis. Another indicator which may be useful to select 
relevant medication errors could be the actual harm of the reported medication error. From our 
weekly screening we know that actual harm is not always filled in correctly and it remains 
necessary to investigate how useful this indicator is for selection of relevant methods. The 
selection of reports based on actual harm can be compared with the weekly screening results. 
 
CMR and pharmacovigilance 
An overlap exists between the domain of interest of pharmacovigilance centres for adverse drug 
reactions and that of reporting programmes for medication errors like the CMR (overlap is 
number 3 in the Venn Diagram shown in the Introduction (chapter 1) as figure 1). In the 
European Union, legislation (Directive 2001/83/EC, Recital (5) and (17), Article 1(11) and 101(1)) 
has been approved in July 2012, which stipulates that medication errors should be included in the 
reporting of adverse drug reactions.22 This legislation does not sufficiently take into account the 
clear differences in the recognition and evaluation of medication errors and adverse drug 
reactions and also the actions to be taken after evaluation (see table 1 in Introduction (chapter 
1): comparison of medication errors and adverse drug reactions). Firstly, medication errors 
without harm and near misses are likely to become underrepresented in a system that 
traditionally focuses on adverse drug reactions. Secondly, the blame free reporting of medication 
errors is currently not regulated in the reporting of adverse drug reactions to pharmacovigilance 
centres. Furthermore we wonder whether the experiences in processing of adverse drug 
reactions by pharmacovigilance centres can be transferred on one-to-one basis to the collecting 
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and analysing of medication errors. The different kinds of recommendations related to adverse 
drug reactions and medication errors requires a different approach. In the current situation we 
foresee two possible scenarios. The first one is that pharmacovigilance centres will collect 
adverse drug reactions and medication errors. An advantage of this option is that only one 
reporting programme for medication-related problems needs to be promoted and that it is clear 
for healthcare providers where they can report any medication-related problem. Disadvantages 
are that near misses may become underexposed and errors not involving medicines (e.g. wrong 
site surgery) will not be reported to pharmacovigilance centres. In other words a second 
reporting programme for healthcare-related errors remains necessary. The second scenario is to 
establish a reporting programme for medication errors and all other kinds of healthcare-related 
errors. An advantage is that healthcare providers have one reporting programme to report 
errors, which can all be submitted to the same root cause analytical approach. A disadvantage is 
partial overlap of medication-related errors with the input of pharmacovigilance centres.  
In the Netherlands it is currently not clear yet how to respond to these legislative developments. 
In some other countries like Denmark and England one reporting programme for all kind of 
healthcare-related errors including medication errors has been established. In Morocco the 
patient safety organisation has one reporting programme for adverse drug reactions and 
medication errors. It should be investigated, which approach is most preferable for healthcare 
providers who wish to report adverse drug reactions, medication errors and healthcare-related 
errors (e.g. wrong site surgery) without interruption of their clinical work.  
 
IMPLICATIONS: CREATION AND UPTAKE OF OUTPUT 
Targeting of the output 
In the medication process, other actors than pharmacists, notably physicians and nurses, are also 
involved and it is illogical not to disseminate to all those who are directly concerned. We believe 
that for better implementation of the recommendations, the CMR needs to disseminate its 
output (e.g., the alerts and newsletters) to the most appropriate healthcare providers. For the 
CMR the most efficient way to disseminate output to healthcare providers is to collaborate with 
their professional organisations. The current dissemination to hospital pharmacists and 
community pharmacists is already through the collaboration between the CMR and the two 
professional national organisations of hospital pharmacists and pharmacists. These professional 
organisations can send a direct email to their members. Collaboration with these organisations 
will also increase professional support for the CMR recommendations.  
Beside healthcare providers the CMR should send specific warnings and/or recommendations to 
the most appropriate parties such as software vendors, health authorities (healthcare 
inspectorate, medicine regulatory agency), university educators, and national guideline 
developers. This is especially relevant for recommendations which are not directly aimed at daily 
clinical practice, such as recommendations about changing the naming of a medicine, IT problems 
(e.g. computer screen lay out), or the content of guidelines. 
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ISMP in the United States has a special edition of a newsletter for patients. It is a health 
education newsletter and it teaches patients to become active partners with their healthcare 
providers. If feasible, the CMR should develop a newsletter which is especially targeted to 
patients and to society at large. The patient newsletter should focus on issues about the use of 
medicines and especially the use of medicine at home.  
 
Uptake and impact of the recommendations  
The degree of uptake of the CMR recommendations in three alerts varied (chapter 9). The CMR 
should consider ways to increase awareness and uptake of recommendations. For instance, the 
CMR could follow the example of the ISMP in the United States to present its recommendations 
in the form of a checklist for implementation in which healthcare providers can tick off each 
recommendation after they have implemented it into daily practice. If this tool would be offered 
through a website, it would not only show healthcare providers which recommendations still 
need attention but it would also provide the CMR with direct feedback on the degree of 
implementation of its recommendations. In the same checklist, healthcare providers should also 
be allowed to explain why they did not implement certain recommendations. Research will be 
necessary to explore the usefulness of such a feedback system and its impact on the uptake of 
recommendations. Secondly more and larger studies are necessary to investigate the association 
between the degree of uptake and potential determinants. In this thesis we only investigated a 
few potential determinants.  
The degree of uptake is an indication for the implementation of the recommendations, but the 
actual effects on practice and patient safety are still unknown. Currently formal evidence what 
effects scientific case reports, alerts and newsletters actually have on patient safety, is lacking. It 
also needs to be explored and evaluated what is the effectiveness and efficiency of different 
methods of output. 
 
CONCLUSION  
This thesis presents a series of studies of the Dutch nationwide reporting programme (CMR). 
Healthcare providers use the CMR reporting programme to report medication errors and to share 
their experiences with other professionals. The CMR organisation collects medication errors, 
selects and analyses them, provides feedback, and disseminates recommendations. The objective 
of the CMR is to support risk management in the medication process by informing healthcare 
providers and other actors about the risks in the medication process and by sending out alerts, 
newsletters and other signals to prevent or reduce reoccurrence of specific high-risk medication 
errors.  
This thesis shows that the current main input comes from individual healthcare providers in 
hospitals and community pharmacies. Input from individual healthcare providers needs to be 
broadened. In coming years patients and other healthcare providers such as general 
practitioners, medical specialists, dentists, home care nurses, etc. should also become actively 
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involved in the reporting to the CMR. Beside reports from individual healthcare providers the 
CMR can benefit from newsletters and alerts of other national reporting programmes. The input 
itself can improve by raising the reporting rate and especially the reporting of relevant 
medication errors that meet the three basic selection criteria of the CMR for analysis. The quality 
of the reports can be enhanced by introducing the combination of a dedicated person and a web 
based response system. 
In order to respond to this growing input the CMR also needs to incorporate new selection and 
supplementary screening methods. Selection methods using a list of search terms or marking 
reports during the screening are especially useful to reselect reports that already have been 
screened in the past.  
On the output side, the CMR should disseminate its alerts and newsletters not only to 
pharmacists, but also to other healthcare providers involved in the medication process, such as 
physicians and nurses. These professionals need to be informed about high risk medication 
errors. The output of the CMR is not only relevant for healthcare providers but also for 
healthcare agencies and third parties, such as the Ministry of Health, pharmacovigilance centres, 
regulatory authorities, pharmaceutical industries, software vendors, guideline developers, and 
international reporting programmes. Additionally the CMR needs to improve the degree of 
uptake of the recommendations. 
Ultimately the CMR is dependent on healthcare providers for sufficient and informative input, 
but the same healthcare providers are also involved in the reception and uptake of the 
recommendations. An interdependence exists between the healthcare providers and the CMR. 
Together they can reach the goal of providing and guarantying a safe environment for patients. 
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Patient safety has become an  important  issue  in healthcare and actions are needed to  increase 
patient safety. One of the strategies to enhance safety is the professional reporting and analysing 
of medication errors in order to explore the actual nature of the errors, the consequences for the 
patients and  the underlying causes of  the errors. The aim  is  that sharing  this  information with 
other healthcare providers will help to prevent the reoccurrence of similar medication errors. 
Medication errors and adverse drug reactions are both belonging to the domain of adverse drug 
events.  Despite  the  overlap  between  adverse  drug  reactions  and  medication  errors,  also 
differences  exist.  An  adverse  drug  reaction  is  always  directly  related  to  the  pharmacological 
characteristics of the medicine. In an adverse drug reaction a medicine is always involved and in a 
medication error  the medicine and/or  the device  to administer  the medicine are  involved. An 
adverse drug  reaction  always has  some harm  to  the patient  and  a medication error  can have 
some harmful outcome or potential harm (near misses) to the patient. The root cause analysis of 
a medication error  is  related  to underlying human and organisational causes, while an adverse 
drug  reaction  focuses  on  the  pharmacology  of  the  drug.  Furthermore,  the  recommendations 
related to adverse drug reactions and medication errors are different. For adverse drug reactions 
the most common recommendations are to withdraw the medicine or to adapt the Summary of 
Product Characteristics  (SPC).  In  contrast,  recommendations  concerning medication  errors  are 
more  extensive  and  related  to  the  medication  process,  work  process  and/or  handling  by 
healthcare providers. The definition of an adverse drug event  is a harmful outcome that occurs 
while  a  patient  is  taking  a  drug  or  at  some  time  afterwards,  but  that  may  or  may  not  be 
attributable  to  it.  A medication  error  can  occur  at  any  stage  of  the  treatment  process:  from 
prescribing to dispensing and compounding and eventually to the administration of a medicine 
and monitoring of its effect. 
In  the Netherlands medication  errors  can  be  reported  to  a  nationwide  reporting  programme 
named Central Medication  incidents Registration  (CMR). The  research  in  this  thesis  focuses on 
the  usefulness  of  the  CMR  as  a  patient  safety  enhancing  tool  for  healthcare  providers  in  the 
context  of  clinical  practice.  Three  aspects  of  the  nationwide  reporting  programme  are 
highlighted: (1)  input of data to the CMR; (2) basic methods of working of the CMR programme 
including the selection and analysis of reports of medication errors; and (3) creation and uptake 
of relevant output.  
 
INPUT OF DATA INTO THE CMR 
The main routes of input of medication errors are currently the reporting by individual healthcare 
providers  via  a web  based  reporting  form  and  the  redirection  of  reports  collected  from  local 
reporting  programmes  in  hospitals  or  community  pharmacies.  Another  possible  route  for  the 
CMR  to  receive  input  is  consulting  scientific  literature.  Chapter  2  reviewed  studies  about 
dispensing  errors  in  Pubmed®  online  that  were  published  from  2003  to  2008  inclusive.  The 
objective was  to explore dispensing errors  in scientific  literature  to get  insight  into  the nature, 
frequencies, and underlying causes of dispensing errors. The results were that most studies have 
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investigated dispensing errors  in hospitals  in the United States of America (USA) or Europe. The 
rates of dispensing errors were generally low to very low, but further improvements in pharmacy 
distribution  systems  are  still  important  because  pharmacies  dispense  such  high  volumes  of 
medications that even a very  low error rate can translate  into a noticeable absolute number of 
errors. Furthermore  little  information was available about  the underlying  causes of dispensing 
errors, because most  studies have not  addressed  this  aspect. A  few  root‐cause  analyses have 
been  performed  and  the  most  important  causes  of  dispensing  errors  were  related  to 
organisational  problems,  such  as  shortage  of  staff  and  high workloads. With  this  chapter we 
conclude  that such  literature  reviews can enrich  the picture of specific subjects and/or  risks  in 
the medication process.  
Another new type of input is alerts and newsletters from national reporting programmes abroad. 
Chapter  3  illustrated  the  need  for  the  exchange  of  alerts  between  national  centres  within 
different countries. Using a striking medication error with cabazitaxel (Jevtana®) as an example 
we provided a compelling argument for making better mutual use of warnings issued by national 
centres  for  medication  errors  in  the  European  Union  (EU).  A  lack  of  clarity  in  the  product 
information of cabazitaxel caused  the medication error. As a  result patients were  treated with 
doses of cabazitaxel that were over 15% higher than  intended. This chapter argued that similar 
medication  errors  occurred  in  Spain,  United  Kingdom,  and  The  Netherlands  and  that  each 
country  independently sent out an alert to warn the healthcare providers  in their own country 
with  an  interval  of  many  months.  National  centres  for  medication  errors  can  learn  valuable 
lessons from alerts issued by foreign sister organisations. 
To get more insight into the alerts and newsletters as input for the CMR we explored in chapter 4 
the  value  of  ninety  disseminated  information  items  (alerts  and  newsletters)  issued  by  three 
national  reporting  programmes  in  English  speaking  countries  (Canada,  USA,  United  Kingdom 
(UK)). The aim was  to explore  to which extent alerts and newsletters about medication errors 
issued  in  one  country  could  also  be  relevant  for  other  countries.  We  collected  the  ninety 
disseminated  information  items  in  the  period  from  June  2009  until  June  2012  and  compared 
them with the reported medication errors, disseminated alerts, and disseminated newsletters of 
the CMR. In this study we found that most alerts and newsletters from other national reporting 
programmes were potentially relevant for the Dutch healthcare setting. From the 90 items 87.8% 
(n=79) were relevant for Dutch healthcare and these errors could also occur in The Netherlands. 
For  14  items  the  CMR  also  disseminated  an  alert  or  newsletter  about  them.  Taking  the 
dissemination  dates  into  consideration  the CMR  could  have  learned  from  two  items  of  ISMP‐
Canada, two items of ISMP‐USA and seven items of NRLS‐UK. Conversely our study showed that 
Canada and UK could have benefited  from  three different  items of  the CMR. For  two  items of 
Canada  the CMR had disseminated  these  items eight months and 31 months earlier. The CMR 
had  disseminated  one  comparable  item  47 months  earlier  than UK.  This  study  showed  for  a 
broad range of errors that the CMR could learn from the three reporting programmes in Canada, 
USA and UK. More research is necessary to realize the learning between countries due to barriers 
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such  as  different  languages,  taxonomies,  definitions  and  the  various  operating  procedures 
between  the  reporting programmes.  This  research  shows  that national  reporting programmes 
can benefit from sharing alerts and newsletters and doing so to enhance the  learning between 
countries.  The CMR  should  incorporate  the newsletters  and  alerts of other national  reporting 
programmes in its screening and analyses. 
 
BASIC FUNCTIONING OF THE CMR PROGRAMME 
To  facilitate  reporting  and  analysis,  a  reporting  programme  is  necessary  to  which  healthcare 
providers  can  report  their  medication  errors.  The  CMR  is  such  a  reporting  programme  for 
healthcare  providers  in  The  Netherlands.  The  purpose  of  chapter  5  was  to  describe  the 
architecture,  implementation and status of  the CMR and  to compare  it with similar systems  in 
other countries (USA, Canada, UK and Denmark). The basic objective of the CMR is to support the 
risk management of medication processes by sending out alerts and newsletters and generally 
informing healthcare providers, third parties in healthcare and government about risks, based on 
the reports and trend analyses in the CMR database. The CMR programme consists of a website, 
a  database,  a web‐based  reporting  form,  an  application  to  import  reports  generated  in  other 
local  reporting  programmes  (including  a  real‐time  interface),  an  application  to  generate  an 
overview of reported medication errors and a national warning system for healthcare providers. 
The requirements of a general nationwide reporting programme are: adequate  IT support, easy 
accessibility,  user  friendly  and  fit  for  nationwide  implementation  across  various  healthcare 
sectors. We notices that the architecture of the CMR programme meets these requirements.  In 
the  period  from  March  2010  to  March  2011,  community  pharmacies  and  hospitals  reported 
different  kinds  of  medication  errors.  The  reports  from  community  pharmacies  more  often 
concerned  the  processing  of  prescriptions  and  medication  surveillance  phase  (42.5%)  while 
hospital reports were more often related to the administration phase (38.7%). The reporting rate 
from  hospitals  was  low:  only  13  of  the  90  participating  hospitals  reported  more  than  100 
medication errors, 11 hospitals  reported between one  and 50 errors and 67 hospitals did not 
report any errors in a period of four years. The conclusion of this chapter was that the strategy to 
expand the CMR to community pharmacies has been successful, and this approach should now 
be used to expand the CMR to the rest of primary care.  
The  CMR  database  consists  known  and  already  reported  medication  errors,  but  also  reports 
which describe new kind of medication errors or not yet  reported  to  the CMR database. New 
kinds of medication  errors  can be  caused by  introductions of new medicines, new healthcare 
initiatives and changes  in current healthcare process. Selection methods are necessary to select 
these  kinds  of  reports  from  the  CMR  database.  With  external  signals  like  new  healthcare 
initiatives the CMR can decide to be more alert about a subject and to search for reports in the 
CMR database. Two different selection methods for the CMR database were explored in chapters 
6 and 7. Chapter 6 aimed at  the analysis of  the nature and consequences of a  large sample of 
information technology (IT) related medication errors, as reported by healthcare professionals in 
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community pharmacies and hospitals. A string of search terms referring to IT was developed for 
identifying text fragments in the free text description. The results were that one of six medication 
errors (16.1%, n=668) were related to IT;  in community pharmacies more errors (21.5%, n=351) 
were related to IT than in hospitals (12.6%, n=317). Computerized prescriber order entry systems 
and pharmacy information systems played a pivotal role in causing IT‐related  medication errors. 
A majority of the medication errors were human–machine interaction related. Interceptions may 
be performed  from  the  technical/organisational perspective  (e.g.,  system design and workflow 
changes), but also from the human perspective (e.g., training of individuals). 
Chapter  7  analysed  the  nature  and  consequences  of medication  errors  related  to  automated 
dispensing dosing (ADD). Relevant reports were selected during the weekly screening of reports 
by the CMR team. Since October 2011 the CMR team has marked all medication errors that were 
associated with  ADD.  Each medication  error was  classified  independently  by  two  researchers 
using six main categories: person discovering the error; phase of the medication process in which 
the error occurred; immediate cause of the error; nature of error from the healthcare provider’s 
perspective,  nature  of  error  from  the  patient’s  perspective  and  the  consequent  harm  to  the 
patient resulting from the error. The results were that 6.2% of the medication errors reported by 
community pharmacies medication errors and only 0.4% of the errors reported by hospitals were 
related  to  ADD.  In  the  community  pharmacies  the  medication  errors  were  concentrated  in 
entering into the pharmacy information system and filling the ADD bags. The immediate cause of 
an  error  was  often  a  change  in  the  patient’s  medicine  regimen  or  location.  The  absolute 
percentage of errors related to ADD may seem low, but the use of ADD will increase further and 
it is necessary to pay attention to this new type of medication errors in healthcare. 
 
CREATION AND UPTAKE OF RELEVANT OUTPUT 
The current output of the CMR mainly consists of alerts and newsletters with recommendations. 
We explored another  form of output with a publication of a case  report  in  scientific  literature 
(chapter  8).  In  chapter  8  the  CMR  used  the  form  of  a  scientific  case  report  to  disseminate  a 
warning. This case involved a 3‐year old patient treated with Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia (ALL) 
who had been erroneously treated 8 times with E. coli asparaginase instead of PEG asparaginase. 
In the scientific literature this was the first reported case of a patient who was undertreated with 
asparaginase through an erroneous switch of E. coli asparaginase and PEG asparaginase. Several 
mechanisms may have contributed to the confusion in this case. We recommended that all forms 
of asparaginase registered and/or described in treatment protocols should be incorporated in the 
drug  database  that  is  used  in  hospitals  for  drug  identification.  We  also  recommended 
computerized warnings  about  the  existence  of  3  forms  of  asparaginase,  should  be  generated 
whenever  asparaginase  is  ordered,  compounded,  or  dispensed.  The  publication  of  this 
medication  error  as  a  scientific  case  report  required  considerably  more  time  and  effort  in 
comparison with publication  in the CMR newsletter, due to the extensive review process of the 
scientific journal. It was also necessary to adapt the recommendations for healthcare providers of 
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different  countries,  because  the  recommendations  were  first  developed  for  the  healthcare 
situation in The Netherlands. On the other hand a publication in the scientific literature can reach 
an international audience. 
In  chapter  9  the  degrees  of  self‐reported  uptake  of  the  CMR  recommendations  were 
investigated. The aim of this study was to explore the degree of uptake of the recommendations 
that  were  issued  in  three  medication  safety  alerts  and  to  identify  potential  determinants 
associated with successful uptake. The primary outcome was the degree of self‐reported uptake 
of  specific  recommendations and we also  looked at associations of  the degree of uptake with 
several  potential  determinants.  Adoption  of  the  CMR  recommendations  varied  considerably 
depending on  the specific alert. A non‐significant  trend  towards an association between active 
reporting to the CMR and a better uptake of the recommendation was seen. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In  chapter  10 we  discuss  the main  findings  and  suggest  future  developments  for  the  CMR  in 
practice and research. One of the issues is the reporting rate which is highly variable and overall 
low. To  improve the reporting rate a safe reporting culture  is necessary. Healthcare authorities 
(e.g. healthcare  inspectorate) and government need to organise their  inspection and  legislation 
in  such way  that  this  furthers  a  safe  reporting  culture.  For  the  CMR  it  is more  effective  and 
efficient  to  improve  the  reporting  of  relevant medication  errors  instead  of  just  enlarging  the 
number of reports. A relevant medication error can be defined as an error that meets the three 
basic  selection  criteria  of  the  CMR  for  further  analysis:  (1)  risk  of  recurrence;  (2)  educational 
potential for other healthcare providers; and (3) risk of serious harm to the patient. To enhance 
the reporting of such relevant medication errors, the CMR should provide a manual and training 
course  for  healthcare  providers.  Secondly  every  hospital  or  community  pharmacy  should 
preferably  have  at  least  one  dedicated  person who  feels  responsible  for  the  collecting,  local 
analysis and reporting of medication errors to the CMR. 
In  this  thesis we described  the disproportionateness  in  the  reports  that  the CMR received. We 
advise the CMR to respond to this disproportionateness in reporting, otherwise relevant types of 
medication  errors  may  be  missed.  Expanding  the  reporting  programme  to  other  healthcare 
providers such as general practitioners, dentists and home care nurses  is a way to broaden the 
variety of reports. The CMR can also request the healthcare providers to pay attention at specific 
subject for reporting. In addition, patients should also become  involved  in reporting medication 
errors, but research about how the CMR can facilitate patients to report medication errors is still 
necessary. 
In our research we observe that the current quality of the CMR reports is inconsistent. Due to the 
low quality it is often very hard to retrieve the exact nature, causes and relevancy of the reported 
medication errors. Research  is needed to  investigate the causes of the  low quality of reports  in 
the CMR database. Beside the current telephone contact with healthcare providers we advise the 
CMR to  introduce the combination of a dedicated person and a web based response system to 
  Summary   
181 
enhance  the  quality  of  the  reports.  With  this  response  system  the  CMR  can  arrange  direct 
feedback to the reporter to confirm the facts related to the error and healthcare providers can 
resubmit extra  information. The dedicated person can submit the extra  information to the web 
based  response  system  and  can  also  train  his  or  her  colleagues  in  recognizing  and  analysing 
relevant medication errors and reporting them in the correct way. 
A fourth issue is the output from other national reporting programmes, which can help the CMR 
to  recognize  similarities  and  trends  more  timely.  The  CMR  is  well‐advised  to  screen  the 
newsletters  and  alerts  of  other  national  reporting  programmes  and  a  structural  method  to 
incorporate this output is necessary. For the time being we advise the CMR to concentrate on the 
output of  the United Kingdom  first, because  this output matches best with Dutch healthcare. 
Subsequently  the  CMR  should  explore  how  it  can  collaborate  more  intensively  with  other 
national reporting programmes about exchanging newsletters and alerts. 
In the research about the basic functioning of the CMR we observe that the manual case‐by‐case 
screening  is time‐consuming. A disadvantage of weekly decisions  is that the reports  in the CMR 
database that already have been screened in the past cannot be reselected anymore. We advise 
the  CMR  to  use  the  explored  selection  methods  for  selecting  relevant  reported  medication 
errors,  but  further  research  is  necessary  to  explore  the  sensitivity  and  selectivity  of  these 
selection methods. This will help the CMR to decide which selection methods are most useful in 
general and which ones  for  specific  subjects. To cope with  the growing number of  reports  the 
CMR  will  need  to  explore  supplementary  methods  to  screen  and  select  relevant  reports. 
Research  is necessary  to establish which supplementary selection methods are useful and how 
these can be incorporated within the weekly screening. 
Another  interesting  issue  is  the  overlap  between  the  reporting  of  adverse  drug  reactions  to 
pharmacovigilance centres and  reporting programmes  for medication errors  like  the CMR. The 
European Union has approved a legislation in July 2012, which stipulates that medication errors 
should  be  included  in  the  reporting  of  adverse  drug  reactions.  This  legislation  does  not 
sufficiently  take  into  account  the  clear  differences  in  the  recognition  and  evaluation  of 
medication errors and adverse drug reactions and also the actions to be taken after evaluation. In 
The  Netherlands  it  is  currently  not  yet  clear  how  to  respond  best  to  these  legislative 
developments.  It  should  be  investigated,  which  approach  is  most  preferable  for  healthcare 
providers who wish to report adverse drug reactions, medication errors and healthcare‐related 
errors (e.g. wrong site surgery) without interruption of their clinical work. 
In the output of the CMR we underline two  issues. One  issue concerns the target groups of the 
CMR output: alerts and newsletters are currently only disseminated to hospital pharmacists and 
community pharmacists. We believe  that  for better  implementation of  the  recommendations, 
the CMR needs  to disseminate  its output  to  the most appropriate healthcare providers. Other 
actors  than  pharmacists,  notably  physicians  and  nurses,  are  also  involved  in  the  medication 
process and therefore the CMR output should be disseminated to them too. Besides healthcare 
providers  the  CMR  should  also  send  specific  warnings  and/or  recommendations  to  the  most 
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appropriate  parties  such  as  pharmaceutical  industry,  software  vendors,  health  authorities 
(healthcare inspectorate, medicine regulatory agency) , university (for the purpose of education), 
and national guideline developers. 
Finally we notice that the degree of uptake of the CMR recommendations vary and we advise the 
CMR  to  explore  ways  to  increase  awareness  and  uptake  of  recommendations.  The  CMR  can 
present  its recommendations  in the form of a checklist for  implementation  in which healthcare 
providers can tick off each recommendation after they have implemented it into daily practice. In 
the  same  checklist,  healthcare  providers  should  also  be  allowed  to  explain  why  they  do  not 
implement  certain  recommendations. Research will be necessary  to  explore  the usefulness of 
such a feedback system and  its  impact on the uptake of recommendations. Secondly more and 
larger  studies  are necessary  to  investigate  the  association between  the degree of uptake  and 
potential determinants. It also needs to be explored and evaluated what is the effectiveness and 
efficiency of different methods of output. 
 
In  conclusion,  this  thesis  has  presented  a  series  of  studies  of  the Dutch  nationwide  reporting 
programme (CMR). The CMR is a patient safety enhancing tool for healthcare providers in clinical 
practice,  but  the CMR needs  to  broaden  the  input  by  incorporating  newsletters  and  alerts of 
other national  reporting programmes.  Secondly  the  input needs  to broaden by expanding  the 
CMR  to  new  participants.  The  input  itself  can  improve  by  raising  the  reporting  rate  and  the 
quality  of  the  reports.  In  order  to  respond  to  this  growing  input  the  CMR  incorporates  new 
selection and supplementary screening methods. The challenges in the output of the CMR are to 
broaden  the  target  group  by  disseminating  the  information  to  other  healthcare  providers, 
healthcare  agencies  and  third  parties.  Additionally  the  CMR  needs  to  improve  the  degree  of 
uptake of the recommendations. By implementing these proposals the CMR will further increase 
its already valuable contributions to patient safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Summary  
183 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Samenvatting 
 Learning from medication errors through a nationwide reporting programme 
186 
Patiëntveiligheid is een belangrijk aandachtsgebied binnen de gezondheidszorg. Om de veiligheid 
van patiënten in de zorg verder te laten groeien, zijn strategieën en verbeteracties nodig. 
Zorgverleners hebben daarom gewerkt aan allerlei veiligheidsprojecten zoals de campagnes van 
handen wassen in ziekenhuizen, de richtlijn overdracht medicatiegegevens in de keten, de 
introductie van elektronische voorschrijfsystemen, de uitwisseling van laboratoriumwaarden 
tussen artsen en apothekers en het voorkomen van verwisseling van patiënten bij het operatieve 
proces. Dit proefschrift beschrijft het onderzoek dat is gedaan naar één van die strategieën, 
namelijk: het melden en analyseren van medicatie-incidenten door zorgverleners. Zowel 
medicatie-incidenten als bijwerkingen behoren tot hetzelfde domein, namelijk nadelige 
geneesmiddel uitkomsten. Desondanks zijn ze niet onderling uitwisselbaar. Bijwerkingen en 
medicatie-incidenten lijken op een aantal aspecten op elkaar, maar er zijn ook verschillen: een 
geneesmiddel is altijd betrokken in een bijwerking en in een medicatie-incident is een 
geneesmiddel en/of een hulpmiddel voor toediening van het geneesmiddel betrokken. De 
patiënt ervaart bij een bijwerking altijd een nadelige uitkomst en bij een medicatie-incident kan 
de patiënt een nadelig uitkomst ondervinden of het medicatie-incident heeft een potentiële 
schade (bijna-incident). Een medicatie-incident is gerelateerd aan menselijke en/of 
organisatorische oorzaken terwijl een bijwerking altijd wordt veroorzaakt door de 
farmacologische eigenschappen van het geneesmiddel. Tot slot verschillen de aanbevelingen 
enigszins tussen een bijwerking en een medicatie-incident. Naar aanleiding van een bijwerking 
kan een geneesmiddel uit de markt worden gehaald of de samenvatting van de 
productkenmerken (SmPC) wordt aangepast. Bij medicatie-incidenten worden aanbevelingen 
gemaakt over het medicatieproces, werkproces en/of handelingen van zorgverleners. De definitie 
van een nadelige geneesmiddeluitkomst is een nadelige uitkomst die vóórkomt terwijl de patiënt 
een geneesmiddel inneemt of die nadien vóórkomt, ongeacht of deze nu wel of niet toe te 
schrijven is aan het geneesmiddel. Een medicatie-incident komt in elke fase van de behandeling 
voor: van het voorschrijven tot het afleveren en bereiden en uiteindelijk bij het toedienen van 
het geneesmiddel en de monitoring van het effect. Door medicatie-incidenten te melden en te 
analyseren is het mogelijk om de aard, de oorzaken en de gevolgen voor de patiënt van 
medicatie-incidenten te achterhalen. Het is uiteindelijk de bedoeling om deze gegevens en kennis 
met andere zorgverleners en met andere partijen in de zorg (bijvoorbeeld CBG, farmaceutische 
fabrikanten) te delen zodat de kans op herhaling van een vergelijkbaar medicatie-incident niet 
alleen bij de melder maar ook elders kan worden verkleind. 
In Nederland kunnen zorgverleners medicatie-incidenten melden bij een nationaal meldsysteem, 
genaamd Centrale Medicatie-incidenten Registratie (CMR). De onderzoeken in dit proefschrift 
gaan over de inrichting en bruikbaarheid van de CMR als een patiëntveiligheid vergrotend 
hulpmiddel voor zorgverleners in de praktijk. Drie aspecten van het nationale meldsysteem zijn 
onderzocht: (1) toevoer van gegevens richting de CMR; (2) functionaliteit van de CMR inclusief 
het selecteren en analyseren van meldingen van medicatie-incidenten; en (3) ontwikkeling en 
implementatie van de opbrengst van de CMR.  
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TOEVOER VAN GEGEVENS RICHTING DE CMR 
De huidige toevoer van medicatie-incidenten richting de CMR is afkomstig van individuele 
zorgverleners die melden via het meldformulier op de website of via een koppeling tussen de 
CMR en de interne meldsystemen in ziekenhuizen en openbare apotheken. Een andere bron voor 
de CMR is het raadplegen van wetenschappelijke literatuur. Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft studies over 
afleverfouten die in Pubmed® online van 2003 tot en met 2008 zijn gepubliceerd. Het doel van 
deze studie was om inzicht te krijgen in de aard, frequentie en oorzaken van afleverfouten. Uit dit 
onderzoek bleek dat de meeste studies afleverfouten in ziekenhuizen in de Verenigde Staten of 
Europa hadden onderzocht. In het algemeen was het aantal afleverfouten laag tot zeer laag, 
maar verdere verbetering van de distributiesystemen in apotheken is nog steeds noodzakelijk, 
omdat het zeer hoge absolute aantal afleveringen van geneesmiddelen zelfs bij een zeer laag 
foutpercentage kan zorgen voor een hoog aantal incidenten in de praktijk. Daarnaast kan de 
impact op de patiënt van iedere afzonderlijke afleverfout groot zijn. Verder zagen we dat er 
weinig informatie bekend was over de oorzaken van afleverfouten, omdat de meeste studies dit 
aspect niet hebben onderzocht. Slechts enkele oorzakenanalyses waren uitgevoerd. De 
belangrijkste oorzaken van afleverfouten waren gerelateerd aan organisatorische problemen, 
zoals een tekort aan medewerkers en hoge werkdruk. We concludeerden aan de hand van deze 
studie dat wetenschappelijke literatuur bruikbaar kan zijn om rond specifieke onderwerpen en/of 
risico’s in het medicatieproces informatie te vergaren. 
Een ander type van toevoer van gegevens richting de CMR is het beoordelen en indien zinvol 
overnemen van alerts en nieuwsbrieven die afkomstig zijn van buitenlandse meldsystemen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 laat de noodzaak zien van het uitwisselen van alerts tussen nationale meldsystemen 
van verschillende landen. Met één opvallend medicatie-incident met cabazitaxel (Jevtana®) 
hebben we geïllustreerd hoe wenselijk het is om op Europees niveau de waarschuwingen van de 
nationale meldsystemen onderling uit te wisselen. Het medicatie-incident met cabazitaxel werd 
veroorzaakt door onvolledige informatie in de samenvatting van productkenmerken (SmPC) van 
cabazitaxel. Het gevolg was dat patiënten werden behandeld met een overdosering van ruim 
15%. In dit hoofdstuk zagen we dat precies hetzelfde medicatie-incident in Spanje, Verenigd 
Koningrijk, en in Nederland heeft plaatsgevonden en dat de landen ieder onafhankelijk van elkaar 
met tussenpozen van maanden een alert hebben uitgestuurd om de eigen zorgverleners te 
waarschuwen. Nationale meldsystemen voor medicatie-incidenten kunnen waardevolle lessen 
leren uit de alerts die worden verstuurd door buitenlandse zusterorganisaties.  
Om meer inzicht te krijgen in de mogelijkheden om alerts en nieuwsbrieven als nieuwe toevoer 
van gegevens richting de CMR te gebruiken, hebben we in hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek gedaan naar 
het nut van 90 informatie-items (alerts en nieuwsbrieven) die zijn verspreid door drie nationale 
meldsystemen uit Engels sprekende landen (Canada, Verenigde Staten (VS) en Verenigd 
Koningrijk (VK)). Het doel van dit onderzoek was om te verkennen in welke mate alerts en 
nieuwsbrieven over medicatie-incidenten uit een land ook relevant kunnen zijn voor andere 
landen. We verzamelden 90 informatie items die waren uitgezonden in de periode van juni 2009 
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tot juni 2012. Vervolgens hebben we deze 90 informatie items vergeleken met de Nederlandse 
geneesmiddelenmarkt, Nederlandse gezondheidszorg, gemelde CMR-medicatie-incidenten, 
uitgezonden CMR-alerts, en uitgezonden CMR-nieuwsbrieven. In dit onderzoek hebben we 
gevonden dat de meeste alerts en nieuwsbrieven van andere nationale meldsystemen potentieel 
relevant waren voor de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg. Van de 90 items waren 87.8% (n=79) 
relevant voor de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg en deze medicatie-incidenten konden zich ook in 
Nederland voordoen. Voor 14 items heeft de CMR ook een alert of nieuwsbrief verstuurd. 
Wanneer er rekening werd gehouden met de datum van verspreiding dan bleek dat de CMR 
zeker van twee items van Canada, twee items van de VS en zeven items van het VK had kunnen 
leren. Hoewel ons onderzoek niet daarvoor was opgezet, liet het ook het omgekeerde resultaat 
zien dat Canada en VK van drie verschillende items van de CMR hadden kunnen leren. Bij twee 
items van Canada had de CMR dezelfde items acht maanden en 31 maanden eerder 
gecommuniceerd. De CMR had een vergelijkbaar item 47 maanden eerder uitgezonden dan het 
VK. De daadwerkelijke uitwisseling kan nog worden belemmerd door barrières zoals verschillen in 
taal, taxonomie, definities en werkwijzen tussen landen. Meer onderzoek is nodig om te 
achterhalen hoe deze barrières kunnen worden verholpen. In ieder geval laat dit onderzoek zien 
dat de CMR kan leren van medicatie-incidenten die afkomstig zijn van drie meldsystemen uit 
Canada, VS en VK. Nationale meldsystemen moeten onderlinge uitwisseling bevorderen en 
voordeel halen uit het delen van alerts en nieuwsbrieven. Het verdient aanbeveling dat de CMR 
de alerts en nieuwsbrieven van andere nationale meldsystemen toevoegt aan haar huidige 
screening en analyses.  
 
FUNCTIONALITEIT VAN HET CMR MELDSYSTEEM 
In Nederland kunnen zorgverleners medicatie-incidenten melden aan de CMR. Hoofdstuk 5 
beschrijft de architectuur, de implementatie en status van de CMR. Tevens hebben we het CMR-
meldsysteem vergeleken met meldsystemen in andere landen. De CMR heeft als doelstelling om 
het risicomanagement in het medicatieproces te ondersteunen, door op basis van medicatie-
incidenten meldingen en trendanalysen in de CMR-databank, alerts en nieuwsbrieven te 
verzenden, zodat zorgverleners, andere partijen in de zorg en overheid in brede zin worden 
geïnformeerd over de risico’s van het medicatieproces. Het CMR-meldsysteem bestaat uit een 
website, een databank, een meldingsformulier op de website, een import-applicatie voor 
meldingen die afkomstig zijn van lokale interne meldingssystemen (inclusief een directe 
verbinding), een applicatie om overzichten en grafieken van gemelde medicatie-incidenten te 
genereren en een nationaal waarschuwingssysteem voor zorgverleners. Een landelijk 
meldsysteem zou moeten voldoen aan de volgende eisen: adequate IT-ondersteuning, 
gemakkelijke toegankelijkheid, gebruiksvriendelijkheid en geschikt zijn voor landelijke 
implementatie in de verschillende sectoren binnen de gezondheidszorg. We constateerden dat 
de architectuur van het CMR-meldsysteem aan deze eisen voldoet. In de periode van maart 2010 
tot maart 2011 meldden openbare apotheken en ziekenhuizen verschillende soorten medicatie-
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incidenten. De meldingen van openbare apotheken gingen vaak over medicatie-incidenten, die 
plaats hadden gevonden tijdens aanschrijven van recepten en in de medicatiebewakingsfase 
(42.5%). Daarentegen waren de meldingen van ziekenhuizen vaak gerelateerd aan het toedienen 
van het geneesmiddel (38.7%). Het meldingscijfer van ziekenhuizen was laag: in een periode van 
vier jaar hadden slechts 13 van de 90 deelnemende ziekenhuizen meer dan 100 meldingen 
gedaan, 11 ziekenhuizen hadden tussen de één en 50 medicatie-incidenten gemeld en 67 
ziekenhuizen hadden geen enkel medicatie-incident gemeld. De conclusie van dit hoofdstuk was 
dat de expansie van de CMR naar openbare apotheken een succesvolle strategie was. Deze 
aanpak kan ook worden gebruikt om de CMR uit te breiden naar de overige zorgverleners in de 
eerstelijns zorg.  
De CMR-databank bevat bekende en eerder gemelde medicatie-incidenten, maar ook meldingen 
die nieuwe soorten medicatie-incidenten beschrijven of niet eerder zijn gemeld. Nieuwe soorten 
medicatie-incidenten kunnen het gevolg zijn van introducties van nieuwe geneesmiddelen, 
zorgvernieuwing en veranderingen in bestaande zorgprocessen. Er zijn selectiemethodes nodig 
om bepaalde soorten meldingen uit de CMR-databank te kunnen selecteren. Op basis van 
externe signalen zoals een zorgvernieuwing kan de CMR besluiten om waakzaam te zijn en 
meldingen in de CMR-databank te zoeken. Twee verschillende selectiemethodes voor de CMR-
meldingen zijn onderzocht in hoofdstukken 6 en 7. In hoofdstuk 6 was het onderzoek gericht op 
de analyse van een steekproef van meldingen van openbare apotheken en ziekenhuizen om de 
aard en gevolgen van IT gerelateerde medicatie-incidenten te achterhalen. We stelden 
verschillende zoektermen op die verwezen naar IT en vervolgens werden deze zoektermen 
gebruikt om tekstfragmenten in de vrije tekst beschrijving van het meldformulier te detecteren. 
Het resultaat was dat één op de zes medicatie-incidenten (16.1%, n=668) was gerelateerd aan IT. 
Voorschrijfsystemen en apotheek-informatie-systemen speelden een cruciale rol in het 
veroorzaken van IT gerelateerde medicatie-incidenten. Verbetering moet worden nagestreefd 
vanuit technisch/organisatorisch perspectief (zoals design van het systeem, verandering van het 
werkproces) maar ook vanuit menselijk perspectief (zoals trainingen aan zorgverleners).  
Hoofdstuk 7 analyseerde de aard en gevolgen van medicatie-incidenten die gerelateerd waren 
aan geïndividualiseerde distributie systeem toediening (GDS). Relevante meldingen werden 
geselecteerd tijdens de wekelijkse screening waarbij het CMR-team meldingen selecteert en 
beoordeelt. Sinds oktober 2011 markeerde het CMR-team alle medicatie-incidenten die waren 
gerelateerd aan GDS toepassingen. Elk gemarkeerd incident werd onafhankelijk door twee 
onderzoekers op zes aspecten beoordeeld en geclassificeerd: persoon die het medicatie-incident 
heeft ontdekt; fase van het medicatieproces waarin het medicatie-incident heeft 
plaatsgevonden; de directe oorzaak van het medicatie-incident; aard van het medicatie-incident 
vanuit het perspectief van de zorgverlener, aard van het medicatie-incident vanuit het 
perspectief van de patiënt en de schadelijke gevolgen voor de patiënt veroorzaakt door het 
medicatie-incident. Wij vonden dat 6.2% van de medicatie-incidenten van openbare apotheken 
en slechts 0.4% van de medicatie-incidenten van ziekenhuizen waren gerelateerd aan GDS-
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toepassingen. In de openbare apotheken waren de medicatie-incidenten vooral geconcentreerd 
in het aanschrijven in het apotheek-informatie-systeem en het vullen van de GDS-toediening 
doseerzakjes. Twee veel genoemde directe oorzaken van een medicatie-incident waren het 
veranderen van het geneesmiddelenschema van de patiënt of een verhuizing van de patiënt. Het 
absolute percentage van GDS-toepassing gerelateerde medicatie-incidenten was laag, maar het 
gebruik van GDS zal verder toenemen en het blijft noodzakelijk om aandacht te schenken aan dit 
nieuwe type medicatie-incidenten in de gezondheidszorg. 
 
ONTWIKKELING EN IMPLEMENTATIE VAN DE OPBRENGST VAN DE CMR 
De huidige opbrengst van de CMR bestaat hoofdzakelijk uit alerts en nieuwsbrieven met 
aanbevelingen. We onderzochten een andere vorm van opbrengst door een medicatie-incident in 
de wetenschappelijke literatuur te publiceren (hoofdstuk 8). In hoofdstuk 8 hebben we 
geëxploreerd of de publicatie van een medicatie-incident in de wetenschappelijke literatuur een 
geschikte vorm van opbrengst voor de CMR was. In dit medicatie-incident kreeg een 3 jaar oude 
patiënt acht keer een verkeerde behandeling voor Acute Lymfatische Leukemie (ALL) door een 
verwisseling tussen E. coli asparginase en PEG asparaginase. In de wetenschappelijke literatuur 
was dit de eerste gemelde casus van een patiënt die was onderbehandeld met asparaginase door 
een verwisseling tussen E. coli asparaginase en PEG asparaginase. Het was niet bekend of 
vergelijkebare meldingen in andere landen waren gemeld. Verschillende oorzaken hebben 
mogelijk bijgedragen aan deze verwisseling. In de publicatie adviseerden we om alle vormen van 
asparaginase op te nemen in de ziekenhuis geneesmiddelendatabank ten behoeve van de 
identificatie van geneesmiddelen. Een tweede aanbeveling was om computersignalen te 
gebruiken die zorgverleners waarschuwen dat er drie verschillende vormen van asparaginase 
bestaan. De publicatie van dit medicatie-incident in de wetenschappelijke literatuur vereiste 
aanzienlijk meer tijd en energie dan een publicatie in een CMR-nieuwsbrief, vanwege het 
uitgebreide beoordelings-reviewproces van het wetenschappelijke tijdschrift. Verder was het 
noodzakelijk om de aanbevelingen die voor de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg waren ontwikkeld, 
aan te passen zodat ze ook relevant werden voor de zorgverleners uit de verschillende landen. 
Daarentegen kan met een publicatie in de wetenschappelijke literatuur gebruik worden gemaakt 
van het netwerk van het tijdschrift om een internationaal publiek te bereiken.  
In hoofdstuk 9 hebben we de zelf gerapporteerde implementatiegraad van CMR-aanbevelingen 
onderzocht. Het doel van deze studie was om de implementatiegraad van de aanbevelingen van 
drie verstuurde alerts te achterhalen en de potentiële determinanten die gerelateerd zijn aan 
een succesvolle implementatie te identificeren. De primaire uitkomst was de zelf gerapporteerde 
implementatiegraad per specifieke aanbeveling en daarnaast hebben we ook gekeken naar de 
relatie tussen de implementatiegraad en de verschillende potentiële determinanten. De 
implementatie van de aanbevelingen varieerde behoorlijk tussen de verschillende alerts. Er was 
een niet significant verband zichtbaar tussen het actief melden aan de CMR en een betere 
implementatie van de aanbevelingen. 
 Samenvatting  
191 
DISCUSSIE EN CONCLUSIE 
In hoofdstuk 10 bespreken we de belangrijkste bevindingen en toekomstige ontwikkelingen voor 
de CMR in praktijk en onderzoek. Een van de kwesties is dat het meldgedrag van zorgverleners 
zeer varieert en laag is. Om het meldgedrag te verbeteren is een veilige meldcultuur nodig. 
Overheid (bijvoorbeeld de Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg) zou in de visitaties en wetgeving 
moeten letten op een veilige meldcultuur. Voor de CMR is het meer effectief en efficiënt om het 
melden van relevante medicatie-incidenten te verbeteren dan alleen het vergroten van het totale 
aantal meldingen. Een relevant medicatie-incident kan worden gedefinieerd als een medicatie-
incident dat voldoet aan de drie basis selectie criteria van de CMR voor nadere analyse: (1) kans 
op herhaling; (2) educatieve waarde voor andere zorgverleners; (3) kans op ernstige schade voor 
de patiënt. Om het melden van relevante medicatie-incidenten te verhogen kan de CMR een 
handleiding en training aan zorgverleners bieden. Verder zou in ieder ziekenhuis of openbare 
apotheek minstens één coördinerende persoon aanwezig moeten zijn die verantwoordelijk is 
voor het verzamelen, lokaal analyseren en melden van medicatie-incidenten aan de CMR.  
In dit proefschrift zien we ook een onevenredige verdeling van de meldingen die de CMR 
ontvangt, met andere woorden bepaalde soorten medicatie-incidenten worden vaker gemeld 
dan andere soorten. Zorgverleners melden vaak medicatie-incidenten binnen het eigen 
werkterrein en de openbare apotheken melden dan vooral medicatie-incidenten die tijdens 
aanschrijven van recepten en in de medicatiebewakingsfase plaatsvinden. Daarentegen waren de 
meldingen van ziekenhuizen vaak gerelateerd aan het toedienen van het geneesmiddel. We 
adviseren de CMR om actie te ondernemen tegen deze onevenredige verdeling van meldingen 
aan de CMR, anders is het mogelijk dat relevante type medicatie-incidenten worden gemist, zoals 
medicatie-incidenten in de huisartsenpraktijk. Uitbreiding van het meldsysteem naar andere 
zorgverleners zoals huisartsen, tandartsen en thuiszorg verpleegkundigen is een manier om de 
variatie van meldingen te verbreden. Verder kan aan melders worden gevraagd aandacht te 
schenken aan specifieke onderwerpen. Tot slot kunnen ook patiënten worden betrokken bij het 
melden van medicatie-incidenten, maar hiervoor dient eerst te worden onderzocht hoe de CMR 
patiënten in het melden van medicatie-incidenten kan faciliteren.  
In ons onderzoek observeerden we dat de huidige kwaliteit van de CMR-meldingen niet 
consistent is. Door de lage kwaliteit is het vaak heel moeilijk voor de CMR om snel de exacte 
aard, oorzaken en relevantie van de gemelde medicatie-incidenten in te schatten. Om de 
kwaliteit van meldingen te verhogen, adviseren we het aanwijzen van één coördinerende 
persoon per organisatie of per afdeling die verantwoordelijk is voor het melden van medicatie-
incidenten. Daarnaast is een antwoordsysteem via een website nodig naast het telefonisch 
benaderen van melders. De CMR kan dan vervolgens via dit antwoordsysteem communiceren 
met de melder. De melder kan via dit antwoordsysteem vragen van de CMR beantwoorden en 
extra informatie insturen. Wanneer het wordt gecombineerd met één coördinerende persoon 
dan kan deze persoon de extra informatie via het antwoordsysteem indienen en tevens zijn of 
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haar collega’s trainen in het herkennen en analyseren van relevante medicatie-incidenten en het 
melden van deze medicatie-incidenten op de juiste manier.  
De vierde kwestie gaat over de opbrengst van andere landelijke meldsystemen. Uit het 
onderzoek blijkt dat alerts en nieuwsbrieven van andere landen de CMR kunnen helpen in het 
eerder herkennen van specifieke problemen en trends. We adviseren om een structurele 
methode op te zetten om de alerts en nieuwsbrieven van andere landelijke meldsystemen te 
screenen en op te nemen in de toevoer van gegevens richting de CMR. In de tussentijd adviseren 
we de CMR om zich eerst te concentreren op de opbrengst van het Verenigd Koningrijk, omdat 
de opbrengst van dit land het meest lijkt te bieden aan de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg. Ook 
moet worden onderzocht hoe de uitwisseling tussen de CMR en andere landelijke meldsystemen 
kan worden geïntensiveerd. 
In het onderzoek over de functionaliteit van het CMR-meldsysteem observeren we dat de 
handmatige screening veel tijd kost. Een nadeel van deze wekelijkse beoordeling is dat 
meldingen in de CMR-databank die in het verleden zijn gescreend niet meer opnieuw worden 
geselecteerd. Om het groeiende aantal meldingen aan te kunnen, moet worden onderzocht 
welke aanvullende selectiemethoden bruikbaar zijn en hoe deze kunnen worden samengevoegd 
in de wekelijkse screening. We adviseren de CMR daarom om indien nodig ook de door ons 
onderzochte selectiemethoden voor het selecteren van relevante gemelde medicatie-incidenten 
toe te passen. Verder onderzoek is evenwel nodig naar de sensitiviteit en selectiviteit van deze 
selectiemethoden. Dit onderzoek zou helpen bij het beslissen welke selectiemethoden het 
meeste geschikt zijn om te gebruiken voor alle meldingen en welke methodes voor specifieke 
onderwerpen.  
Een andere interessante kwestie is de overlap tussen het melden van bijwerkingen aan 
bijwerkingencentra en meldsystemen voor medicatie-incidenten zoals de CMR. De Europese Unie 
heeft in juli 2012 een verordening goedgekeurd, waarin is bepaald dat het melden van medicatie-
incidenten een onderdeel zou moeten zijn van het melden van bijwerkingen. Naar onze mening 
houdt deze verordening nog onvoldoende rekening met de verschillen die er tussen medicatie-
incidenten en bijwerkingen bestaan wat het herkennen, evalueren en terugdringen betreft. In 
Nederland is momenteel nog niet uitgekristalliseerd hoe men deze verordening zal uitwerken. 
Het is wenselijk om nader te onderzoeken welke aanpak de meeste voorkeur geniet van 
zorgverleners, zodat zij zonder noemenswaardige onderbreking van het klinisch werk zowel 
bijwerkingen, medicatie-incidenten en niet-medicamenteuze incidenten (bijvoorbeeld aan de 
verkeerde zijde opereren) kunnen melden.  
Aan de output zijde van de CMR zien wij twee belangrijke kwesties. Eén kwestie gaat over de 
doelgroep van de CMR-opbrengst. Momenteel worden de alerts en nieuwsbrieven alleen naar 
ziekenhuisapothekers en openbaar apothekers verzonden. We zijn de mening toegedaan dat 
voor een optimale implementatie van de aanbevelingen, de CMR de alerts en nieuwsbrieven naar 
alle relevante zorgverleners moet verspreiden. Andere actoren dan de apotheker, in het 
bijzonder artsen en verpleegkundigen die ook direct betrokken zijn in het medicatieproces, 
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zouden relevante CMR-aanbevelingen moeten ontvangen. Naast zorgverleners zou de CMR 
specifieke waarschuwingen en/of aanbevelingen naar de meest relevante partijen bijvoorbeeld 
farmaceutische fabrikanten, softwareleveranciers, gezondheidsautoriteiten (Inspectie voor de 
Gezondheidszorg, geneesmiddelen registratieautoriteit), universiteiten (ten behoeve van 
onderwijs) en richtlijnopstellers moeten versturen. 
Tot slot merken we op dat de implementatiegraad van de CMR aanbevelingen varieert en we 
adviseren om te onderzoeken hoe de bekendheid en implementatie van de aanbevelingen 
kunnen worden verhoogd. De CMR kan de aanbevelingen presenteren in de vorm van een 
controlelijst ter ondersteuning van de implementatie, waarin zorgverleners voor elke aanbeveling 
kunnen afvinken of zij die hebben geïmplementeerd in de dagelijkse praktijk. Als de CMR het 
invullen van deze controlelijsten zou kunnen inzien, zou de CMR beter kunnen monitoren in 
hoeverre haar aanbevelingen in de praktijk worden geïmplementeerd. Zorgverleners moeten 
hierbij dan de mogelijkheid krijgen om uit te leggen waarom zij bepaalde aanbevelingen niet 
hebben geïmplementeerd. Onderzoek is nodig naar het functioneren van zo’n 
terugkoppelingssysteem en de impact op de implementatie van de aanbevelingen. Verder is er 
meer onderzoek nodig maar de relatie tussen de implementatiegraad en potentiële 
determinanten. We bevelen ook aan de effectiviteit en efficiency van de verschillende vormen 
van opbrengst te onderzoeken.  
Concluderend, in dit proefschrift is een serie van studies over het Nederlandse landelijke 
meldsysteem (CMR) gepresenteerd. De CMR is een patiëntveiligheid verhogend instrument voor 
zorgverleners in de dagelijkse praktijk, maar de CMR moet de toevoer van gegevens verbreden 
door alerts en nieuwsbrieven van andere landelijke meldsystemen te screenen. De verbreding 
van de toevoer van gegevens richting de CMR kan verder worden gestimuleerd door het 
meldsysteem open te stellen voor nieuwe deelnemers. De gegevens kunnen worden verbeterd 
door het meldgedrag en de kwaliteit van de meldingen te verhogen. Als reactie op de groeiende 
toevoer van gegevens moet de CMR meer ervaring opdoen met nieuwe selectie- en 
screeningsmethoden. Het verbreden van de doelgroep door de informatie te verspreiden naar 
andere zorgverleners, organisaties in de gezondheidszorg en derde partijen is de volgende 
uitdaging voor de CMR. Bovendien moet de CMR de implementatiegraad van de aanbevelingen 
monitoren en waar nodig verbeteren. Door het implementeren van deze voorstellen zal de CMR 
haar waardevolle bijdrage aan de patiëntveiligheid verder kunnen vergroten.  
 
 
病人安全(patient safety) 已成為醫療保健服務內的重要議題，而業界亦有必要加強對此方面
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病人安全(patient safety) 已成為醫療保健服務內的重要議題，而業界亦有必要加強對此方面
的措施。 為了探討用藥疏失(medication error)的真正性質、對病患的後果及事故的潛在起
因，其中一個提升安全策略就是專業通報及用藥疏失分析，透過跟醫護機構及人員交換情
報，可以減低發生同類失誤的機會。 
 
用藥疏失及藥物不良反應(adverse drug reaction)同屬藥物不良事件(adverse drug event)，但
兩者不盡相同。藥物不良反應總是直接跟藥理特徵(pharmacological characteristics)有關，並
涉及藥物對病患的傷害。而用藥疏失則跟藥物與配藥儀器有關，可能傷害病患，或在幾近
錯失的階段(near misses)為病患帶來潛在風險。從根本原因分析(root cause analysis)，用藥疏
失牽涉到人為及機構錯誤，藥物不良反應則涉及到藥理(pharmacology)。除此以外，對藥物
不良反應及用藥疏失的建議亦有所不同。對於藥物不良反應，最普遍建議病患停用該款藥
物，或按藥品說明書(summary of product characteristics, SPC) 改變劑量。反之，對用藥疏失
的建議更全面，跟用藥過程、醫護人員的工作步驟及處理有更大關係。藥物不良事件發生
於病患正服用或已服用藥物一段時間後出現的有害後果，或與藥物無關的反應。而用藥疏
失則可以出現在任何處理程序，包括處方(prescribing)、配藥(dispensing)、藥物調劑
(compounding)、藥物管理及藥效監測。 
 
在荷蘭，用藥疏失可向國家通報系統中央藥物事故登記(Central Medication incidents 
Registration, 下稱 CMR)。是次論文研究集中 CMR 於臨床應用下提升病人安全的用處。研究
強調 CMR 三大方面: (1) 資料申報, (2) 系統基本運作模式，包括篩選及分析用藥疏失報告，
以及 (3) 相應建議提供及外界採用。  
 
資料申報 
申報用藥疏失的主要途徑包括個別醫療機構及人員透過網上申報表格呈報，以及從醫院或
社區藥房(community pharmacy) 收集的報告。而 CMR 亦可從科研文獻中獲取資訊。本文第
二章探討了由 2003 年至 2008 年於藥劑文獻網站 Pubmed®發表的配藥失誤(dispensing errors) 
研究，旨在了解其性質、次數及深層起因。大多數研究調查了美國及歐洲醫院內的配藥失
誤，結果顯示，發生失誤的機率一般介乎低至相當低水平。然而，由於藥房每日配方大量
藥物，即使輕微失誤亦可導致大量事故發生，所以進一步改善藥物分配系統(pharmacy 
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distribution system) 仍然重要。再者，因為大部分研究未有觸及引致配藥失誤的深層原因，
對此的資料翏翏可數。而少數根本原因分析顯示，最重要起因是人手不足及工作量大等機
構問題。總括來說，這類文獻綜述(literature review)可增強對用藥過程中特定情況及風險的
了解。  
 
海外通報系統的警示及通訊亦是另一種資料來源。本文第三章說明了各國通報中心互通警
示情報的必要。從錯誤利用卡巴他賽注射液(Cabazitaxel (Jevtana®)) 的用藥疏失個案中，切
實證明歐盟各國間的用藥疏失通報中心可更有效利用共享情報。由於藥物使用說明欠缺清
晰，引致用藥疏失。結果，病患被注射了比正常多 15%的劑量。本章討論了發生在西班
牙、英國及荷蘭的同類用藥疏失，以及每隔數月各國向國內醫護機構及人員提供的警示。
由此可見，各國通報中心可從鄰近國家提供的警示學習。 
 
為理解警示及通訊作為 CMR 的資料來源，本文第四章探討了由英語國家(加拿大、美國、
英國)內三個國家通報系統發佈的訊息，從而探討某國發出有關用藥疏失的警示及通訊跟其
他國家相關的程度。研究收集了 90 個從 2009 年 6 月至 2012 年 6 月發佈的訊息，並與之跟
CMR 的用藥疏失報告、警示及通訊比較。研究發現，大部分其他國家通報系統的警示及通
訊都可能與荷蘭醫療體系相關，而這類失誤亦可能發生在荷蘭，佔整體 87.8% (n=79)。CMR
也有對其中 14 項訊息發出警示及通訊。以發佈日期作考量，CMR 可參考出自加拿大醫藥
行為安全協會(ISMP-Canada)的 2 個訊息、美國醫藥行為安全協會(ISMP-USA)的 2 個訊息，
及英國全國通報及學習系統(NRLS-UK)的 7 個訊息。此外，研究亦發現加拿大及美國可反過
來從 CMR 的 3 個不同訊息學習。參考加拿大其中 2 個訊息，CMR 分別早於 8 個月及 31 個
月前已發佈相關資訊。而 CMR 比英國更早於 47 個月前已發佈類似情況。 
 
是次研究顯示，CMR 可從加拿大、美國及英國的通報系統學習各種不同的失誤。但由於語
言、分類法(taxonomy)、定義及通報系統間各種運作程序有差異，未來定需更多研究以實
現各國相互學習。再者，各國亦可從警示與通訊情報互換來促進學習。因此，CMR 應配合
其他國家的資訊作篩選及分析。 
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CMR的基本運作模式 
為促進通報及分析，能讓醫療機構及人員報告用藥疏失的通報系統是必不可少，而 CMR 是
荷蘭的相關通報系統。本文第五章旨在介紹系統的結構、推行及現況，並比較其他國家(美
國、加拿大、英國及丹麥)的類似系統。CMR 的根本目標是根據資料庫內的報告及趨勢分
析，發出警示與通訊，並提醒醫療機構、醫護人員、體系內的第三者及政府有關風險，以
支援用藥過程的風險管理(risk management)。系統包含網頁、資料庫、網上通報表格、從其
他地方通報系統導入的應用程式(包括實時介面)、提供已通報的用藥疏失概括報告應用程
式，及為醫護人員而設的全國警示系統。一般國家通報系統需要充足電腦支援，容易操作
及使用，並能配合國家內不同醫療界別推行。研究發現，CMR 的結構亦合乎這些規定。從
2010 年 3 月至 2011 年 3 月，社區藥房及醫院通報了各類用藥疏失個案。社區藥房較常通
報關於藥方處理(processing of prescription)及藥物監測階段(medication surveillance phase)，
佔 42.5%。而醫院則較常報告關於行政階段，佔 38.7%。醫院通報數字屬低，90 間參與的
醫院內，只有 13 間四年內呈報超過 100 次用藥疏失事故，11 間通報 1 至 50 次，67 間甚至
沒有通報過任何事故。本章總括認為已成功將 CMR 擴展至社區藥房，而此做法應擴展至其
他主要醫療範疇內。  
 
CMR 資料庫包含已知及已呈報的用藥疏失事故，亦有新類型或從未上報至資料庫的報告。 
新類型的用藥疏失可因採用新藥、新醫療措施及現行醫療程序轉變而引致。為了從 CMR 資
料庫內選出這些報告，篩選方法是不可或缺。而系統可因醫療措施這類外在改變而特別注
意某個主題，及從資料庫中搜尋報告。本文第六章及第七章探討了 CMR 資料庫兩種不同的
篩選方法。第六章旨在從社區藥房及醫院專業人員報告跟科技有關的用藥疏失事故，分析
其性質及後果。研究收集多項與科技相關的檢索項目，以便從隨意文字描述(free text 
description)中分辨文字片段。結果顯示，16.1%跟科技有關(n=668)。而社區藥房(21.5%, 
n=352) 比醫院(12.6%, n=317) 出現更多涉及科技的失誤。電腦化配藥輸入系統及藥房資訊系
統是引致涉及科技方面用藥疏失事故至為關鍵的因素。絕大部分失誤都跟人機互動(human-
machine interaction)有關，醫療機構除了可在技術或機構層面外(例如系統設計及工作流程
改變)，亦可在人為層面上(例如員工訓練)介入。 
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而第七章分析了涉及自動劑量配藥(automated dispensing dosing, ADD)的用藥疏失性質及後
果。CMR 團隊每週篩選相關報告，並從 2011 年 10 月起標示所有涉及自動劑量配藥的用藥
疏失事故。各種用藥疏失會由兩名研究人員分為六大類別: 發現失誤的人、失誤發生時用藥
過程的階段、失誤的直接原因、從醫療機構及人員看失誤的性質、從病患看失誤的性質，
以及因失誤為病患帶來的傷害。結果發現，涉及自動劑量配藥的用藥疏失是由社區藥房報
告，佔 6.2%，而僅 0.4%個案報告來自於醫院。社區藥房的用藥疏失集中在藥房資訊輸入及
藥物分配。這類失誤的直接原因是由於病患服藥習慣或地點上改變。儘管涉及自動劑量配
藥失誤的絕對百分比似乎不高，但自動劑量配藥使用更趨廣泛，醫療體系需要關注這類新
型用藥疏失。 
 
相關資料提供及外界採用 
目前 CMR 提供的資料主要包括警示及附有建議的通訊。本文第八章探討了以科學文獻個案
研究作為另類資料提供。而 CMR 以科學案例報告來發佈警示。案例關於一名患上急性淋巴
性白血病(Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, ALL)的三歲病患，八次錯誤地注射了大腸桿菌天冬
酰胺酶(E.coli asparaginase)，並非 PEG 天冬酰胺酶(PEG asparaginase)。根據科學文獻，此個
案是首宗因錯用天冬酰胺酶導致治療不足(undertreated)的案例，而多個系統可能引致混
淆。研究建議，所有已登記與納入治療方案的天冬酰胺酶應包含於醫院藥物資料庫，以供
分辨。另外，當訂購、藥物調劑或配方此類藥物時，系統應提供三類不同藥物的警示。有
見於檢閱科學期刊過程仔細，以科學個案報告形式發表這類用藥疏失，比在 CMR 通訊內發
表，需要更多時間及努力。再者，由於建議先根據荷蘭醫療情況所提出，所提出的建議亦
有必要能讓其他國家的醫療機構及人員使用。另一方面，科學文獻也可供外國專家閱覽。 
 
本文第九章調查了自行通報採用 CMR 建議的程度。研究旨在探討外界採用三個藥物安全警
示系統所提供建議的程度，以及影響採用的因素。主要結果反映，採用建議的程度會根據
特定警示而存在相當大的差異。此外，積極通報與外界採用更多建議並無顯著關連。 
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討論及結論 
本文第十章討論了研究主要結果，及建議 CMR 在實行及研究上的未來發展。其中一個問題
是通報數字變化大及整體為低。故此，為改善通報數字，安全通報文化是不可或缺。醫療
監測當局及政府應整理調查及立法，以推進安全通報文化。就 CMR 而言，改善相關用藥疏
失通報比單純擴大報告數字更具效用。相關用藥疏失即是達到三個基本條件，就可讓系統
進一步分析的失誤，包括(1)重現的風險; (2)向其他醫護人員提供教育; 及(3) 病患受嚴重傷害
的風險。CMR 應向醫療機構及人員提供操作說明及訓練課程，從而促進相關失誤通報。除
此之外，每間醫院或社區藥房都應至少一名安排指定人員負責收集個、機構內部分析，及
向 CMR 通報用藥疏失。 
 
本文第五章描述了 CMR 收到的報告存在不成比例問題，建議應對此採取措施，以防遺漏任
何相關案例。而將通報系統擴展至其他醫護人員包括家庭醫生、牙醫及私家看護可以使報
告更多元化。CMR 亦可要求醫護人員留意特定通報主題。再者，病患亦應參與通報用藥疏
失，但未來仍需更多有關 CMR 如何推動病患通報的研究。 
 
研究發現，目前 CMR 報告質量不一。由於質量低下，研究員難以從報告中探尋引起失誤的
真正性質、成因及相關程度，未來需要調查導致資料庫報告質量低的原因。除了現行以電
話聯絡醫療機構及人員外，研究亦建議 CMR 加入專責通報人員及網上回應系統(web based 
response system)，從而提升報告質量。利用回應系統，CMR 可直接向通報人員溝通，並確
認失誤的相關事實，而醫療機構及人員可提交額外資料。專責通報人員可提交至網上回應
系統。並同時教導同僚辨析用藥疏失及正確報告。 
 
另外，研究顯示，其他國家通報系統資料可以協助 CMR 更及時地識別相似之處及趨勢。系
統要慎重篩選其他國家通報系統的警示及通訊，亦有必要以結構性方法去結合這些資料。
目前而言，系統可先集中於英國案例，因其跟荷蘭醫療體系最匹配。隨之而行，CMR 應探
索如何在交換情報方面與其他國家有更深入協作。 
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從 CMR 基本運作的研究觀察所得，以人手逐個個案篩選是相當費時。每週選擇個案的壞處
是，曾在資料庫中篩選過的永不能再選用。CMR 可利用研究所得的方法，去選擇已上報的
相關用藥疏失報告。而未來亦需要研究這些篩選方法的規定及敏感度，從而讓系統決定哪
種方法最適用於整體與特定類別。為應付日益增長的報告量，CMR 應探索其他方法來篩選
相關報告。未來須研究建立適用的挑戰方法，以及如何將不同方法配合於每週篩選程序之
內。 
 
值得注意的是，在藥物不良反應通報情況下，藥物安全監測中心(pharmacovigilance centre)
跟 CMR 這類為用藥疏失而設的通報系統有角色重疊。2012 年 7 月，歐盟通過了法案，明
確規定用藥疏失需納入藥物不良反應通報內。是次立法規定不單充份顧及分辨與評估用藥
疏失及藥物不良反應的真正差異，亦考慮到評估後應採取的行動。目前，荷蘭仍未清楚如
何以最佳方法應對這類法律發展。未來應調查在沒有干擾臨床工作下，最適合醫療機構及
人員通報藥物不良反應、用藥疏失及醫療失誤(如錯位手術[wrong site surgery])的方法。 
 
研究突顯了 CMR 資料提供的兩大問題。CMR 目前只向醫院藥劑師及社區藥房藥劑師提供警
告及通訊。研究相信，系統需要將訊息發放給最合適的醫療機構及人員。不單藥劑師，特
別是內科醫生跟護士，亦有參與用藥過程，並應得到相關資訊。除此以外，CMR 亦應提供
特定警示與建議予最合適的參與方，包括製藥業[pharmaceutical industry]、軟件商、衛生當
局(如醫療監察局[healthcare inspectorate]、藥物監察局[medicine regulatory agency])、大學
及制定政策的官員。 
 
最後，研究發現，外界跟從 CMR 建議的程度不一，因此 CMR 應探索方法以增加認識及採
用內容。系統可用清單模式表述建議，讓醫療機構及人員於日常工作中推行，並於每次完
成後打勾。同時，清單上應讓醫療機構及人員解釋沒有推行個別建議的原因。未來要探索
這類通報系統的用處及實行建議的影響，亦需更多大規模的研究，以調查採用建議的程度
跟潛在影響因素之間的關係，並評估所提供的資料效用。 
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總括而言，本文闡釋了連串有關荷蘭國家申報系統 CMR 的研究。在臨床應用上，CMR 可協
助醫療機構及人員提升病人安全。除了需要將其他國家申報系統的通訊及警示納入其中之
外，系統亦要將其擴展至不同層面，讓個案種類更多元化。透過提升通報率及報告質素，
可以改善個案內容。為應對不斷增長的通報量，系統納入了新方法以篩選及補充檢查。向
其他醫護人員、醫療機構及第三者發放資訊以擴大目標群是 CMR 面對的挑戰。此外，系統
需改善外界採用建議的程度。透過推行以上建議，CMR 將進一步擴大對病人安全的珍貴貢
獻。 
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Het laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift vind ik misschien wel het moeilijkste onderdeel 
vanwege de afwezigheid van een wetenschappelijke benadering. Het gaat hier immers om mijn 
eigen beleving en om de mensen die een invulling hebben gegeven aan het onderzoek, de vele 
vergaderingen, artikelen én mijn leven!  
 
MIJN BELEVING 
Dit promotieonderzoek heeft mijn professionele en persoonlijke leven op drie belangrijke 
manieren verrijkt. Allereerst is er de kennisverrijking. Door een promotieonderzoek vergaar je 
veel kennis over een bepaald onderwerp. In het begin tastte ik vooral in het duister, maar 
gelukkig stond ik er niet alleen voor. Zoals ik in mijn dankwoord zal uitleggen hebben mijn 
begeleiders hier een cruciale rol gespeeld. Ik vergaarde kennis, kreeg inzicht en ging verbindingen 
zien. Op een gegeven moment kon ik ook de ‘wetenschappelijke informatiebron’ zelf verrijken 
door publicaties met betrekking tot mijn onderzoek. 
 
Het tweede belangrijke aspect was voor mij het verder ontwikkelen van professionele 
competenties, zoals: analytisch vermogen, schrijfvaardigheid, overtuigingskracht, creativiteit, 
samenwerken, resultaatgerichtheid, plannen en organiseren. Deze vaardigheden kunnen 
vervolgens weer worden toegepast op ieder nieuw onderwerp. Gedurende vier jaar heb ik deze 
vaardigheden mogen ontwikkelen. Een belangrijke leerervaring was voor mij dat perfectie niet 
het einddoel is. Ik werd mij meer en meer bewust van het belang om continue te blijven leren en 
mij te blijven ontwikkelen.  
 
Als laatste wil ik de veranderingen in mijn persoonlijk leven noemen. Dit was voor mij ook 
meteen de belangrijkste dimensie van dit promotieonderzoek. Je leert omgaan met vreugde 
wanneer een artikel is geaccepteerd, maar ook met teleurstelling omdat je net een e-mail hebt 
gekregen met de mededeling dat jouw artikel niet interessant genoeg wordt gevonden voor 
publicatie. In een promotieonderzoek is er altijd veel te doen. Je leert daarom keuzes te maken 
over welk onderzoek eerst moet worden uitgevoerd, maar ook een balans te vinden tussen werk 
en privé. Verder ontwikkel je je doorzettingsvermogen en moet je veel discipline hebben om in 
het weekend eerst je data te analyseren of minimaal een alinea te schrijven en dán pas te 
genieten van het mooie weer. Tot slot heb ik geleerd om ook veel geduld te hebben en op een 
diplomatieke manier redacteuren en beoordelaars van repliek te dienen. Zonder het eindeloze 
enthousiasme van mijn begeleiders was het mij niet gelukt om hierin belangrijke stappen te 
zetten. Een promotieonderzoek kan ik van harte aanraden. Ga ervoor, ook al kan het begin 
moeizaam zijn. Mijn ervaring is dat de weg naar het doel leerzaam en prachtig is en veel 
voldoening geeft. 
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EEN WOORD VAN DANK 
Een nawoord kan niet zonder een dankwoord. Vooral niet omdat ik samen met anderen aan dit 
promotieonderzoek heb gewerkt. Laat ik beginnen met mijn dank aan mijn promotores Prof. dr. 
Peter de Smet, Prof. dr. Michel Wensing, Prof. dr. Marcel Bouvy en mijn co-promotor dr. Patricia 
van den Bemt.  
 
Beste Peter, het begon met het REMEDIE project en het eerste artikel over afleverfouten. Een 
van je eerste adviezen was dat onderzoek doen ook flexibel kan en dat het helemaal niet erg is 
dat we aan het begin van het traject niet meteen het volledige einddoel zien. Een proefschrift kan 
een receptenboek zijn met een verzameling van verschillende goede recepten, in plaats van een 
roman met één verhaallijn. En je hebt gelijk! We hebben samen gewerkt aan een reeks van 
mooie onderzoeken die naast het dienen van de wetenschap ook waardevol zijn voor de 
dagelijkse apotheekpraktijk. Op persoonlijk vlak heb ik vooral van jou gezien hoe belangrijk 
empathie is. In Nijmegen vormden jij samen met Michel Wensing de dagelijkse begeleiding. Jullie 
waren de ideale coaches voor mij.  
 
Beste Michel, van jou heb ik veel geleerd van je methodologisch kennis. Zonder jouw advies 
startte ik geen onderzoek. Je doelgerichte aanpak en pragmatische benadering zorgden ervoor 
dat alles op rolletjes liep. Door jou bleven we bij de les tijdens onze overleggen.  
 
Beste Marcel, we hebben vanuit de SIR en Apotheek Stevenshof meerdere keren een 
onderzoekaanvraag ingediend. Uiteindelijk is het ons dan gelukt om samen door middel van dit 
promotieonderzoek een bijdrage te leveren aan de wetenschap. Ik heb veel waardering voor de 
tomeloze energie waarmee jij de apotheekpraktijk en de wetenschap combineert.   
 
Last but not least, beste Patricia, je was de laatste die aansloot in het begeleidingsteam, maar ik 
ben blij dat je hebt toegezegd om mee te werken aan dit promotieonderzoek. Jouw visie op het 
ziekenhuis en ervaringen in het classificeren van medicatie-incidenten waren van grote waarde 
bij de verschillende onderzoeken. Je was altijd snel met e-mails en het terugsturen van reacties. 
Je timemanagement en efficiency zijn waardevolle voorbeelden voor mij.  
 
De Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij ter bevordering der Pharmacie (KNMP) heeft mij 
ruimte gegeven om twee dagen in de week in het Radboud UMC te werken. Daarvoor wil ik de 
MT leden Leon Tinke,  Jean Hermans, dr. Frans van de Vaart en Remco Velasquez bedanken. Mijn 
speciale dank gaat daarbij uit naar dr. Frans van de Vaart, mijn afdelingsmanager. Frans, jij zorgt 
op de afdeling voor het juiste klimaat om onderzoek en praktijk bij elkaar te laten komen. Jouw 
eigen ervaring met promoveren en enthousiasme motiveerde mij om deze wetenschappelijke 
uitdaging aan te gaan. 
 
 Learning from medication errors through a nationwide reporting programme 
208 
A word of thanks to the members of the International Medication Safety Network (IMSN). We 
exchanged valuable experience about reporting medication errors in different countries. I very 
much appreciated the patient safety conferences, IMSN meetings and hospitality of the host 
countries. A special word of thanks to Michael Cohen (ISMP USA), dr. David Cousins (NHS 
England) and David U (ISMP Canada) for their valuable contributions to several studies and 
providing extremely useful feedback with respect to my research.  
 
Voor een aantal publicaties wil ik de co-auteurs bedanken voor het meeschrijven en 
becommentariëren: dr. David Cousins, Prof. dr. Rob Pieters, Maarten Torringa, Arianne van Rhijn, 
dr. Rienk Tamminga, en Willem van der Veen. 
 
In Nijmegen zat ik samen met twee mede-promovendi, Willemijn Eppenga en Margreet Warlé-
van Herwaarden, in een noodgebouw. Het noodgebouw was té koud of té warm, maar gelukkig 
compenseerde onze gezelligheid deze onaangename situatie. We doorliepen hetzelfde traject 
van “ups” en “downs”, maar als ik terugkijk heb ik eigenlijk alleen mooie herinneringen. Binnen 
het Radboud UMC wil ik de collega’s van IQ healthcare bedanken. Ondanks dat ik voor een 
andere organisatie werk, kreeg ik een warm welkom. Veel dank ook aan Jolanda van Haren voor 
het verzorgen van de layout van mijn proefschrift. Beste Jolanda, ik zal vooral de lunches met jou 
gaan missen; het was altijd vreselijk gezellig! De afdeling klinische farmacie van het Radboud 
UMC wil ik bedanken voor het mede-financieren van publicaties, een congresbezoek en het 
drukken van het proefschrift.   
 
De levendige belangstelling en betrokkenheid van mijn collega’s van de KNMP in dit 
promotieonderzoek laat de intrinsieke verwevenheid zien van de apotheekpraktijk en de 
wetenschap. Ik wil jullie bedanken voor jullie steun en medeleven. Extra aandacht verdienen mijn 
directe collega’s van de afdeling beroepsontwikkeling / zorgonderzoek en innovatie. Ik wil twee 
collega’s speciaal noemen: Brigit van Soest en Prof. dr. Peter de Smet. Samen hebben we de 
subsidieaanvraag van het actieprogramma Maatschappelijke Sectoren en ICT voor het REMEDIE-
project ingediend. Al tijdens het schrijven van het voorstel heb ik veel geleerd. De toekenning van 
de subsidie was het begin van een succesvolle samenwerking.   
 
Zonder de subsidie van het actieprogramma Maatschappelijke Sectoren en ICT zou de uitbreiding 
van de CMR niet in een stroomversnelling terecht zijn gekomen. Met de subsidie hebben we de 
CMR technisch kunnen aanpassen zodat ziekenhuizen, openbare apotheken en GGZ instellingen 
zich konden aansluiten op de CMR. Vanuit het actieprogramma Maatschappelijke Sectoren en ICT 
kregen we begeleiding van Jacques Frankhuizen en Hans Haveman. Jacques en Hans, bedankt 
voor jullie fantastische begeleiding en het organiseren van de netwerkbijeenkomsten waarbij 
waardevolle ervaringen werden uitgewisseld.  
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Voor de technische advisering wil ik Rutger Haagsma en Peter van der Meer van Ritense BV 
bedanken. Software en techniek zijn nu geen vreemden meer voor mij. We hebben een goede 
basis gelegd voor het CMR systeem.  
 
Dit onderzoek was zeker niet gelukt zonder medewerking van Hayo Graatsma, Henriëtte 
Leenders, David Opstelten, Arianne van Rhijn, en Jacqueline Santen-Reestman van de Stichting 
Portaal voor Patiëntveiligheid / CMR. Ik ben trots dat dit proefschrift de Stichting Portaal voor 
Patiëntveiligheid / CMR houvast biedt om de patiëntveiligheid verder te verbeteren door melding 
van medicatie-incidenten. Het beschikbaar stellen van het meldsysteem en de anonieme 
meldingen vormden één van de pilaren van dit proefschrift. Veel dank gaat uit naar de 
apothekers en apothekersassistenten die werkzaam zijn in ziekenhuizen en openbare apotheken 
voor het melden van medicatie-incidenten. Arianne en Jacqueline, het was leerzaam om met 
jullie op een intensieve manier de meldingen te analyseren en te classificeren. En ook geweldig 
leuk!  
 
Mijn eerste onderzoeksproject tijdens mijn studie ging over de rol en meerwaarde van de 
apotheker (PharmValue). Hiermee werd mijn interesse in onderzoek gewekt. Prof. dr. Kees de 
Blaey, jou wil ik bedanken voor jouw voorstel om het onderzoek bij dr. Dick Tromp in Kampen te 
doen. Dick, je bent het boegbeeld van het in de praktijk brengen van de farmaceutische 
patiëntenzorg. Jouw begeleiding beviel mij zo goed dat ik na mijn onderzoeksproject ook stage in 
Apotheek Flevowijk heb gelopen. Daar heb ik gezien hoeveel voldoening het geeft om in een 
apotheek te werken. Veel dank hiervoor.  
 
Na mijn opleiding kreeg ik de kans om praktijkervaring en onderzoekservaring op te doen in 
Apotheek Stevenshof en SIR Institute for Pharmacy Practice and Policy te Leiden. Mijn 
registratiefase als openbaar apotheker in Apotheek Stevenshof was leerzaam en vormde de basis 
voor mijn enthousiasme voor farmaceutische patiëntenzorg. Ik pluk nog steeds de vruchten van 
de daar opgedane ervaring. Veel dank aan de apothekers, apothekersassistenten, onderzoekers 
en medewerkers van Apotheek Stevenshof en SIR. Ik kijk nog vaak terug in hét boek!  
 
Tot slot wil ik nog mijn vrienden en familie noemen. Naast de emotionele steun zorgden zij voor 
een gezonde afwisseling tussen werk en privé. Ik heb genoten van het lekkere eten en de wijn, 
maar vooral van de geanimeerde gesprekken. In het kader van dit proefschrift staat één diner 
centraal: het ‘stellingendiner’. Het stellingendiner had als doel om tot ‘leuke’ stellingen te komen. 
Het resultaat was een muur vol post-it van negen vrienden die het proefschrift hebben gelezen. 
Dank voor jullie suggesties: Alexander Case, Fleur de Lima, Robin Micka, Frank Peusen, Ewoud 
Roos, Pieter Stillebroer, Frans-Anton Vermast, Remco Vervoorn, en Niels Voeten.  
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Thessa en Melle Bakker zorgden altijd voor spontane dim sum lunches op zondag. Ik kijk al weer 
uit naar de volgende lunch! Carlijn Kneepkens, beste Carlijn, ik houd het kort maar jij begrijpt 
gewoon waarom ik je hier noem. Frank Peusen, beste Frank, de ‘tweede’ Limburger in mijn 
vriendenkring. Onze vakgebieden hebben niet een één-op-één verband met elkaar maar jouw 
inzichten en kennis waren relevant. Astrid Homan en Brigit Homan, veel dank voor het meelezen. 
Maar jullie gaven mij meer dan dat: inspiratie voor het professionele en persoonlijke leven. 
Andrea en Jeroen Dudley Owen, dank voor de tijd in het mooie Melbourne en de gastvrijheid. Ik 
heb daardoor met plezier aan dit hoofdstuk kunnen schrijven.  
 
Mijn paranimfen, Frank Peusen en Remco Vervoorn, ik ben dankbaar dat jullie hebben toegezegd 
om mijn paranimfen te zijn. Jullie ondersteuning, adviezen en luisterend oor kwamen goed van 
pas tijdens de voorbereiding van de verdediging.  
 
De nodige afwisseling kwam ook van de (oud-) bestuursleden van de Universiteit Utrecht 
Alumninetwerk regio Den Haag, Expertisecentrum Farmaceutische Zorg Departement 
Haaglanden (oud-Departement ’s-Gravenhage van de KNMP), de vrienden van de Utrecht Tafel 
en de vrienden van de TGIF groep. Het deed mij goed dat ik even iets anders kon doen en in alle 
gevallen werden lezingen, borrels, gala’s, diners en uitjes (o.a. Parijs!) gecombineerd met 
aangenaam of dansend gezelschap. 
 
Anneke Booij. Beste Anneke, we leerden elkaar kennen in Kampen. Jij werkte toen bij dr. Dick 
Tromp en ik kwam onderzoek doen. Helaas kan jij de verdediging van dit promotieonderzoek niet 
meer meemaken. Je toonde veel belangstelling voor mijn onderzoek en het was altijd fijn om met 
jou over farmacie te praten. Je blijft in mijn herinnering als de fijne vrouw die je was.  
 
Vrienden die ik om allerlei redenen wil noemen en bedanken: Nils Bakker, Luc Besançon, Robert 
van den Bos, Stefan de Bruijn, Helena Chon, Kirsty Chu, Niels van Daal, Marcel Dekker, Sapna 
Goedan, Jonathan van der Geer, Remco Groenewold, Bart-Jan Hoedemaker, Reshma Jagernath, 
Karin Janssen, Martine Kruijtbosch, Fufit Lee, Constant Mouton, Rogier Mulder, Gar Yein Ng, 
Christian Pahlplatz, Jan-Willen Postema, Cecil Ravesloot, Eva van Roode, Dewi Rosalina, Mark 
Rutgers van der Loeff, Just Schimmelpenninck, Corinne Schouten, Ruben Senden, Virgil 
Sewberath Misser, Hans Verbeek, Huug van den Wall Bake, Benjamin Wesseling, en Joris 
Wouters. Na de verdediging is er weer tijd en ruimte om samen te eten en bij te praten. Ik zal dan 
koken!  
 
Ka-Pui, mijn lieve zusje, je hebt je draai en je liefde – Tim Long – gevonden in London en gelukkig 
overbrugt de digitale wereld de afstand. Jouw adviezen en ervaringen uit de financiële wereld 
bleken leerzaam en toepasbaar in de farmacie. Tenslotte dank ik mijn ouders die mij het leven 
hebben gegeven en zoveel meer. 
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致謝詞 
我親愛的妹妹嘉佩，你跟Tim_Long在倫敦找到了彼此，開展人生新一頁。幸好，數碼世界
縮短人與人之間的距離。感謝所有人的建議，而我們在各自的專業領域—金融與藥劑—
找到共鳴。最後感謝父母生下了我，給我無限支持。 
 
Ka-Chun 
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Ka-Chun Cheung was born on 18 February 1978 in Roosendaal, The Netherlands. In 1997 he 
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One of the strategies to enhance patient safety is the spontaneous 
reporting and analysis of medication errors. Sharing this information 
with other healthcare providers will help to prevent the reoccurrence 
of similar medication errors. In The Netherlands medication errors 
can be reported to a nationwide reporting programme named Central 
Medication incidents Registration (CMR). The research in this thesis 
focuses on the usefulness of the CMR as a patient safety-enhancing 
tool for healthcare providers. Three domains in this programme are 
highlighted: (1) furthering the input of data to the CMR; (2) basics of 
the CMR database and exploration of different analytic methods; and 
(3) the creation and uptake of relevant output.
